JUDGMENT Stevens and Stephen, JJ. - This second appeal arises out of a suit brought by the Plaintiff, as the purchaser of a certain taluka right, for declaration of title and possession of certain property upon the allegation that he had been dispossessed from that property by all the Defendants together. It was alleged that some of those Defendants in collusion with the rest had actually ejected the Plaintiff by ploughing the land. 2. The title of the Plaintiff was denied, as was the possession of himself and his predecessor in title and the alleged dispossession. 3. The suit was defended by three of the Defendants only--the 4th the 6th and the 7th. One written statement was filed by the 4th Defendant and another by the 6th and 7th Defendants. Both sets of Defendants objected that the suit was bad for misjoinder. But that objection was overruled by the Court of First Instance on the ground that, according to the case of the Plaintiff, the Defendants had all combined to dispossess him and that it was evident upon their own case that, as the Munsiff expresses it, they had "laid their heads together to back the Plaintiff," by which we presume he meant that they laid their heads together to eject the Plaintiff. The Court of First Instance further found in favour of the title and the possession of the Plaintiff and his predecessor in title and against the title set up respectively by the 4th Defendant and the Defendants Nos. 6 and 7. 4. The Defendants Nos. 6 and 7 alone preferred an appeal to the lower Appellate Court. 5. The lower Appellate Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Plaintiff had not proved the right which he set up to the land in dispute or possession by himself or on the part of his predecessor in title. 6. Three grounds were taken in arguing this appeal before us. One was, that the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court had misconceived the case; secondly, it was urged that the lower Appellate Court ought to have ordered a further investigation. As regards these two points, nothing need be said. 6. Three grounds were taken in arguing this appeal before us. One was, that the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court had misconceived the case; secondly, it was urged that the lower Appellate Court ought to have ordered a further investigation. As regards these two points, nothing need be said. The only substantial point is the third, which we proceed to notice; that is, that as the 6th and 7th Defendants alone appealed, being interested under different title from the 4th Defendant in separate portions of the land, the appeal ought to have been allowed only as far as they were concerned and not also in favour of the 4th Defendant. 7. Upon the other side, reference has been made to Section 544 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides, so far as it is necessary to quote it for the purpose of this case, that where there are more Defendants than one in a suit and the decree appealed against proceeds on any ground common to all the Defendants, any one of the Defendants may appeal against the whole decree and thereupon the Appellate Court may reverse or modify the decree in favour of all the Defendants. 8. The question is whether it can be said that the decree appealed against in this case proceeded on any ground common to all the Defendants. In this connection, we have been referred on the part of the Appellant to the case of Syed Hussain v. Madan Khan ILR (1894) Mad. 265, as also to the cases of Sreeram Ghuttuck v. Brojo Mohun Ghossal (1869) 11 W.R. 449 and Boy do Nath Burmah v. Ojan Bibee (1869) 11 W.R. 238. The Madras case is based apparently upon the former ease of this Court, to which we have just referred. 9. With regard to the Madras case, ILR (1894) Mad. 265, with great respect, we must say that in our opinion the decision seems somewhat to narrow the effect of the provisions of Section 554. That section does not require that the decree appealed against should proceed exclusively on grounds common to all the Defendants, but that it should proceed on any ground common to all the Defendants. 10. 265, with great respect, we must say that in our opinion the decision seems somewhat to narrow the effect of the provisions of Section 554. That section does not require that the decree appealed against should proceed exclusively on grounds common to all the Defendants, but that it should proceed on any ground common to all the Defendants. 10. The case in page 449 of the 11th volume of the Weekly Reporter was a case of a different kind from that with which we are now dealing; and it seems to us scarcely, upon its own facts, to support the argument which has been adduced for the Appellants in a case of the present kind. The case at page 238 of the same volume also, it appears to us, presents some points of difference from the present case, especially this difference, that whereas, as we understand, if the Plaintiff's title were found to be proved in the present case, it would stand equally good against all the Defendants; in that case the success of one of the Defendants depended upon a circumstance which did not arise in the case of the other Defendants. It seems to us difficult to say that in the present case the decree appealed against in the lower Appellate Court did not proceed on any ground common to all the Defendants, when there are at least two grounds which were common to them all; the first being the title of the Plaintiff, which, if it succeeded at all, would succeed equally against them all and secondly, the ground that they had combined to oust the Plaintiff from the land in dispute. 11. In this view we think that the learned Subordinate Judge was justified in decreeing the whole appeal, with reference to the terms of the provisions of Section 544 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and we, therefore, dismiss this appeal with costs.