Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (Sept. 8, 1898) varying a decree of the First Subordinate Judge of the 24-Pergunnahs (Oct. 3, 1896). The property in suit, known as Chuck Bele Doorganugger, was claimed by the respondent as reversionary heir to its former owner, Ram Sagore Mitter, who died in 1834 leaving two daughters. One of the daughters died shortly after her father, and the case for the plaintiff was that her son Uma Churn Dutt effected a partition with the surviving daughter and died in 1872; that the surviving daughter was nevertheless entitled to the whole estate for a womans estate and died in 1894, her son having predeceased her; that thereupon the succession of the reversioner opened, and that he, as daughters son to Ram Sagores paternal uncle, was as nearest heir entitled to the whole of his estate absolutely. The appellant, who was in possession, claimed title to the whole of the said chuck under certain transactions of mortgage and sale, the effect of which depended upon a purchase made by his predecessor in title at an execution sale dated January 5, 1885, under a decree for rent against Isaneswari, the surviving daughter. Both Courts dismissed the suit as regards Uma Churn Dutts half-share. The High Court gave the respondent a decree in respect of Isaneswaris half-share. The appeal, which related only to this half-share, depended upon whether the sale of January 5, 1885, passed to the purchaser an absolute estate in this half-share, or only the limited estate held by the daughter of the last full owner. On this point the Subordinate Judge decided that what was sold at the sale of January 5, 1885, was not the interest of a Hindu widow, but the estate which she represented, and that the plaintiff was estopped by the decision in a suit which had been brought shortly afterwards by Isaneswari to set aside the said sale, in consequence of which his right to the property in suit was extinguished. On appeal by the plaintiff the High Court decided that the sale only passed the limited interest of Isaneswari in the estate, and that the decision relied upon which had dismissed Isaneswaris suit to set it aside did not operate to prevent the plaintiff from now claiming as reversioner. On appeal by the plaintiff the High Court decided that the sale only passed the limited interest of Isaneswari in the estate, and that the decision relied upon which had dismissed Isaneswaris suit to set it aside did not operate to prevent the plaintiff from now claiming as reversioner. In the result the judgment of the High Court decreed to the plaintiff the eight annas share of Isaneswari, with mesne profits and costs in proportion. The ground upon which the High Court proceeded was that by the sale in the suits against Isaneswari only the limited estate of the said Isaneswari passed, and that her failure to set aside such sale affected only that limited interest and not the estate of the reversioner, and that therefore the reversioner was not barred by the dismissal of her suit; that the suit against Isaneswari being admittedly one for arrears of rent, which accrued due during her life and after the death of her father, created only a personal liability on her part, and did not attach to the reversion, and they pointed out that the tenure itself had not been brought to sale under the provisions of the rent law. Upon this latter point, namely, what passed by the sale according to the provisions of the rent law, the High Court proceeded as follows — "The sale, though for arrears of rent, was admittedly in execution of decrees for rent obtained by certain sharers, not the entire body of co-sharers, in the undivided estate under which the chuck in dispute was held, and according to the law then in force (s. 64 of Act VIII. of 1869 B. C), it had the same effect as the sale of any immovable property sold in execution of a decree not being for arrears of rent payable in respect thereof; that is to say, it would pass, not the whole tenure, but only the right, title, and interest of the judgment debtor. of 1869 B. C), it had the same effect as the sale of any immovable property sold in execution of a decree not being for arrears of rent payable in respect thereof; that is to say, it would pass, not the whole tenure, but only the right, title, and interest of the judgment debtor. The judgment debtor in this case was Isaneswari, who held the qualified estate of a Hindu daughter under the law of the Bengal school; but the Court below has held that as she represented the absolute estate for certain purposes, and as the suits for rent were brought against her as representing the absolute estate, the whole inheritance, and not merely her limited interest, passed by the sale in execution of the rent decrees, and the decision of the Privy Council in Jugol Kishore v. Jotindro Mohun Tagore (( 1884) L. R. 11 Ind. Ap. 66; S.C. Ind. L. R. 10 Calc. 985.) is relied upon in support of this view. The rule Lald down in that case is this If the suit is simply for a personal claim against the widow, then merely the widows qualified interest is sold, and the reversionary interest is not bound by it. If, on the other hand, the suit is against the widow in respect of the estate or for a cause which is not a mere personal cause of action against the widow, then the whole estate passes. 11 The suit against Isaneswari was admittedly one for arrears of rent, and the question is whether a claim for arrears of rent is a personal claim against the widow, or is one against the inheritance which for certain purposes she represents. The point is not free from difficulty, and there is some conflict of authority in this Court upon it, the cases of Tiluck Chunder v. Muddun Mohun (( 1869) 12 Suth. W. R. 504.) and Anundnwyee v. Mohendro Narain (( 1871) 15 Suth. W. R. 264.) being in favour of the respondent, while Mohima Chunder v. Ram Kishore (( 1875) 23 Suth. W. R. 174.) (in which Tiluck Chunder v. Muddun Mohun (12 Suth. W. R. 504.) was cited and considered) and Kristo Gobind v. Hem Chunder (( 1880) Ind. L. R. 16 Calc. 511) support the opposite view. As for the case of Jugol Kishore v. Jotindro Mohun Tagore (L. R. 11 Ind. Ap. 66; S.C. Ind. W. R. 174.) (in which Tiluck Chunder v. Muddun Mohun (12 Suth. W. R. 504.) was cited and considered) and Kristo Gobind v. Hem Chunder (( 1880) Ind. L. R. 16 Calc. 511) support the opposite view. As for the case of Jugol Kishore v. Jotindro Mohun Tagore (L. R. 11 Ind. Ap. 66; S.C. Ind. L. R. 10 Calc. 985), relied upon by the Court below, though it lays down the general principle quoted above, the facts of that case were different from those in the case we are now considering. There the sale was in execution of a decree for mesne profits and costs against a Hindu widow, who was sued along with certain reversionary heirs for posses sion of immovable property and for mesne profits. Here the suit for rent was brought against Isaneswari alone, and in respect of arrears which accrued due after her fathers death; and as she was in enjoyment of the rents and profits of the chuck, the liability for rent ought to be regarded as her personal liability, and ought not to be held as attaching to the reversion unless the landlords proceeded to bring the tenure itself to sale under the special provisions of the rent law. In Tiluck Chunder v. Muddun Mohun (2) the landlord had, as has been pointed out by the Privy Council in Baijun Doobeys Case (( 1875) L. R. 2 Ind. Ap. 275; S.C. Ind. L. R. 1 Calc. 133.), proceeded against the tenure under the rent law; and the same remark also applies to the case of Anundmoyee v. Mohendro Narain. (15 Suth. W. R. 264.) The present case, in our opinion, is rather analogous in principle to the case of Baijun Doobey v. Brojo Bhookan Lal Awati (5), in which the Privy Council held that a sale in execution of a decree against a Hindu widow for arrears of her mother-in-laws maintenance, which was a charge on the inherit ance, passed only the widows estate ; and, following that case and the case of Mohima Chunder v. Bam Kishore (1), we hold that the sale in question passed only the limited estate of Isaneswari." De Gruyther, for the appellant, contended that the sale of January 5, 1885, operated to pass the whole estate. It took place under Bengal Act VIII. It took place under Bengal Act VIII. of 1869, the intention of which was to enable the landlord to sell the whole interest in the defaulting tenure, thereby extinguishing the reversioners contingent title see s. 34, which lays down procedure; s. 59, as to sale of under tenant’s right; s. 60, as to effect of sale of under-tenure; and s. 66. Sect. 64 relates to the case where some of the landlords desire to proceed to sale. He referred to Ashanulla Khan Bahadoor v. Rajenda Chundra Rai (( 1885) Ind. L. R. 12 Calc. 464); Tiluck Chunder v. Muddun Mohun. (12 Suth. W. R. 504.) Moreover, a Hindu widow or daughter represents so completely the estate of the last full owner that an execution sale against her readily passes the full estate see Shivagunga Case (( 1863) 9 Moores Ind. Ap. Ca. 604); Hunooman Persaud Panday v. Mussamat Babooee Munraj (( 1856) 6 Moores Ind. Ap. Ca. 393, 423); Baboo Kameswar Pershad v. Run Bahadoor Singh (( 1880) L. R. 8 Ind. Ap. 8.); Baijun Doobey v. Brij Bhookan Lal Awuti (L. R. 2 Ind. Ap. 275; S.C. Ind. L. R. 1 Calc. 133.); Anundmoyee v. Mohendro Narain. (15 Suth. W. R. 264.) In the cases of Mohima Chunder v. Bam Kishore (23 Suth. W. R. 174; S.C. 15 Beng. L. R. 142.) and Kris to Gobind v. Hem Chunder (Ind. L. R. 16 Calc. 511.), the tenure was not brought to sale in respect of which the arrears were due. The intention here was to sell the tenure absolutely, and that intention was sufficiently carried into effect see Jugol Kishore v. Jotindro Mohun Tagore. (Ind. L. R. 10 Calc. 985; S.C. L. R. 11 Ind. Ap. 66, 71, 73) Bonnerjee, for the respondent, contended that the High Court was right for the reasons given in its judgment in holding that what passed by the sale of 1885 was only Isaneswaris limited interest in the tenure. Although it is competent for a landowner to bring the tenure in default to an absolute sale, it is only by following strictly the special procedure for that purpose provided by Act VIII. of 1869 that the purpose can be effected. Although it is competent for a landowner to bring the tenure in default to an absolute sale, it is only by following strictly the special procedure for that purpose provided by Act VIII. of 1869 that the purpose can be effected. As the High Court pointed out, that had not been followed, with the result (see s. 64 of the Act) that the sale proceeded under the ordinary provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, according to which it was impossible to contend that the sale passed anything further than the right, title, and interest of the judgment debtor see Nugender Chunder Ghose v. Sreemutty Kaminee Dossee. (( 1867) 11 Moores Ind. Ap. Ca. 241.) He also referred to the case in 2 Ind. Ap. 275 as laying down the principles which govern the present case. De Gruyther replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR ANDREW SCOBLE. The question in this appeal is as to the title to a half-share of the estate of Chuck Bele Doorganugger in Bengal, which, prior to 1834, belonged to one Ram Sagore Mitter. Upon his death he was succeeded by his two daughters, Anundmoyi and Isaneswari; and upon the death of the former, her son and his aunt Isaneswari divided the estate equally between themselves; and Isaneswari continued to hold her half-share until her death in February, 1894. The respondent now claims it as next heir to the estate of Ram Sagore according to the Hindu law in force in Bengal, while the appellant claims as purchaser at a sale in execution of decrees for rent obtained against Isaneswari in 1883-84. And the point for determination is whether the purchaser at the sale acquired an absolute interest in the estate sold, or only such limited interest as Isaneswari took as her fathers daughter. Both Courts in India have found that the property in question was originally the estate of Ram Sagore Mitter, and that on the death of Isaneswari the respondent was the next heir, and these findings were not disputed before their Lordships. It is, therefore, only necessary to consider the circumstances of the case so far as they relate to the execution sale, which is the foundation of the appellants claim. The estate known as Chuck Bele Doorganugger is an under-tenure of a zemindari which is not specifically named, and in which there are several co-sharers. It is, therefore, only necessary to consider the circumstances of the case so far as they relate to the execution sale, which is the foundation of the appellants claim. The estate known as Chuck Bele Doorganugger is an under-tenure of a zemindari which is not specifically named, and in which there are several co-sharers. To the suits brought against Isaneswari in 1883-84 for arrears of rent only some of these co-sharers were parties, and although, in one of them, the plaintiffs prayed that the amount decreed might be "recovered by the sale of the property in arrears/ the decrees given, were for money only. This was in accordance with the provisions of Bengal Act VIII. of 1869, by which the procedure in suits between landlords and tenants was at that time regulated. Sect. 64 enacts that when a decree for arrears of rent has been obtained by a co-sharer in a joint undivided estate, the undertenure cannot be sold until the movable property of the judgment debtor has been sold and proved insufficient to satisfy the decree. " In such case," the section proceeds, "such undertenure, if of the nature described in section 59" (that is to say, if by the title-deeds or the custom of the country it is transferable by sale), " may be seized and sold in execution of such decree, according to the ordinary procedure of the Court, and not in the manner provided in the said section, and every such sale shall have such and the same effect as the sale of any immovable property sold in execution of a decree, not being for arrears of rent payable in respect thereof "; in other words, as if the sale were in execution of an ordinary money decree, in which case, as is established by a long series of decisions, only the right title and interest of the judgment debtor passes. To make the tenure itself liable to sale in execution the special procedure required by the Act would be necessary, and all the co-sharers would have to be made parties to the suit. This course was not followed in the case under consideration, but the execution sale was made under the ordinary conditions imposed by the Code of Civil Procedure. The Subordinate Judge held that what was sold was not the interest of a Hindu widow (? daughter), but the estate which she represented. This course was not followed in the case under consideration, but the execution sale was made under the ordinary conditions imposed by the Code of Civil Procedure. The Subordinate Judge held that what was sold was not the interest of a Hindu widow (? daughter), but the estate which she represented. The learned judges of the High Court, however, were of opinion that as " the suit for rent was brought against Isaneswari alone, and in respect of arrears which accrued due after her fathers death, and as she was in enjoyment of the rents and profits of the chuck, the liability for rent ought to be regarded as her personal liability, and ought not to be held as attaching to the reversion unless the landlords proceeded to bring the tenure itself to sale under the special provisions of the rent law." In this opinion their Lordships concur. The provisions of the rent law were devised for the protection of all parties interested in the tenure, and they would be defeated if fractional shareholders were allowed to evade them by the method adopted in this case. It was properly pointed out to their Lordships by Mr. Bonnerjee, the learned counsel who appeared for the respondent, that in awarding mesne profits " for the three years next preceding the institution of the suit," the High Court had lost sight of the fact that Isaneswari died on February 26, 1894, and that the suit was instituted on July 27, 1894, about five months after her death. The decree must therefore be amended so as to give mesne profits from February 26, 1894, on which date the respondent succeeded to the estate, until delivery of possession to him. Subject to this amendment, their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the decree of the High Court should be confirmed, and this appeal dismissed. The appellant must pay the costs of the appeal.