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1903 DIGILAW 35 (CAL)

Profulla Chandra Sen v. Emperor

1903-02-13

body1903
JUDGMENT Harington, J. - In this case a Rule was granted calling upon the District Magistrate to show, cause why the conviction and sentence 'passed on one Profulla Chandra Sen should not be set aside on the ground that no sanction had been granted for his prosecution for the offence of which he had been convicted. 2. Profulla Chandra Son was Sub-Registrar of Sarail, in the district of Tippera; he has been convicted of three offences under Sections 468/109 of the Indian Penal Code. It has been found by the Deputy Magistrate that ten deeds registered on October 31, 1899, at the Appellant's office were forgeries and that they were either forged by the Appellant himself or by his orders with the object of earning for him as Sub-Registrar an additional commission from the Government of Rs. 20. On appeal the conviction was upheld, but the sentence altered. In support of the Rule it is contended: (i) That the Sub-Registrar is a 'public servant' and that he is accused of an offence as such public servant and that under the provisions of Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code the sanction of the Government having power to order the removal of the accused, or of some Court or other authority to which the Sub-Registrar is subordinate, is necessary before any Court can take cognizance of the case; (ii) That no sanction has been granted by any such authority for the prosecution of the accused under Sections 468/109 and therefore the Court had no jurisdiction to try and convict the accused. 3. It is contended by the learned vakil, who showed cause against the Rule, that no sanction was necessary, that the institution of proceedings by the sanctioning authority was sufficient sanction and that in any case a letter, which has been produced, written by the Inspector-General of Registration, Bengal, to the Registrar of Tippera, directing that the accused should be prosecuted, as advised by the Legal Remembrancer, on charges under Sections 417 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code, was sufficient sanction to justify a conviction under Sections 468/109. It is contended by the learned Counsel, who appeared in support of the Rule, that if the letter be regarded as a sanction, it is only a sanction to prosecute for a substantive offence u/s 468 and not for abetment of such offence under Sections 468/109. It is contended by the learned Counsel, who appeared in support of the Rule, that if the letter be regarded as a sanction, it is only a sanction to prosecute for a substantive offence u/s 468 and not for abetment of such offence under Sections 468/109. In my opinion, it is unnecessary to discuss the question whether sanction was necessary u/s 197 before the Appellant could be prosecuted for the offence disclosed by the facts to which I have referred ; because if sanction be necessary, the letter of the Inspector-General of Registration is, in my opinion, a sufficient sanction to justify a conviction under Sections 468/109 That letter directs a prosecution u/s 468 and it was of a charge u/s 468 that the Court took cognizance. On the same facts as those on which the charge u/s 468 was founded, the Magistrate convicted the accused of an offence under Sections 468/109. In my opinion, this state of things is provided for by Section 230 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which enacts that if an offence stated in a" new, altered, or added charge is one for the prosecution of which previous sanction is necessary, the case shall not be proceeded with until such sanction is obtained, unless sanction has been already obtained for a prosecution on the same facts as those on which the new or altered charge was founded." Here it cannot be suggested that the charge under Sections 468/109 was founded on any but the same facts as those on which the sanction for a prosecution u/s 468 was granted. That being so, no fresh sanction was necessary u/s 230 of the Code. The sanction already given was quite sufficient to justify the conviction of the Appellant under Sections 468/109. It is unnecessary therefore to discuss the question whether, on the facts disclosed, a sanction u/s 197 was necessary. On the ground that the sanction granted was sufficient, the Rule must, in my opinion, be discharged. 4. We direct that the Petitioner be called upon to surrender to his bail and serve the remainder of his sentence. Brett J. 5. I agree that the Rule must be discharged. 6. On the ground that the sanction granted was sufficient, the Rule must, in my opinion, be discharged. 4. We direct that the Petitioner be called upon to surrender to his bail and serve the remainder of his sentence. Brett J. 5. I agree that the Rule must be discharged. 6. The main contention advanced in support of the Rule is that the sanction given by the Inspector-General of Registration was for the prosecution of the Petitioner for offences under Sections 468 and 417 of the Indian Penal Code and not for the abetment of Ghose offences; and that as Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code contains no sub-section corresponding to Sub-section 3 of Section 195 of the Code, there could be no conviction for abetment where sanction had been given for prosecution for the substantive offence only. In this argument there appears to be some misunderstanding of the meaning of Sub-section 3 of Section 195 of the Code. That sub-section lays down that sanction for the prosecution for the abetment of an offence is necessary in the same way as sanction for prosecution for the substantive offence and the omission of the sub-section from Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot have the effect suggested. The sanction given by the Inspector-General of Registration was for the prosecution of the Petitioner for certain acts, that is to say, for fabricating false documents and for cheating by means of fabricated documents. This sanction would, in my opinion, cover the abetment of the fabrication of the fake documents if that offence was committed for the purpose of cheating by means of those documents. The finding of the Joint-Magistrate is that the ten deeds which were registered on the 31st October 1899 were forgeries and that they were either forged by the accused himself or by his orders with the object of cheating the Government and obtaining an additional commission of Rs. 20 to which he was not entitled. 7. The sanction undoubtedly covered the new charge, as it was based on the same facts and under the provision of Section 230 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no additional sanction was required.