Judgement Appeal from a decree of the above Court (May 10, 1899) affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Hardoi (May 26, 1896). The suit was brought to recover certain villages which were in the possession of Imtiaz Fatima when she died on December 19, 1894, on the allegation that she was in possession as absolute owner, and that on her death the estate, of which the appellants had taken unlawful possession, devolved by the Mahomedan law of inheritance upon the plaintiffs as her brother and sister. The plaint alleged in effect that Imtiaz Fatima was at her death the absolute proprietor of the estate in suit as the surviving widow of Murtaza Bakhsh, who died in 1865, and that the plaintiffs were her heirs. The written statements pleaded that on the preparation of the lists of taluqdars under s. 8, Act I. of 49 Law Rep. 31 Ind. App. 30 ( 1903- 1904) Mohammad Abdussamad V. Kurban Husain 150 1869, the name of Murtaza Bakhsh was entered in lists 1 and 3, list 1 being a list of all persons who were to be considered taluqdars within the meaning of the Act; and list 3 being " A list of the taluqdars not included in the second of such lists to whom sanads or grants have been or may be given or made by the British Government up to the date fixed for the closing of such lists, declaring that the succession to the estates comprised in such sanads or grants shall thereafter be regulated by the rule of primogeniture." It was urged that s. 10, Act I. of 1869, provided that the Courts shall take judicial notice of the said lists, and shall regard them as conclusive evidence that the persons named therein are such taluqdars; while s. 22 provided a special rule of descent for taluqdars, whose names were entered in list 3, which under the circumstances of this case carried the estate to the widows for life, with reversion to the heirs of the husband as that term is interpreted by the Act. The appellants accordingly contended that on the death of Murtaza Bakhsh the estate vested in the widows for life, and that on the death of Mussammat Imtiaz Fatima, they, as next heirs of her husband, were entitled to succeed. The appellants accordingly contended that on the death of Murtaza Bakhsh the estate vested in the widows for life, and that on the death of Mussammat Imtiaz Fatima, they, as next heirs of her husband, were entitled to succeed. The plaintiffs in their replication pleaded that no sanad had ever been granted to Murtaza Bakhsh; that the entry of his name in the lists of taluqdars was ultra vires and made by inadvertence, in consequence of which, the provisions of s. 10, Act I. of 1869 notwithstanding, he was not a taluqdar within the meaning of the Act. They next urged that, Murtaza Bakhsh having died on January 18, 1865, prior to the passing of Act I. of 1869, the succession could not be governed by the provisions of that Act; that on his death the estate vested in his heirs as indicated by the Mahomedan law, and was not divested by the passing of the Act. They further contended that his mother and two widows had by adverse possession acquired a title as against the right heirs of Murtaza Bakhsh, and that on the death of the first widow in 1888, Imtiaz Fatima, as the surviving joint tenant, became sole absolute owner of the entire estate. The judge of the First Court decreed in favour of the respondents for one-half of the property in dispute. He held that Murtazas heirs, as ascertained by the ordinary Mahomedan law, were entitled at his death, and found that his mother held possession as absolute owner adversely to the appellants; that after her death his two widows held similar possession with equal shares. He held that on the death of the first widow her half-share devolved by inheritance under Mahomedan law on the appellants; and that on the death of the second widow, Imtiaz, her half-share, which had been in her possession for more than twelve years adversely to the appellants, devolved upon the respondents. He held that on the death of the first widow her half-share devolved by inheritance under Mahomedan law on the appellants; and that on the death of the second widow, Imtiaz, her half-share, which had been in her possession for more than twelve years adversely to the appellants, devolved upon the respondents. The judgment appealed from affirming this decision was concluded as follows— " As Murtaza Bakhshs estate had lawfully vested in persons who were his heirs under the ordinary Mahomedan law of inheritance, and who were not his heirs within the meaning of Act I. of 1869 before that Act came into force, the provisions of s. 22 cannot be applied to the succession, and it is unnecessary to consider the effect of the entry of Murtaza Bakhshs name in list 3 in connection with the provisions of s. 10. It appears to me, however, that the contention of the learned counsel for the defendants has much force, namely, that the entry of Murtaza Bakhshs name in list 3 is, by s. 10, conclusive evidence that he was not only a taluqdar, but also a taluqdar to whom a sanad had been given by the British Government, declaring that the succession to the estates comprised in the sanad should thereafter be regulated by the rule of primogeniture. But we are at once faced with this difficulty— that as no sanad was as a matter of fact given to him, it is impossible to ascertain the estates the succession to which is to be regulated by the rules of primogeniture. It appears to me that the rule of succession enacted in s. 22 is, in the case of a taluqdar whose name is entered in list 3, applicable only to the estates comprised in the sanad. " In the case of Shankar Bakhsh v. Hardeo Bakhsh (L. R. 16 Ind. Ap. 71.) their Lordships of the 49 Law Rep. 31 Ind. App. 30 ( 1903- 1904) Mohammad Abdussamad V. Kurban Husain 151 Privy Council held that an entry in list 3 had been improperly made, and, notwithstanding the provisions of s. 10, did not give effect to it. Ap. 71.) their Lordships of the 49 Law Rep. 31 Ind. App. 30 ( 1903- 1904) Mohammad Abdussamad V. Kurban Husain 151 Privy Council held that an entry in list 3 had been improperly made, and, notwithstanding the provisions of s. 10, did not give effect to it. That was a case in which the first summary settlement of 1856 had been made with the three sons of Daryao Singh, the then head a sanad had been issued in 1859 in the terms of that settlement, and of Daryao Singhs reply to the circular of 1860 ; there was a family arrangement by which the estate was treated as one owned by the members of the family as co-sharers; a second sanad was subsequently given to Daryao Singh on October 11, 1860, containing the rule of primogeniture, although Daryao Singh had stated that he was satisfied with the previous sanad, and that he did not wish to have a sanad according to the law of primogeniture; and in 1869, when the lists were prepared, the name of Daryao Singh, then deceased, was entered in list 3, notwithstanding that his three sons had expressed a wish that their names should be so entered. Having regard to these facts, their Lordships found it impossible to attach importance to the proceeding by which the name of Daryao Singh was entered in list 3, and held that there was an improper entry in that list. " Similarly, in the present case I think that importance cannot be attached to the entry of Murtaza Bakhshs name in list 3, and that his name was improperly entered in that list. " His application for a sanad had been rejected by the Chief Commissioner in 1862, on the ground that he was not a proper person to receive such a document. The learned counsel for the defendants admitted that his clients were unable to shew that any circular regarding the succession to the estates of taluqdars wasissued to him. It is admitted that no sanad was given to him. He had died in 1865, and his estate had then vested in his heirs under the ordinary Mahomedan law. The learned counsel for the defendants admitted that his clients were unable to shew that any circular regarding the succession to the estates of taluqdars wasissued to him. It is admitted that no sanad was given to him. He had died in 1865, and his estate had then vested in his heirs under the ordinary Mahomedan law. There is no evidence that any inquiries were made from the members of the family at the time of the preparation of the lists." Ross, for the appellants, contended that the Courts below were wrong in holding that s. 22 of Act I. of 1869 did not apply to the estate of Murtaza Bakhsh. Although he had no sanad, the kabulyat executed at the time of settlement was equivalent thereto. Sect. 10 of Act I. of 1869 was conclusive on the subject of the entry of his name in the lists under s. 8. According to the true construction and intention of the Act, the succession to his estate was governed in consequence by s. 22 and not by s. 23, and the line of succession directed by the statute must be followed in preference to that indicated by the ordinary Mahomedan law. He referred to ss. 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, and 22 of the Act, and to the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, ss. 4, 112, 113; also to Brij Indar Bahadur Singh v. Ranee Janki Koer (( 1877) L. R. 5 Ind. Ap. 1, 12.); Achal Ram v, Udai Partab Addiya Dat Singh (( 1883) L. R. 11 Ind. Ap. 51.); Hurpurshad v. Sheo Dyal (( 1876) L. R. 3 Ind. Ap. 259, 270.); Shankar Bakhsh v. Hardeo Bakhsh. (( 1888) L. R. 16 Ind. Ap. 71.) De Gruyther, for the respondents, contended that the Lower Courts were right in holding that Murtaza Bakhsh was not in law during his life and at the time of his death a taluqdar within the meaning of Act I. of 1869. Accordingly, that Act did not govern the succession to his estate, which was regulated by the Mahomedan law. The heirs indicated by that law attained to vested interests in that estate at his death, and there was nothing in the Act which operated to divest those interests or which shewed any intention with that view. Accordingly, that Act did not govern the succession to his estate, which was regulated by the Mahomedan law. The heirs indicated by that law attained to vested interests in that estate at his death, and there was nothing in the Act which operated to divest those interests or which shewed any intention with that view. The Act only applied to those who had been settled with as taluqdars in their lifetime, not to those who had been settled with only as zemindars see Widow of Shanker Sahai v. Rajah Kashi Pershad (( 1873) L. R. Suppl. vol. 220, 237.), and the letter of October 10, 1859, scheduled to the Act; Sykes Taluqdari Law, pp. 51, 55, 286, 389, 391. Murtaza Bakhsh had never been settled with as taluqdar, but only as zemindar, and the Government had never decided in his favour that he should be regarded as a taluqdar. The entry of his name in the lists after his death was clearly a mistake, and the case in L. E. 16 Ind. Ap. 71 shews that no effect will be given to it. 49 Law Rep. 31 Ind. App. 30 ( 1903- 1904) Mohammad Abdussamad V. Kurban Husain 152 Ross replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD LINDLEY. The appellants in this case claim one-half of certain estates in Oudh as the statutory heirs of one Murtaza Bakhsh, who was a Mahomedan taluqdar, and who died on January 18, 1865. The respondents claim the same half as his heirs by Mahomedan law, and it is conceded that they are entitled to it unless the succession was altered by the Oudh Estates Act of 1869 and what was done after his death. Murtaza Bakhsh in his lifetime was a taluqdar, and in May, 1858, a summary settlement of the estates in question was made with him. The Oudh Estates Act, 1869, was founded on, and was passed to give effect to, certain orders of the Governor-General of India made in October, 1859, and set out in the 1st schedule to the Act. Under those orders lists were to be prepared of the taluqdars with whom summary settlements had been made, and sanads, i.e., grants, were to be issued to them. Forms of these sanads were prepared and many were granted. In January, 1862, Murtaza Bakhsh applied for a sanad from the English authorities, and his application was refused. Under those orders lists were to be prepared of the taluqdars with whom summary settlements had been made, and sanads, i.e., grants, were to be issued to them. Forms of these sanads were prepared and many were granted. In January, 1862, Murtaza Bakhsh applied for a sanad from the English authorities, and his application was refused. He never in fact obtained any sanad in his lifetime; and his name was never in his lifetime entered on any list of officially recognised taluqdars. Under these circumstances it seems plain that when Murtaza Bakhsh died he had acquired a permanent hereditary and proprietary right recognised by the Indian Government in the estates in question; but the succession to them, not having been altered by any sanad, was governed by the ordinary Mahomedan law, which was the only law applicable to the case. The appellants, however, rely on what happened after his death, and it is necessary to consider what this was. "When he died he left his mother and some cousins and two widows; and in March, 1865, his mothers name was entered in the Collectors books in substitution for his own, and she was recorded as sole owner. This appears to have been done with the consent of his two widows and the cousins under whom the respondents claim. The Estates Act, 1869, came into operation in January of that year, and in July 1869, the name of the deceased appears in two of the lists directed to be made by the Act. How it got there is not known. But there it is. In November, 1870, the mother died. She appointed the two widows her successors, and in April, 1871, the names of the two widows who were in possession were substituted for hers in the Collectors books. Their right, however, to be so recorded was disputed by the cousins, and litigation ensued; but both widows died before it ended, and it is unnecessary to refer further to this matter. The present suit was instituted in March, 1895. The plaintiffs (now represented by the respondents) were the heirs, namely, brother and sister of the last surviving widow, i.e., the second wife of Murtaza Bakhsh. They claimed under the ordinary Mahomedan law. The present suit was instituted in March, 1895. The plaintiffs (now represented by the respondents) were the heirs, namely, brother and sister of the last surviving widow, i.e., the second wife of Murtaza Bakhsh. They claimed under the ordinary Mahomedan law. The defendants (i.e. the appellants) claim under his first wife and under the Act of 1869, The Subordinate Judge held that the entry of Murtaza Bakhshs name in the lists was ultra vires and of no effect; that the mother held the estate as absolute owner; that after her death the two widows held as absolute owners in equal shares; that on the death of the first wife one-half of the estate descended on the defendants in accordance with ordinary Mahomedan law, and that on the death of the second wife her half descended on the plaintiffs by the same law. The plain tiffs were content with this decision, but the defendants appealed from it. The decision was, however, affirmed by the Judicial Commissioner, and the defendants have appealed 49 Law Rep. 31 Ind. App. 30 ( 1903- 1904) Mohammad Abdussamad V. Kurban Husain 153 from his decision. Their Lordships have no hesitation in affirming it. The whole case turns on the entry of Murtaza Bakhshs name in two of the lists ordered to be made by the Act of 1869. Sect. 10 of the Act compels the Courts to regard such lists as conclusive evidence that the persons named therein are taluqdars or grantees within the meaning of the Act. When the lists referred to are looked at, it will be found that there are six lists see s. 8. Murtaza Bakhshs name is in the first and third. The entries, therefore, by ss. 8 and 10 are conclusive evidence (1.) that he is to be considered as having been a taluqdar within the meaning of the Act see ss. 2, 8, list 1; and (2.) that he was a taluqdar to whom a sanad had been made declaring that the succession to the estates comprised in it should be regulated by the rule of primogeniture see ss. 2, 8, list 3. These enactments are clear and peremptory, and would be decisive if they applied to this case. It is not, however, in accordance with sound principles of interpreting statutes to give them a retrospective effect. The Court cannot construe ss. 2, 8, list 3. These enactments are clear and peremptory, and would be decisive if they applied to this case. It is not, however, in accordance with sound principles of interpreting statutes to give them a retrospective effect. The Court cannot construe ss. 8 and 10 so as to deprive the successors of the estates of a person who had died before those sections came into operation of rights which they acquired on his death. Entries of the names of deceased persons in the lists mentioned in s. 8 do not appear to have been contemplated by the Act, but such entries have no doubt been made and they are practically harmless if the names were already in former lists made under the Orders in Council, or if the entries do not alter the previously acquired rights of any one. This was the case in Achal Ram v. Udai Partab Addiya Dat Singh, (L. R. 11 Ind. Ap. 51.) But no decision has been referred to which supports the contention that the entry of the name of a person who died before the Act came into force can divest rights previously acquired on his death. In this case the death occurred in 1865, and the successors then acquired their rights under the ordinary Mahomedan law. The Oudh Estates Act did not come into operation until 1869; and to construe its provisions as altering the succession would be not only unjust, but plainly contrary to well-settled legal principles. The able counsel for the appellants endeavoured to surmount this difficulty by suggesting that there must have been some family arrangement to the effect that the entries in question should have been made, and that the succession should be changed. But there is no evidence from which any such conclusion can be drawn. The only evidence bearing on the subject is the consent of the heirs to the entry of the mother of Murtaza Bakhsh in the Collectors books shortly after his death. But when she died, the entry of the names of her two daughters-in-law was objected to, and litigation followed. The issues settled in the action do not raise the question whether any such arrangement was in fact come to, and their Lordships cannot adopt the suggestion of the learned counsel as a basis for their decision. But when she died, the entry of the names of her two daughters-in-law was objected to, and litigation followed. The issues settled in the action do not raise the question whether any such arrangement was in fact come to, and their Lordships cannot adopt the suggestion of the learned counsel as a basis for their decision. Their Lordships, therefore, will humbly advise his Majesty to dismiss this appeal, and the appellants must pay the costs.