JUDGMENT Ameer Ali, J. - This is a suit for damages brought under the following circumstances. 2. The Plaintiff, who is a merchant and dealer in jute and carries on business in Calcutta, contracted to buy from the Defendant and the Defendant contracted to sell to the Plaintiff, by bought and sold notes dated the 19th July 1899, 2,000 kutcha bales of certain jute at Rs. 4-12 per bazar maund. By another contract entered into on the same date, the Plaintiff agreed to purchase and the Defendant agreed to sell to the Plaintiff another quantity of 1,000 kutcha bales of the same kind of jute, delivery or shipment was to be, at the seller's option, during 'August-September.' In the month of August the Defendant gave notice to the Plaintiff, of his inability to perform the contract. It is quite clear that the Plaintiff on receiving the notice was under no obligation to go into the market to buy the goods, nor could the contract be rescinded without the consent of the Plaintiff. 3. No delivery having been made in terms of the contract, the Plaintiff, some time in October, bought the quantity of jute which had been contracted for and now claims the difference between the market rate prevailing on the 6th of October and the contract price. 4. The Defendant's contention is that the Plaintiff is entitled to damages on the basis of the market rate prevailing on the 31st of August and no further. This contention has been formulated by his counsel in this way. The Defendant had the option of making shipment or delivery either in August or September, as it was open to him to make shipment in either of these months; he having given notice in August, the damages ought to be calculated on the basis of the market rate at the end of August : had he given notice in September, it would have been calculated at the market rate prevailing at the end of September. The argument is extremely ingenious. No authority, however, has been brought to my notice in support of the contention. 5. The text in Addison on Contracts based on the case of Leigh v. Paterson (1818) 8 Taunt 540 is perfectly clear. The argument is extremely ingenious. No authority, however, has been brought to my notice in support of the contention. 5. The text in Addison on Contracts based on the case of Leigh v. Paterson (1818) 8 Taunt 540 is perfectly clear. In Addison the principle is thus stated : "If the vendor has a month or any specific period of time allowed to him for making the delivery and finds before the time has elapsed that he will be unable to complete the delivery and gives notice to the purchaser that he refuses to proceed therewith and the price rises, the measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the higher price of the subject-matter on the last day of the period within which the delivery ought to have been made." In Leigh v. Paterson (1818) 8 Taunt 540 the marginal note is as follows : "If a vendor has time until a given day to deliver goods and on prior day, when the prices are low, he refuses to proceed with the contract, after which the price rises, the purchaser, not rescinding, is entitled to recover the difference between the contract price and the higher price which the goods bear on the last day appointed for the fulfilment of the contract." 6. Mr. Das argues that the period of time allowed to the vendor in the present case, for making delivery, was not a continuous period, but an optional period of two separate months in which he could deliver. To my mind, it is a matter of indifference whether he has two months or one month for the purpose of fulfilling the contract. There is no doubt a difference between the use of the word "and" and the use of the word "or" in connection with the two months. The difference is only as regards the character of the delivery; for example, if the condition had been this delivery to be in "August and September," it would have implied that the goods might be delivered in instalments through-out that period, the whole contract to be completed in those two months, viz., August and September. But where the expression is "August or September," in that case the whole contract might at the seller's option be completed in either of these two months. But where the expression is "August or September," in that case the whole contract might at the seller's option be completed in either of these two months. The option given to the seller to fulfil the contract either in August or September does not alter his liability for fulfilment of the contract. He had the whole of two months for the purpose of making delivery and fulfilling the contract. The measure of damages must be the market rate on the 30th September. 7. I do not agree with the contention of the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff that the measure of damages is to be taken at the market rate on the 6th of October. The condition as to price "per Calcutta bazar maund, the actual gross weight delivered at Watson's Press" refers, in my opinion, to the maundage on which the price was calculated and not as to the term of delivery which is provided for separately at the bottom of the bought note. 8. I therefore refer the matter to the Official Referee, to find the market rate on the 30th of September and assess damages on the basis of the difference between the contract rate and the market rate prevailing on that date.