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1903 DIGILAW 29 (CAL)

Annada Sundari Chandalini v. Kebulram Changa

1903-02-06

body1903
JUDGMENT 1. We have had some difficulty in ascertaining what were the findings of the Courts in this case, whether it was found that the Plaintiff's suit was to recover possession by reason of a title acquired from an auction-purchase of the rights of an occupancy-raiyat, such transfer having been recognised by some of the landlords, or whether his suit was to recover possession solely on a settlement made with him by some of the landlords shareholders after the relinquishment of the occupancy-tenant. We have, however, come to the conclusion that the trial was held on the findings of the first Court that the Plaintiffs suit was to recover possession as occupancy-tenant by reason of his purchase of such rights at a sale in execution of decree, and that he had obtained a recognition of such transfer by some of the landlords co-sharers in the property. The first Court found that the title so acquired was in respect only of an eight annas share of the occupancy right, inasmuch as it was not proved to the satisfaction of the Munsif that the recognition had been by landlords of a larger share. But the first Court, in considering whether the suit was barred by limitation, held that it came within the terms of Schedule III of the Bengal Tenancy Act inasmuch as it was a suit to recover possession of lands claimed by the Plaintiff as an occupancy-raiyat, and that, not having been brought within two years from the date of dispossession, the suit was barred. On appeal by the Plaintiff, the Subordinate Judge held that the suit was not barred inasmuch as the dispossession being by the landlords of only a fractional share of the property, the limitation provided by the Bengal Tenancy Act would not apply. The only reported case on this subject is that of Parameswar Nomosudra v. Kali Mohun Nomosudra 4 C. W. N. 801 : s. c. I. L. R. 28 Cal. 127 (1900). The only reported case on this subject is that of Parameswar Nomosudra v. Kali Mohun Nomosudra 4 C. W. N. 801 : s. c. I. L. R. 28 Cal. 127 (1900). It seems doubtful whether, from the nature of the case then before the learned Judges, this can be properly regarded as an authority on the subject inasmuch as it contained only an instruction to the lower Court how the case should be dealt with after remand ; and the opinion so expressed professed to proceed moreover on the judgment of a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Joolmutty Bewa v. Kali Prosunno Roy 4 C. W. N. 903, note : s. c. I. L. R. 28 Cal. 127, note (1894) reported in a note in the same page. But the Judges constituting the Full Bench refused to consider the point referred to it and, therefore, as we understand the case, it cannot be accepted as an authority at all. What we have to consider in the present case is whether the suit is barred by limitation within the terms of Sch. III of the Bengal Tenancy Act. As dealt with by the first Court--and we understand the judgment of the lower Appellate Court to be in concurrence with that of the first Court on the merits of the case--the suit is no doubt in the terms of the limitation expressed in the Bengal Tenancy Act, inasmuch as it is a suit to recover possession of land claimed by the Plaintiff as an occupancy-raiyat, and the only question in doubt seems to be whether the fact that only some of the co-sharers have dispossessed the Plaintiff who claimed to be an occupancy-raiyat under them would affect the operation of this special law of limitation. This special limitation is no doubt restricted to suits between persons occupying the position of landlord and tenant, for, it is in regard to such relations that the Act has been designed. It seems to us, having regard to this fact, that it is of no consequence whether the ejectment was by some co-sharers or by the entire body of landlords. In this view, we think that the suit is barred and that consequently the judgment of the lower Appellate Court must be set aside and that of the first Court which dismissed the suit restored. In this view, we think that the suit is barred and that consequently the judgment of the lower Appellate Court must be set aside and that of the first Court which dismissed the suit restored. The Defendant will be entitled to receive the costs of this Court and of the lower Appellate Court.