JUDGMENT 1. These two references are so closely connected that it will be convenient to deal with them in one judgment. 2. The question referred for opinion in Appeal Suits Nos. 152 and 186 is whether when the stridhanam property of a woman devolves on her sons, who, with their father, form an undivided Hindu family at the time of the mothers death, the sons take as joint tenants with benefit of survivorship, or jointly or in common without benefit of survivorship. 3. The Appellants pleader contends that the recent ruling of the Privy Council in the case of Venkayyamma Garu v. Venkataramanayyamma Bahadur Garu I.L.R. 25 Mad. 678, on which the Respondent mainly relies, does not apply to this case in which the co-heirs inherited the stridhanam of their mother, and that there is no warrant under the Hindu Law of Mitakshara for holding that the stridhanam of a woman devolves upon her heirs, even if they be her male issue, as joint property with benefit of survivorship. We think that this contention is well founded. It is impossible to read the judgment of the Privy Council without coming to the conclusion that they guarded themselves against using language which would apply to the devolution of stridhanam property. After setting forth the facts of the case fully at the beginning of the judgment, they advert to the obscurity of the Mitakshara Law of Inheritance in the case of women, and refer to their former decisions as conclusively establishing that property inherited by a widow from her husband or by a daughter from her father, is a limited and restricted estate only, and not stridhanam, and that upon her death the next heirs of the husband or father succeed thereto, and that, therefore, the co-heirs in the case before them on the death of their mother succeeded as heirs to their maternal grandfather. Their Lordships then propose the question "What then was the character of the property which they took?" and begin to answer it as follows: "In the grandfathers hands it was separately acquired property. Their Lordships then propose the question "What then was the character of the property which they took?" and begin to answer it as follows: "In the grandfathers hands it was separately acquired property. In the hands of the grandsons it was ancestral property which had devolved on them under the ordinary law of inheritance." If their Lordships were of opinion that it would have made no difference whatever whether it was the mothers stridhanam which had devolved upon her sons, or the maternal grandfathers property which had devolved upon them, there was no object in making a pointed statement that the estate which a daughter inherits from her father is not her stridhanam, and that on her death her sons take it directly as heirs of their maternal grandfather, and that the estate, devolved on the grandsons under the ordinary law of inheritance. The ordinary law of inheritance referred to is, there can he no doubt, the cardinal text of the Hindu Law of Inheritance to the separate property of a male, as opposed to the inheritance to the property of a hermit, dealt with separately by the author of the Mitakshara in chapter 2, Section 8, and devolution of the stridhanam property of a woman, also separately dealt with in chapter 2, Section 11. We cannot accede to the suggestion of the Respondents pleader that "ordinary law of inheritance" is here used as distinguished from any mode of descent sanctioned by a special custom or usage opposed to the general law of inheritance, as laid down in the Mitakshara. Nor can we accede to the Appellants contention, founded upon the passage quoted and followed by their Lordships from the judgment in the case of Katama Natchiar v. Rajah of Sivagunga 9 Moo. I.A. 543 at p. 611, that the ruling of the Privy Council under consideration cannot apply to the present case by reason that the undivided family in the present case consisted not only of the two undivided brothers, on whom the stridhanam devolved, but also of their father, for in the case before their Lordships there was in fact, as appears from the judgment of this Court as well as of the Privy Council, the very same joint family as in the present case, and the property devolved on the sons to the exclusion of their father. 4. 4. As, then, the question before us is not concluded by the authority of the Privy Council ruling relied on by the Respondent, we have to consider "what is the rule of Hindu Law under the Mitakshara which is applicable?" At the outset we may observe that the stridhanam property of a woman, with a solitary exception which need not be referred to here, primarily descends upon her daughters, who either are or will necessarily on marriage become members of a different family, and in default of daughters, on the daughters offspring, females having precedence over male off spring. It is only in default of the daughters line that sons succeed to their mothers stridhanam. The rule of devolution is substantially the same under the Dayabhaga system of Hindu law which, unlike the Mitakshara, does not recognize the benefit of survivorship even in the case of unobstructed succession to the property of a male. In the case of the devolution of a males property under the Mitakshara, the cardinal principle is that it should remain in the same family, and that is the reason why agnates, however remote, are preferred to cognates, however near, with one exception, viz., the daughters son. So far as a widow, daughter, mother and paternal grandmother, who are specially provided for in the line of inheritance, are concerned, they, as has now been conclusively established, are simply interposed during their life-time, without diverting the line of inheritance among agnates, until they are exhausted. There is not a single instance indicated in the Mitakshara of the benefit of survivorship between co-heirs inheriting stridhanam property, and, in our opinion, there is no divergence between the Mitakshara and the Dayabhaga as to the character of the estate which, in the case of stridhanam property, devolves upon co-heirs. It would be revolutionary to hold that all property which comes to two or more persons who happen to be members of an undivided family is taken by them with benefit of survivorship, and there is no warrant whatever in the Mitakshara for such a general proposition. It has been held in more cases than one that property which comes to members of an undivided family by devise or gift is not taken by them with benefit of survivorship (Remun Persad v. Mussumat Radha Bceby 4 Moo. I.A. 137 at p. 174, Bai Diwali v. Patel Bechardas I.L.R. 26 Bom. 445). It has been held in more cases than one that property which comes to members of an undivided family by devise or gift is not taken by them with benefit of survivorship (Remun Persad v. Mussumat Radha Bceby 4 Moo. I.A. 137 at p. 174, Bai Diwali v. Patel Bechardas I.L.R. 26 Bom. 445). The Privy Council, no doubt, has ruled in Venkay-yamma Garu v. Vekataramanayyamma Bahadur Garu I.L.R. 25 Mad. 678 that the position taken by the High Court of Calcutta (Jasoda Koer v. Sheo Pershad Singh I.L.R. 17 Cal. 33) and by this Court (Sri Raja Chelikani Venkataramanayamma Garu v. Appa Rau Bahadur Garu I.L.R. 20 Mad. 207) that obstructed heritage universally devolves on co-heirs as tenants in common, and not as joint tenants with benefit of survivorship, is one that is erroneous; but their Lordships have abstained from laying down that, as a universal rule, a heritage which devolves upon co-heirs, who happen to be all or some of the members of an undivided family under the Mitakshara, is taken by them with benefit of survivorship. They refer only to two instances as disproving the universal proposition laid down by the Calcutta High Court, viz., the case of widows and daughters on whom the inheritance devolves with benefit of survivorship, both under the Mitakshara and Dayabhaga, and that even after they effect a partition between themselves of their limited estate in which they have no interest surviving them, either joint or several, transmissible to their heirs (Muttu Vaduganadha Tevar v. Dora Singha Tevar I.L.R. 3 Mad. 290 at p. 301). But we may observe that both these cases are cases of inheritance to the property of a male, and do not affect the question of the devolution of stridhanam property. 5. It is certain that the author of the Mitakshara does not make a distinction between "obstructed" and "unobstructed" heritage, in respect of the devolution of stridhanam property: such distinction was according to his scheme, pertinent only to the inheritance of the property of a male. The definitions of "obstructed" and "unobstructed" heritage given by him and by those who follow him, refer in terms only to the property of a male. 6. The definitions of "obstructed" and "unobstructed" heritage given by him and by those who follow him, refer in terms only to the property of a male. 6. The learned pleader for the Respondent urges that the character of the property which devolves upon sons, whether from their father or from their mother should to taken to be the same, inasmuch as the Mitakshara deals with both in one and the same text in more than one place. He first refers to chapter 1, Section 3, commenting upon Yagnavalkyas text, chapter II, verse 117, which runs as follows: "Let sons divide equally both the effects and the debts after the demise of their two parents. The daughters share the residue of the mothers property after payment of their share of her debts, and the issue succeed in their default." The author of the Mitakshara explains this text, so far as it relates to the mothers property, as meaning only that, inasmuch as it is the obligation of the sons, and not of the daughters, to discharge the mothers debts, the sons are entitled, even if there are daughters, to inherit so much of the assets of the mother as is necessary to discharge her debts, and that the daughters succeed to the residue; but if there be no debts of the mother to discharge, the daughters inherit the whole estate in preference to the sons. The author of the Mitakshara, therefore, in this passage had not in contemplation the character of the estate devolving upon sons from the mother. 7. He Was only pointing out that the real meaning of Yagnavalkya was not that, on the death of the mother, the sons ought to divide her property among themselves as might at first sight he supposed, but only that they are to inherit such portion of the mothers property as may be necessary to discharge her debts, and that it is upon the daughters that the inheritance devolves, subject merely to a deduction in favour of the sons if there are any debts of the mother to be discharged. 8. The learned pleader for the Respondent next refers to chapter 1, Section 4, commenting upon Yagnavalkyas text, chapter 2, verse 118, in which it is declared that whatever is acquired by one coparcener alone, without detriment to the fathers estate, does not appertain to the co-heirs. 8. The learned pleader for the Respondent next refers to chapter 1, Section 4, commenting upon Yagnavalkyas text, chapter 2, verse 118, in which it is declared that whatever is acquired by one coparcener alone, without detriment to the fathers estate, does not appertain to the co-heirs. The author of the Mitakshara explains that the fathers estate referred to in the text will also apply to mothers estate, in other words, whatever is acquired by one of the sons, without the aid of the mothers stridhanam, will belong to himself, and not to him along with the co-heirs. Though the author of the Mitakshara here refers only to the mother, the reference is only by way of illustration, and the import simply is that whatever is acquired by one of the co-heirs without the aid of the heritage which has devolved on the co-heirs, no matter from whom, will belong to him solely, and it is only if the acquisition is made with the aid of the heritage that it will really form an accretion to the heritage and belong to all the co-heirs (Burnells Dayavibhaga, page 48; Smritichandrika, chapter 6, paragraph 2; Krishnasvami Iyers Translation, page 78; Dayabhaga, chapter 6, Section 1, paragraph 17; Stokes Hindu Law Books, page 269). The author of the Mitakshara, therefore, was not thinking of the character of the heritage devolving on a plurality of co-heirs from different relations, but his object was only to declare that if one of the co-heirs makes an acquisition without the aid of such an heritage, it belongs to him solely, and the co-heirs of the heritage cannot claim a share in such acquisition. Though the author of the Mitakshara deals specially with the partition of the fathers property by sons, yet it is clear from chapter 1, Section 1, paragraphs 4 and 5, that the rules prescribed for the partition of the fathers estate apply mutatis mutandis to the partition of property inherited from any relation, and by co-heirs, whether sons or other relations of the deceased. 9. Another argument used by the Respondents pleader is that, as in the case of the grandsons inheriting to the paternal grandfather, so in the case of grandchildren inheriting to the Stridhanam of the maternal or paternal grandmother, they take per stirpes and not per capita. 9. Another argument used by the Respondents pleader is that, as in the case of the grandsons inheriting to the paternal grandfather, so in the case of grandchildren inheriting to the Stridhanam of the maternal or paternal grandmother, they take per stirpes and not per capita. No doubt there may be this similarity, but, as pointed out by the learned pleader for the Appellant, there is a dissimilarity in another respect, viz., that where the deceased dies leaving children and grandchildren the grandchildren do not by representing their deceased mother or father, as the ease may be, step into their shoes and inherit along with the children of the deceased. 10. The Respondents argument does not, therefore, carry any weight, and is especially ineffective in view of the fact that, notwithstanding that daughters sons do not take per stirpes, but per capita, it has been held by the Privy Council that maternal grandfathers property devolves upon them with benefit of survivorship. We must, therefore, hold that none of the arguments addressed to us show that stridhanam property, when it devolves upon a plurality of heirs, is held by them with benefit of survivorship, or that, at any rate, it is so in the case of stridhanam property of a mother devolving upon her sons. We must also hold that in the case of the devolution of stridhanam property there is nothing peculiar in the Mitakshara law as distinguished from the Dayabhaga law, so as to import the doctrine of survivorship as between the co-heirs, and thus restrict the operation of the rules of inheritance laid down for the devolution of stridhanam property. 11. Our answer to the question referred to us in Appeal Suits Nos. 152 and 186 is that the sons take the stridhanam of their mother as co-owners or tenants in common. 12. The second question referred for our opinion is whether the maternal uncles estate devolves upon his nephews who, at the time of their uncles death, are members of an undivided family, as joint tenants with benefit of survivorship, or as tenants in common, or co-owners without benefit of survivorship. 13. The real question which we have to decide is whether this matter is concluded by the ruling of the Privy Council in Venkayyamma Garu v. Venkataramanayyamma Bahadur Garu I.L.R. 25 Mad. 678. 14. 13. The real question which we have to decide is whether this matter is concluded by the ruling of the Privy Council in Venkayyamma Garu v. Venkataramanayyamma Bahadur Garu I.L.R. 25 Mad. 678. 14. We should have no hesitation in holding that it is not so concluded, but for the observation contained in the judgment of the Privy Council that the decision of this Court (Sri Raja Chelikani Venkataramanmyamma Garu v. Appa Rau Bahadur Garu I.L.R. 20 Mad. 207) which was before their Lordships in appeal and which was reversed and also the decision of this Court in Saminadha Pillai v. Thangathanni I.L.R. 19 Mad. 70 were open to the same objections as their Lordships pointed out to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Jasoda Koer v. Sheo Pershad Singh I.L.R. 17 Cal. 33, which was followed by this Court in the two cases referred to. After full consideration, and not without some diffidence, we have come to the conclusion that the ruling in Venkayyamma Garu v. Venkataramanayyamma Bahadur Garu I.L.R. 25 Mad. 678 does not conclude the question referred to us. At the outset we may observe that the ruling of their Lordships with which we are dealing in terms applies only to the case of daughters sons. These form a class of co-heirs, not liable to be increased after the inheritance has devolved on. the class. But the same cannot be said of all other classes of co-heirs, such as sisters sons who succeed in priority to a sister (Lakshmanammal v. Tiruxengada Mudali I.L.R. 5 Mad. 241). In the case of the latter class, therefore, an anomaly occurs in applying the principal of survivorship which does not arise in applying it to the former class. In the case of daughters sons the inheritance will not devolve on them until after the death of all the daughters, and no one, therefore, can come into existence in the undivided family, as a daughters son, after the inheritance has devolved upon the class; but in the case of the heritage of a maternal uncle there may be only one or two nephews in the undivided family at the time of the uncles death, and other nephews may be born subsequent thereto. Though such after-born nephews are part of the same class as the nephews who were in existence at the time of the uncles death, yet they can acquire no right in the property of their maternal uncle, which has already vested in the nephews who were in existence when the uncle died. 15. Such right as they may acquire by birth in the joint family property of their father or grandfather will be limited to paternal property or to property of the paternal line. In an undivided family every member on birth acquires a right in such property, and the right accruing to him is equal to that of his father in the paternal grandfathers property. By the principal of representation, which obtains in an undivided family, the male issue of a deceased member steps into the shoes of the deceased. 16. In the case, then, that we are considering, the after-born nephew cannot, on his birth into the undivided family, acquire any right in the property of his maternal uncle since it had already vested in his brothers before he was born. 17. If sisters sons take the heritage simply as co-heirs, without benefit of survivorship though they are members of an undivided family, the property will belong to them as their separate property, and on the death of each, his undivided share will devolve upon his separate heirs, including of course his after-born brothers. 18. In Venkayyamma Garu v. Venkataramanayyamma Bahadur Garu I.L.R. 25 Mad. 678 their Lordships of the Privy Council while stating that in the grandfathers hands the estate was separately acquired property, added that it became ancestral property in the hands of the grandsons when it devolved on them by inheritance, and their Lordships applied the law of survivorship in tracing succession to such property on the death of one of the grandsons. We cannot therefore regard the use of the expression "ancestral property" as suggested by the learned pleader for the Appellant as a mere casual statement, carrying no special significance. In the Hindu law the word "ancestor" is not used in the wide sense in which it is used in English law as merely equivalent to the propositus and as the co-relative of heir. In the Hindu law the word "ancestor" is not used in the wide sense in which it is used in English law as merely equivalent to the propositus and as the co-relative of heir. In Hindu law it is used only as signifying a direct ascendant in the paternal or maternal line, and more technically as signifying the paternal grandfather and his ascendants in the male line, and in Colebrooks Translation of the Mitakshara it is the expression "fathers fathers property" that is translated into "ancestral property." While it may or may not be that the expression "ancestral property" in their Lordships judgment is used in the latter sense in which technical sense it is used in several judgments of their Lordship of the Privy Council and also by the Indian Legislature (Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Per sad Singh I.L.R. 5 Cal. 148 at p. 164, Parbati Kumari Debi v. Jagadis Chunder Dhabal I.L.R. 29 Cal. 433 at pp. 452 and 453, Rajah Suraneni Venkata Gopalla Narasimha Row v. Rajah Suraneni Lakshma Venkama Row 13 Moo. I.A. 113 at p. 140, Umrithnath Chowdhry v. Goureenath Chowdry 13 Moo. I.A. 542 at p. 546 and Article 126 of the second schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1877) it appears to as clear that it is not used as denoting property other than that which has devolved from a direct ancestor either in the paternal or maternal line. In the case before their Lordships the property had devolved from the maternal grandfather. In the present case the maternal uncle from whom the inheritance devolved cannot be regarded as an ancestor in the maternal line, in the sense in which the term is used by writers on Hindu law. So far as a daughters sons are concerned, they have a peculiar position in the Hindu law which is denied to all other cognates. Under the older Hindu law, the son of an appointed daughter (putrika putra) was equal to an aurasa or legitimate son and he took his rank, according to many authorities, as the highest among the secondary sons. Under the older Hindu law, the son of an appointed daughter (putrika putra) was equal to an aurasa or legitimate son and he took his rank, according to many authorities, as the highest among the secondary sons. Although this branch of the law is now obsolete, its effect survives in the Hindu law of Inheritance and in the consciousness of the people, for even now he takes a place practically next after male issue, the widow and daughters being simply interposed during their respective lives and the maternal grandfather is regarded "as becoming the possessor of a sons son." 19. The position of a daughter and daughters son in the line of inheritance is considered in the Mitakshara, chapter 2, Section 2, paragraphs 5 and 6, from which we quote the following "Then Vishnu says If a man have neither son, nor sons son, nor (wife nor female) issue, the daughters son shall take his wealth. For in regard to the obsequies of ancestors, daughters sons are considered as sons sons." Manu likewise declares "by that male child whom a daughter, whether formally appointed or not, shall produce from a husband of an equal class, the maternal grandfather becomes the grandsire of a sons son: let that son give the funeral oblation and possess the inheritance.". See also Dayabhaga, Chapter XL, Section II, paragraphs 18, 19 and 20 (Stokes Hindu Law Books, page 327). 20. The difference in his position under the old law and the present law is that under the former if he is the son of an appointed daughter (and only one such daughter can be appointed), he becomes by a fiction of law the son or sons son of the maternal grandfather, and as such a member of the grandfathers family, and is not a member of his own fathers family (Mitakshara, Chapter 1, Section 11, paragraph 3). 21. Under the present law he is a member of his own fathers family, but he is regarded as being also as good as a sons son to his maternal grandfather. 22. 21. Under the present law he is a member of his own fathers family, but he is regarded as being also as good as a sons son to his maternal grandfather. 22. If by reason of a daughters son being considered for spiritual purposes, as equal to a sons son, when the maternal grandfather dies without male issue, the estate devolving upon him (though as "obstructed heritage") from the maternal grandfather can, by a fiction of law, be regarded as "ancestral" property in his hands in the technical sense in which that term is used in the Hindu law, viz., as denoting property descending from a paternal male ancestor, the daughters sons, when there are more than one, will not only hold such estate as joint family property with mutual rights of survivorship to the exclusion of their father and his other coparceners, if any, but their male issue will also on birth acquire, in such property, a right jointly with and equal to their fathers. But if the estate devolving on daughters sons is to be regarded only-as in truth it is-as coming to them from the maternal line, their male issue cannot acquire in such estate a right by birth equal to their fathers-for such right is expressly limited to property devolving upon the father from the paternal line (Mitakshara, chapter I, Section 5, paragraph 5). The anomaly in this latter view will be that though the daughters sons who are undivided as between themselves hold the maternal grandfathers estate (according to the ruling of the Privy Council in Venkayyamma Garu v. Venkataramanayyamma Bahadur Garu I.L.R. 25 Mad. 678 as joint family property with the benefit of survivorship as understood under the Mitakshara law, yet their male issue will not become joint owners in such property possessing equal rights with their father. There can hardly be any doubt that the right of survivorship on which the ruling of the Privy Council is based, is the right of survivorship obtaining under the Mitakshara system (Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramchandra Dutt I.L.R. 23 Cal. 670 at p. 679) according to which the right will not prevail in favour of the survivor, as against the male issue of the deceased. 670 at p. 679) according to which the right will not prevail in favour of the survivor, as against the male issue of the deceased. Under the Mitakshara joint family system there can be no joint family property in respect of which the male issue of the joint owners will not by birth become joint owners with their father (see Sudarsanam Maistri v. Narasimhulu Maistri I.L.R. 25 Mad. 149 at pp. 155 and 156). 23. If, therefore, we are to understand the expression "ancestral property" in their Lordships judgment otherwise than in its technical sense, according to which it is property in which a son on his birth becomes an equal owner with his father, the result of the ruling will be that a species of joint family property unknown to the Mitakshara will be brought into existence. 24. But for the absence of any allusion in the judgment of the Privy Council to the texts already quoted, declaring a daughters son to be as good as a sons son and that "there is no difference in law" between them, we should not hesitate to say that the expression "ancestral property" is used in the judgment in the technical sense already referred to. The nature of the estate devolving upon a daughters son was considered by this Court in two cases (Muttayan Chetti v. Sivagiri Zamindar I.L.R. 3 Mad. 370, Sivaganga Zarnindar v. Lakshmana I.L.R. 9 Mad. 188), both of which were considered by this Court in Venkayyamma Garu v. Venkataramanayyamma Bahadur Garu I.L.R. 25 Mad. 678. In both, the question raised was whether the son of the daughters son had a right of interdiction against an alienation made by his father of his maternal grandfathers property. In both these cases it was held that though in respect of such property, the son may not on birth become an equal owner with his father, entitled to demand partition from his father, yet such property is not the self-acquisition of the father which he can alienate at his will and pleasure. The former case in Muttayan Chetti v. Sivagiri Zamindar I.L.R. 3 Mad. 370 was carried in appeal to the Privy Council (Muttayan Chetti v. Zamindar of Sivagiri I.L.R. 6 Mad. The former case in Muttayan Chetti v. Sivagiri Zamindar I.L.R. 3 Mad. 370 was carried in appeal to the Privy Council (Muttayan Chetti v. Zamindar of Sivagiri I.L.R. 6 Mad. 1) and their Lordships, while concurring in the view that the property was not the self-acquisition of the father, refrained from deciding whether or not the father had absolute power of disposition over such property as he has over his self-acquisition-the decision of that question having become unnecessary in the view which they took of the case on another point. If, in the recent decision of the Privy Council in Venkayyamma Garu v. Venkataramanayyamma Bahadur Garu I.L.R. 25 Mad. 678 the expression "ancestral property" he regarded as having been used by their Lordships in the restricted technical sense above referred to, the result will be that the son will have an equal right with his father in the property which has devolved on the latter from his maternal grandfather, and the ratio decidendi of the ruling itself may be inferred to be that when the maternal grandfathers property devolves upon the sons of a daughter, they and they alone succeed to the maternal grandfather as if he was their fathers father, but in respect of their own paternal property they will be joint owners thereof with their father and his other co-parceners, if any. 25. Whether such be the ratio decidendi or not, and whether the expression "ancestral property" be used as denoting property coming from the paternal line only or from both paternal and maternal lines, we are unable, notwithstanding the adverse comment of the Privy Council on the decision of this Court in Saminadha Pillai v. Thangathanni I.L.R. 19 Mad. 70 to extend the ruling in Venkayyamma Garu v. Venkataramanayyamma Bahadur Garu I.L.R. 25 Mad. 678 to cases other than those in which the inheritance devolves from a paternal or maternal male ancestor on his lineal descendants, whether as "unobstructed" or as "obstructed" heritage. The decision in Saminadha Pillai v. Thangathanni was referred to as follows in the judgment of this Court in the Jaggampet case (Sri Raja Chelikani Venkataramanayamma Garu v. Appa Rau Bahadur Garu I.L.R. 20 Mad. 207 at p. 218): "The ratio decidendi of this decision and of the Calcutta ruling (Jasoda Koer v. Sheo Pershad Singh I.L.R. 17 Cal. The decision in Saminadha Pillai v. Thangathanni was referred to as follows in the judgment of this Court in the Jaggampet case (Sri Raja Chelikani Venkataramanayamma Garu v. Appa Rau Bahadur Garu I.L.R. 20 Mad. 207 at p. 218): "The ratio decidendi of this decision and of the Calcutta ruling (Jasoda Koer v. Sheo Pershad Singh I.L.R. 17 Cal. 33) which in effect it followed, is identical, viz., that survivorship does not exist in any case in which property passes as obstructed heritage." The observation of the Privy Council that Saminadha Pillai v. Thangathanni I.L.R. 19 Mad. 70 case is open to the same objection as the decision, of this Court in Venkayyamma Garu v. Venkataramanayyamma Bahadur Garu I.L.R. 25 Mad. 678 can be construed only as a disapproval of the general position therein maintained that survivorship cannot exist in any case in which property passes as obstructed heritage, and not as a disapproval of the actual decision in the case, even apart from the question of fact on which also it was based. The ruling of the Calcutta High Court in Jasoda Koer v. Sheo Pershad Singh I.L.R. 17 Cal. 33 also proceeded on the same general principle-which was disapproved of by the Privy Council. But as the Calcutta decision, like Venkayyamma Garu v. Venkataramanayyamma Bahadur Garu I.L.R. 25 Mag. 678, related to the property of a maternal grandfather devolving upon his daughters sons, it became necessary for their Lordships of the Privy Council to examine whether, apart from the reasons given, which their Lordships disapproved of the decision itself was sound or not; and adverting to the principles regulating the devolution of joint family property under the Mitakshara law, they came to the conclusion that the decision itself was erroneous. But as regards the decision of this Court in Saminadha Pilhi v. Thangathanni I.L.R. 19 Mad. 70, which related to a case of collateral succession it was unnecessary for their Lordships to examine the soundness or otherwise of the actual decision in the case, apart from the general position therein taken, and the actual decision itself cannot, therefore, be considered as overruled. 26. 70, which related to a case of collateral succession it was unnecessary for their Lordships to examine the soundness or otherwise of the actual decision in the case, apart from the general position therein taken, and the actual decision itself cannot, therefore, be considered as overruled. 26. Our answer to the question referred to us in Second Appeal No. 1388 of 1901 is that on the death of the maternal uncle each of the nephews then in existence took an undivided one-third share of the estate which on his death devolved as his separate property.