Judgement Consolidated Appeals from decrees of the High Court (Dec. 8, 1896) affirming decrees of the District Court of Kistna (Dec. 22, 1894), affirming decrees of the Munsiff of Bezwada (Sept. 11, 1893), dismissing on the ground of limitation suits for rent as regards four years mentioned, and decreeing a balance due for 1299 Fasli. The plaintiff is zemindar of Nusvid, and brought separate suits against each of the respondents which claimed, under the circumstances stated in their Lordships judgment, balance of rent due for the years 1295-99 Fasli. The respondents pleaded limitation in respect of the years 1295-98 Fasli. The date of suit was October 28, 1892. The Munsiff decided that the period of limitation was three years from the time the rents became due. He found that the rents became due for each Fasli year on the expiry of that year, i.e., on July 1, 1886, July 1, 1887, July 1, 1888, and July 1, 1889. 41 Law Rep. 31 Ind. App. 17 ( 1903- 1904) Raja Rangayya Appa Rao Bahadur V. Bobba Sriramulu The High Court in affirming this judgment relied on the case of Siramulu v. Sobhanadri Appa Rau (( 1894) Ind. L. R. 19 Madr. 21.), which was in conflict with Sobhanadri Appa Rau v. Chalamanna. (( 1893) Ind. L. R. 17 Madr. 225.) De Gruyther, for the appellant, contended that no suit for rent would lie while the amount and rate thereof were unascertained. Art. 110 of Act XV. of 1877 says that the period runs from the time when the arrears claimed became due. According to the true construction of Madras Act VIII. of 1865 (see ss. 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 14), while proceedings are pending thereunder to ascertain the rate and amount of rent, there is no rent due within the meaning of the Limitation Act. In this case, therefore, limitation did not begin to run till the decree of the High Court dated October 29, 1889. He relied upon the case cited above from Ind. L. E. 17 Madr. 225, and referred to Gopala Sawmy Mudelly v. Mukkee Gopalier (( 1873) 7 Madras H. C. 312, 331.); Sayud Chanda Miah Sahib v. Lakshmana (( 1876) Ind. L. R. 1 Madr. 45.); Easwara Doss v. Pungavanachari (( 1890) Ind. L. R. 13 Madr. 361.); Ali Khan v. Appadu. (( 1883) Ind. L. R. 7 Madr. L. E. 17 Madr. 225, and referred to Gopala Sawmy Mudelly v. Mukkee Gopalier (( 1873) 7 Madras H. C. 312, 331.); Sayud Chanda Miah Sahib v. Lakshmana (( 1876) Ind. L. R. 1 Madr. 45.); Easwara Doss v. Pungavanachari (( 1890) Ind. L. R. 13 Madr. 361.); Ali Khan v. Appadu. (( 1883) Ind. L. R. 7 Madr. 304.) In Bengal there is s. 32 of Act X. of 1859 to govern a like case see Mussamat Ranee Sumo Moyee v. Shooshee Mokhee Burmonia. (( 1868) 12 Moores Ind. Ap. Ca. 244.) The respondents did not appear. 1903. Dec. 2. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR ARTHUR WILSON. This appeal raises a question of considerable importance in Madras, as to which there has been some difference of opinion amongst the learned judges of the High Court, The plaintiff (appellant) is the zemindar of Nuzvid, and is a " landholder " within the meaning of the Rent Recovery Act (Madras Act VIII. of 1865). The "several defendants hold lands under him in the village of Mustabada, which is included in his zemindari, and they are " tenants " within the meaning of the Act. The defendants occupied the lands to which the present controversy relates for a long period, but the time which has to be considered in this appeal commences with the Fasli year 1295. In that year the plaintiff tendered puttahs which the defendants refused to accept (similar proceedings took place in the subsequent years). The plaintiff thereupon instituted summary suits before the Collector to enforce the acceptance of the puttahs and the execution of corresponding muchilkas. The head Assistant Collector, who heard the cases, made his order modifying the terms of the proposed puttahs, and directing the tender of puttahs embodying his modifications. The District Judge on appeal made additional changes in the puttahs. On further appeal the High Court again varied the terms of the puttahs to be tendered; and thus by the decree of the High Court dated October 29, 1889, the conditions of the tenancies, including the rates of rent, were finally determined. The present suits were brought on October 28, 1892, in the Court of the Munsiff of Bezwada. On further appeal the High Court again varied the terms of the puttahs to be tendered; and thus by the decree of the High Court dated October 29, 1889, the conditions of the tenancies, including the rates of rent, were finally determined. The present suits were brought on October 28, 1892, in the Court of the Munsiff of Bezwada. In them the plaintiff claimed to recover from the defendants balances of rent for their respective holdings, at the determined rates, in respect of the Fasli years 1295, 1296, 1297, 1298, and subsequent years. With the subsequent years this appeal has nothing to do; it is limited to the four years mentioned. The Courts in India have held that the claim for rent in respect of those four years is barred by limitation, and the correctness of that ruling is the one question raised in the present appeal. The rule of limitation applicable to the case is art. 110 of Sched. II. of the Indian Limitation Act (Act XV.) of 1877, which prescribes for a suit for arrears of rent a period of limitation 41 Law Rep. 31 Ind. App. 17 ( 1903- 1904) Raja Rangayya Appa Rao Bahadur V. Bobba Sriramulu 143 of three years reckoned from the time when the arrears become due. The Courts in India have held that the period -of limitation in this case for the rent of each Fasli year runs from the close of that year, and if that view be correct the cases have been rightly decided. The contention before their Lordships was that the period should be counted from October 29, 1889, when the decree of the High Court determined the rent payable. And, if this contention be correct, these claims were in time. The point of time from which, under the Limitation Act, the period of limitation is to run is that at which the arrear became due. In most cases no doubt the point of time at which rent becomes due is the close of the period in respect of which it is to be paid. But this is not necessarily always the case in India, and the Limitation Act is an Act for all India. In most cases no doubt the point of time at which rent becomes due is the close of the period in respect of which it is to be paid. But this is not necessarily always the case in India, and the Limitation Act is an Act for all India. Legislation, or custom, or express contract, or the special circumstances of any case may make rent become due at a point of time different from the close of the period in respect of which it is to be paid. The case of Mussumat Ranee Sumo Moyee v. Shooshee Mokhee Burmonia (12 Moores Ind. Ap. Ca. 244.), heard before this Board, is an example of a suit for rent, governed by a law of limitation substantially the same as that now before their Lordships, in which the date at which the rent became due was held to be an entirely different date from the close of the period in respect of which that rent was payable. The object of a Limitation Act is presumably to compel people who have actionable claims to sue upon them with due promptitude or to forfeit the right to do so at all. In such an Act the falling due of rent naturally means the falling due of an ascertained rent, which the tenant is under an obligation to pay, and which the landlord can claim and, if necessary, sue for. In order to see when rent becomes due in a case like the present it is necessary to turn to the Rent Recovery Act (Madras Act VIII, of 1865). That Act enacts (s. 3) that certain landholders and others shall enter into written engagements with their tenants, to be embodied in puttahs and muchilkas, which (s. 4) must contain, amongst other things, the amount and nature of the rent. By s. 7 no suit or legal proceedings for rent can be sustained unless puttah and muchilka have been exchanged, or a puttah has been tendered such as the tenant was bound to accept, or both parties have agreed to dispense with such documents. If a puttah is tendered and the tenant refuses to accept it, the landholder (s. 9) may proceed by summary suit before the Collector to enforce acceptance of the puttah. If a puttah is tendered and the tenant refuses to accept it, the landholder (s. 9) may proceed by summary suit before the Collector to enforce acceptance of the puttah. And in such a suit it is for the Collector to settle the terms of the tenancy, including the rent, in accordance with the principles laid down in the Act. From the Collectors decision an appeal lies to the Civil Courts (s. 69). Under this procedure it seems clear that as long as proceedings are pending before the Collector and, on appeal from him, before the Civil Courts, the rate of rent is in suspense, for no one can say what it will prove to be, and that, therefore, no arrear of rent can be said to have become due within the meaning of the Limitation Act. That this is the meaning and effect of the Rent Recovery Act becomes much plainer on a further examination of the Act. The Act (s. 87) keeps alive the right to proceed in the Civil Courts in respect of rent, and the present appeal arises out of a civil suit so brought. But the Act deals very briefly with such suits. Its meaning and effect can be better learned from the provisions relating to those special and summary remedies which are dealt with in some detail and fill a large part of the Act. They are available for arrears of rent, and must be put in force within one year from the time when the rent became due (s. 2). Those special remedies are distress, sale of the holding, ejectment, and arrest. And in each of these cases the proceedings must commence with a document stating the amount of rent due (ss. 15, 16, 39, 41, 46). Their Lordships are of opinion that in the present cases no rent was in arrear or due till the rates of rent were ascertained by the decree of the High Court of October 29, 1889, and that limitation runs from that date. 41 Law Rep. 31 Ind. App. 17 ( 1903- 1904) Raja Rangayya Appa Rao Bahadur V. Bobba Sriramulu 144 It may be well to notice two arguments against the view taken by their Lordships, which seem to have had weight with some of the learned judges in Madras. Sect. 41 Law Rep. 31 Ind. App. 17 ( 1903- 1904) Raja Rangayya Appa Rao Bahadur V. Bobba Sriramulu 144 It may be well to notice two arguments against the view taken by their Lordships, which seem to have had weight with some of the learned judges in Madras. Sect. 14 of the Rent Recovery Act says that "when rent shall remain unpaid at the time when, according to any written agreement or the custom of the country, it ought to have been paid," it is to be "deemed an arrear of rent." It has been said, and no doubt rightly, that by the custom of the country agricultural rents are payable at or before the close of the Fasli year. And it has been thought that this section defines the point of time at which agricultural rent becomes in arrear as the close of the Fasli year. And so it seems to do in the cases to which it applies. But, in their Lordships opinion, this whole series of sections applies to ascertained rents, not to rents at rates which have yet to be determined. Another argument has been based upon s. 7 of the Act, already cited. It has been thought that, under that section, where a landholder has tendered a puttah which the tenant refuses, but which, as the result of the litigation rendered necessary by that refusal, has been found to have been a proper one, and then proceeds to sue for the rent so ascertained, lie may be met by a plea of limitation, on the ground that he might have sued, and ought to have sued, for the rent without waiting to have the rate determined. If that view were correct, it would not affect the present case, for in this case the puttah tendered by the landholder was not approved by the Courts, but was altered by them. The High Court, however, in the judgment under appeal, has drawn no distinction between the case in which the puttah tendered has been ultimately approved by the Courts and the case in which it has been modified. And their Lordships think the Court was right in so doing. Sect. 7 is not an enabling section, but a restraining section. The High Court, however, in the judgment under appeal, has drawn no distinction between the case in which the puttah tendered has been ultimately approved by the Courts and the case in which it has been modified. And their Lordships think the Court was right in so doing. Sect. 7 is not an enabling section, but a restraining section. In order to see when there is an arrear which can be sued for it is necessary to examine the Act as a whole; and the reasons have already been stated which lead their Lordships to think that its provisions as to rent due, rent in arrear, and the recovery of rent refer to ascertained rents. For the foregoing reasons their Lordships are of opinion that the claims for rents in respect of the Fasli years 1295, 1296,1297, and 1298 are not barred by limitation. They will humbly advise His Majesty that the decrees of the High Court and the District Court ought to be discharged with costs, and those of the Munsiffs Court discharged, and that the cases ought to be remitted to the High Court with a declaration to the above effect, in order that they may be disposed of in the Munsiff’s Court in accordance with that declaration. The appellant will recover his costs of this appeal from the respondents.