Judgement Four Consolidated Appeals from two decrees of the High Court (July 18, 1898) affirming two decrees of the Subordinate Judge of Madura West (Sept. 29, 1894) which dismissed the suit of the appellant Abdul Aziz Khan and the other appellants associated with him as plaintiffs, and decreed the suit of the respondent bank as against the zemindar of Kannivadi and his sons. The first suit was brought to enforce the title of Abdul Aziz Khan (his co-plaintiffs being purchasers from him), which was that of a purchaser of twelve villages of the zemindari sold in 1873 and 1876 in execution of decrees against Bangaru, the former zemindar. To that suit Appayasami Naicker, the present zemindar, and his sons pleaded that Bangaru was only entitled to the net usufruct of the estate during his life, with power to charge the same only for purposes beneficial to the estate or necessary for the family, without " power to alienate any portion of the estate for a term expiring beyond his lifetime," basing this contention both upon " the tenure upon which the estate is held " and upon "the custom of the family." They contended further that they were not bound by the debts alleged to have been incurred by the said Bangaru, nor by the Court sales made in execution of the decrees passed against him in respect of such debts; and that the right, title, and interest sold ceased with Bangarus death, and that the estate then passed to the first defendant, Appayasami, by survivorship. They contended further that only a life interest "was intended to be sold by the Court, and bargained for and purchased " by Abdul Aziz Khan for a " sum of Rs. 6,980-4," who was at the time of sale, and subsequently, " fully aware that what he bargained for and purchased was only the right, title, and interest of this defendants late undivided brother in the plaint villages as aforesaid," and that "he is estopped by his conduct from bringing the present suit." The Commercial Bank and others were added as defendants claiming title under mortgages executed by Appayasami after his succession to the zemindari on the death of his brother Bangaru in 1881 without issue. The second suit was brought by the Commercial Bank to enforce their rights under the mortgages executed by Appayasami. The second suit was brought by the Commercial Bank to enforce their rights under the mortgages executed by Appayasami. It raised the same issue as between the same parties as in the former suit, in reference to the title conferred upon Aziz Khan by the execution sales in 1873 and 1876. Upon this issue the first Court held " that the uniform course of decisions in this Presidency before the ruling in 10 Allahabad, 272, was that acts and alienations by the holder of an impartible zemindari made to enure beyond his lifetime will, if otherwise than bon& fide, and if prejudicial to the family, be set aside; his acts and alienations are good for his life, but not beyond it, and that series of decisions in this Presidency established the practice above referred to. Until very lately it was the settled usage of those provinces of India which administer Mitakshara law that the holder of an ancestral impartible estate could not alien or incumber it beyond his own life so as to bind his coparceners, except for purposes beneficial to the family and not merely to himself." It added "In deciding this issue as to what was attached, bargained for, sold, and purchased by the first plaintiff, we must be guided only by the prevailing law at that time. Nobody could have expected then what the Privy Council decided thirteen years afterwards. The Courts and parties must have proclaimed for sale and sold only what right, title, and interest the judgment debtor had in the property according to the law then in force. In deciding upon the intention of the parties, I must .... find that the life interest of the judgment debtor was alone sold and purchased by plaintiff. Nobody could have dreamt or thought of what was to happen thirteen years afterwards . . . . In deciding upon the intention of the parties, I must .... find that the life interest of the judgment debtor was alone sold and purchased by plaintiff. Nobody could have dreamt or thought of what was to happen thirteen years afterwards . . . . The conduct of the plaintiffs and the low price paid for this large estate of immense value referred to in the arguments fully support my finding on the intentions of the parties." The High Court referred to a judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to the effect " that what the Courts have to do in such cases as this is to determine ‘the question of fact whether the thing meant to be sold and bought was the entirety of the estate or only a share in it’" Rai Babu Mahabir Pershad v. Rai Markunda Nath Sahai (( 1889) L. R 17 Ind. Ap. 11, 14.); Simbhunath Panday v. Golab Singh (( 1887) L. R. 14 Ind. Ap. 77.) ; and Pettachi Chettiar v. Sangili Veera Pandia (( 1887) L. R. 14 Ind. Ap. 84.) ; and they added " That being so, we have no hesitation in concurring in the conclusion at which the Subordinate Judge has arrived—namely, that the estate sold and bought by the appellants was only the life estate of the zemindar, and determined with his death. The law, as then understood, gave the zemindar no more than a life estate, and the ridiculously low price given for the property purchased indicates that it was only a limited estate that was sold. The first plaintiff would not venture into the witness-box to swear to the truth of his case that he understood he was buying the villages out and out." Phillips, for the appellant in two appeals, namely, Abdul Aziz Khan (the appellants in two other appeals did not appear), contended that Bangaru was entitled to dispose absolutely of the zemindari see Rani Sartaj Kuari v. Rani Deoraj Kuari (( 1888) L. R. 15 Ind. Ap. 51.) and Raja Rao Venkata v. Court of Wards. (( 1899) L. R. 26 Ind. Ap. Ap. 51.) and Raja Rao Venkata v. Court of Wards. (( 1899) L. R. 26 Ind. Ap. 83.) It is said that the view of the law prevailing in 1873 and 1876 was the reverse of that laid down in the two cases cited, and that an impartible zemindari was by that view only alienable for the life of the holder except under special circumstances not shewn to exist in this case. That view is not proved to have existed; and if it did, it was erroneous and did not govern the effect or operation of the sales in question see Act VIII. of 1859, s. 249, which was the Civil Procedure Code in force at the date of sale. The right, title, and interest sold was the title actually, and according to the correct view of the law, vested in Bangaru. There is no sufficient evidence that the sales in question were intended by the Courts making them to pass any less interest than the full legal title of Bangaru, whatever that might be. Nor is there any evidence that the bidders were acquainted with that intention, if it existed. And the cases referred to in the judgment of the High Court were all cases in which the question in the appeal was whether the interest of the judgment debtor was alone sold in execution, or whether more than that share was sold, as it might have been under certain circumstances. There was no question in those cases, or in any other case, as to whether less than the judgment debtors interest was sold, or as to the effect upon a sale of an erroneous view of the law prevailing at the time. It is now settled that an impartible estate is alienable absolutely and not merely for life, and is consequently at the disposal of the Court in execution. The judgment creditor was entitled to have that entire estate sold, if necessary. The question is whether less than the whole of the interest which Bangaru really had passed by the sale. Even assuming the Court and the parties to have thought that he had a less interest, and that the decisions of the Madras Presidency warranted that view, still his actual right, title, and interest was sold, whatever it might turn out to be. Even assuming the Court and the parties to have thought that he had a less interest, and that the decisions of the Madras Presidency warranted that view, still his actual right, title, and interest was sold, whatever it might turn out to be. The purchaser has to take the risk of its turning out to be of no value, no title being warranted. It was further submitted that the question as to what passed by the execution sales was in this case a question of law. There was no ambiguity in th description of the property; there is no question now that the description in its terms covers the entire and absolute interest; there is no question as to its covering more than the property absolutely at the disposal of the judgment debtor. Consequently the legal operation of the sale was to pass whatever interest the judgment debtor actually had in the pro perty, unless such operation was precluded by the use of an appropriate description of the interest sold, specifically limiting it to something less than his full interest. Mayne, and De Gruyther, for the Commercial Bank, contended that both Courts were right in holding that only Bangarus life interest in the villages in question passed by the execution sales to Abdul Aziz Khan. It was not seriously disputed that at the dates of those sales it was the settled law as administered by the Courts in Madras that the holder of an impartible zemindari, who was himself a member of an undivided family, could not aliene or incumber it beyond his own life so as to bind his coparcener except for purposes beneficial to the family. In fact, the case of Pettachi Chettiar v. Sangili Veera Pandia (L. R. 14 Ind. Ap. 84.) shews that that was the opinion of the Privy Council as well as of all the Indian Courts down to the date of L. R. 15 Ind. Ap. 51. As a matter of law, therefore, Bangarus estate was not alienable at the date of the sales except for his own life according to the prevailing interpretation of that law at the time; and the doctrine of Sartaj Kuaris Case (L. R. 15 Ind. Ap. 51.) could not be applied retrospectively;. Then there is the question of fact—What was intended by the Courts to be sold at the execution sales ? Ap. 51.) could not be applied retrospectively;. Then there is the question of fact—What was intended by the Courts to be sold at the execution sales ? Obviously it was that title which alone vested in Bangaru according to the established doctrines. They sold whatever right, title, and interest he possessed according to the law as then understood—not what might have been sold under an alteration in the law as subsequently declared. The purchaser also must. be deemed to have so intended to buy and to have so understood the transaction, and he has not given evidence to the contrary. Reference was made to Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lall (( 1874) L. R. 1 Ind. Ap. 321.); Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh (( 1877) L. R. 4 Ind. Ap. 247.); Baboo Hurdey Narain Sahu v. Pundit Rooder Perkash Misser (( 1883) L. R. 11 Ind. Ap. 26.); Mussamut Nanomi Babuasin v. Modun Mohun (( 1885) L. R. 18 Ind. Ap. 1.); Meenakshi Naidu v. Immudi Kanaka Ramaya (( 1888) L. R. 16 Ind. Ap. 1.); Rai Babu Mahabir Pershad v. Markunda Nath Sahai. (L. R. 17 Ind. Ap. 11, 14, 16.) It is a question of fact in each case, and here the property was sold at a very low price, shewing the view taken by all parties as to the limited extent of Bangarus alienable interest Beresford v. Ramasubba. (( 1889) Ind. L. R. 15 Madr. 197.) Phillips replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR ANDREW SCOBLE. These appeals were heard together, as the decision in all depends upon the same point. The material facts may be very shortly stated. Bangaru, who succeeded to the zemindari of Kannivadi, in the Madras Presidency, in the year 1852 was a member of a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law. The zemindari is an impartible estate, the succession to which is regulated by the custom of primogeniture, and upon the death of Bangaru, on February 9, 1881, without male issue, his brother Appayasami succeeded to the zemindari. The zemindari is an impartible estate, the succession to which is regulated by the custom of primogeniture, and upon the death of Bangaru, on February 9, 1881, without male issue, his brother Appayasami succeeded to the zemindari. Bangaru had found the estate heavily incumbered; and after endeavouring for some years, without much success, to manage it through agents, he executed on July 20, 1861, an instrument by which he transferred to one Adimulam for thirty years the possession and management of the whole zemindari, with the exception of three hill villages, in order to secure the regular payment of the Government demand, the gradual reduction of existing debts, and a modest income for himself. Having made this arrangement, Bangaru proceeded to incur fresh liabilities, and in 1870 and 1871 numerous suits were brought against him, and money decrees obtained by creditors. Two of these were transferred to the appellant Abdul Aziz Khan. The first, dated March 18, 1870, was for Rs. 5264 15a. 9p., with interest and costs; and the second, dated March 7, 1871, for Rs. 20,904 9a., with interest and costs. In execution of these decrees twelve villages of the zemindari were attached and sold by order of the District Court of Madura, and were purchased by the appellant above named for a total sum of Rs. 7010. The certificate of sale of seven villages is dated on March 7, 1873, and that of the remaining five villages on March 22, 1876. In both cases what was purchased was expressed on the face of the certificate to be " the right, title, and interest" possessed by the defendant Bangaru in the properties mentioned. As has been already stated, Bangaru died without issue in 1881, and on April 23 in that year the respondent Appayasami (since deceased) filed a suit against Adimulam and others to set aside the instrument of July 20, 1861, as not binding upon him for reasons given in the plaint. The District Judge found that it was not binding as a lease, but was binding as a mortgage, and, after taking an account of what was due to Adimulam as mortgagee, passed a decree in his favour for Rs. 1,87,835 with interest. Upon appeal to the High Court at Madras, this decree was affirmed with the exception that the sum payable to the mortgagee was reduced to Rs. 1,20,000. 1,87,835 with interest. Upon appeal to the High Court at Madras, this decree was affirmed with the exception that the sum payable to the mortgagee was reduced to Rs. 1,20,000. To satisfy this decree and redeem the property, Appayasami borrowed money from various persons, whose claims are now represented by the respondent, the Commercial Bank of India. On July 20, 1891, the term of thirty years reserved in the conveyance to Adimulam expired, and the appellant Abdul Aziz Khan brought a suit to recover possession of the twelve villages which he had purchased at the Court sales before mentioned from Appayasami, whom he alleged to be in wrongful possession of them. Appayasami in his written statement asserted that all that was attached and sold in execution of the money decrees held by the appellant u was the right, title, and interest of the deceased Bangaru, and that such right, title, and interest ceased with his death." Of the numerous issues raised, the most important was the sixth, namely, " Whether what was attached, bargained for, sold, and purchased by the” (appellant) "was only the life interest of the deceased Bangaru?” The Civil Procedure Code of 1859, which was in force at the time of the execution sales, "required that property sold in execution should be described as the right, title, and interest of the judgment debtor, and it has been held in many cases that the presence of these words in the sale certificate is consistent with the sale of every interest which the judgment debtor might have sold " Mahabir Pershad v. Markunda Nath Sahai. (L. R. 17 Ind. Ap. 11, at p. 16.) Each case, however, must depend upon its own circumstances, and "in all the cases, at least the recent cases, the inquiry has been what the parties contracted about if there was a conveyance, or that the purchaser had reason to think he was buying if there was no conveyance, but only a sale in execution of a money decree" Simbhunath Panday v. Golab Singh. (L. R. 14 Ind. Ap. 77, at p. 83.) As Lord Watson puts it in the course of the argument in the case of Pettachi Chettiar v. Sangili Veera Pandia (L. R. 14 Ind. Ap. (L. R. 14 Ind. Ap. 77, at p. 83.) As Lord Watson puts it in the course of the argument in the case of Pettachi Chettiar v. Sangili Veera Pandia (L. R. 14 Ind. Ap. 84, at p. 85.), in the case of a sale in execution of a money decree, " the questions are, what did the Court intend to sell, and what did the purchaser understand that he bought?" These are questions of fact, or rather of mixed law and fact, and must be determined according to the evidence in the particular case. In the present case it is not disputed that Bangaru and his brother constituted an undivided Hindu family, and that the debts in respect of which the decrees were made were not debts for which the joint estate was liable, if it passed by survivorship to the younger brother. "What then was the extent of the interest held in the estate by Bangaru in his brothers lifetime, and which he was entitled to charge in favour of a personal creditor ? As regards the law of the matter in 1873 and 1876, when the sales took place, it was the accepted law in Madras that the holder of an impartible zemindari, who was himself a member of an undivided family, could not alienate or incumber the corpus of the estate so as to bind his coparceners, except for justifiable especial causes. Prior to 1889 there had been a series of decisions to this effect in the Madras Courts; but in that year, following the judgment of this Committee in the case of Rani Sartaj Kuari v. Rani Deoraj Kuari (L. R. 15 Ind. Ap. 51.), the High Court of Madras overruled those decisions (Beresford v. Ramasubba (Ind. L. R. 13 Madr. 197.)); and it has recently been held by this Committee in the case of Raja Rao Venkata v. Court of Wards (L. R. 26 Ind. Ap. 83.) that impartible zemindaris in the Presidency of Madras are not inalienable in the absence of proof of some special family custom or tenure attaching to the zemindari, and having that effect. This reversal of the previously accepted interpretation of the law does not, in their Lordships opinion, displace its application to the construction of the contracts contained in the certificates of sale now under consideration. This reversal of the previously accepted interpretation of the law does not, in their Lordships opinion, displace its application to the construction of the contracts contained in the certificates of sale now under consideration. " The rights of the parties to a contract," as Willes J. observes in delivering the judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber in Lloyd v. Guibert (( 1865) 6 B. & S. 100, at p. 133.), " are to be judged of by that law which they intended, or rather by which they may justly be presumed to have bound themselves." Their Lordships agree with the Courts below in holding that in 1873 and 1876, when the sales took place, the parties must be taken to be bound by the law as it was at that time understood, and that the estate purchased by the appellant was only the life interest of the then zemindar. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that these appeals should be dismissed, and the decrees of the High Court at Madras confirmed. Munhar Das and his co-appellants have not appeared before their Lordships in support of their appeals. Their Lordships will accordingly order them to pay the costs of those appeals incurred by the Commercial Bank of India, the only respondent who has appeared. The banks costs of the other two appeals must be paid by Abdul Aziz Khan, the appellant therein.