JUDGMENT Arnold White, C.J. 1. This is a revision petition against an order of a District Munsif dismissing an application for leave to sue in forma pauperis. The Munsif made an order under Section 408 of the Code of Civil Procedure appointing a day for the hearing of the application. The application duly came on for hearing under the provisions of Section 409 of the Code and the District Munsif made an order under that Section dismissing the application. He dismissed it upon the ground that the Petitioner on the face of the plaint did not appear to have a right to sue. On the hearing of the application the Petitioner appeared, but the Defendants did not appear, and no argument was addressed to the Court with reference to the question whether, on the face of the application and of the evidence, the applicant was or was not subject to any of the prohibitions specified in Section 407 of the Code. It has been argued before me that it was not competent for the District Munsif to dismiss the application upon the ground taken by him, and the argument was based upon the opening words of Section 408 if the Court sees no reason to refuse the application on any of the grounds stated in Section 407 and on the second paragraph of Section 409 the Court shall also hear any argument which the parties may desire to offer, etc. The argument was that the Court would not make an order under Section 408 fixing a day for the hearing of the application, unless it was satisfied that there was no reason to refuse the application on any of the grounds stated in Section 407, and, that being so the Court could not, where there had been no argument upon the point at the hearing, go into the question again when the hearing took place under Section 409. To adopt the construction which I was invited on behalf of the Petition to adopt with reference to Section 409 would, it seems to me, be placing too narrow a construction upon the words of paragraph 2. To adopt the construction which I was invited on behalf of the Petition to adopt with reference to Section 409 would, it seems to me, be placing too narrow a construction upon the words of paragraph 2. Paragraph 2 says The Court shall also hear any argument which the parties may desire to offer on the question whether, on the face of the application and of the evidence (if any) taken by the Court as herein provided, the applicant is or is not subject to any of the prohibitions specified in Section 407. It enables the parties to argue the question, if they so desire, and requires the Court, if any argument is offered, to consider the argument, but, as it seems to me, it does not preclude the Court if no argument is offered when the matter comes on for hearing under Section 409 from considering whether the applicant is subject to any of the prohibitions specified in Section 407, and if the Court is of opinion that he is, from dismissing the application. It does not follow, because, at the time when the Court acting under Section 408 fixes a day for the hearing of the application, it then sees no reason to refuse the application on any of the grounds stated, that at a later stage when exercising the powers conferred by Section 409 it is not open to the Court to consider whether the applicant is subject to any of these prohibitions. All that Section 408 means is that the Court at that stage of the proceedings must be of opinion that, on the materials then before the Court, there is no reason to refuse the application on any of the grounds stated in Section 407. It is also the duty of the Court when the hearing takes place at a later stage, under Section 409 to consider whether or not the applicant is subject to any of the prohibitions specified. 2. It has also been argued that paragraph C of Section 407 refers to a matter of jurisdiction and not to the question whether or not a good cause of action is disclosed in the application. 2. It has also been argued that paragraph C of Section 407 refers to a matter of jurisdiction and not to the question whether or not a good cause of action is disclosed in the application. No doubt the concluding words of the paragraph " sue in such Court " lend some support to the argument that the paragraph refers to the jurisdiction of the Court and not to the cause of action disclosed in the application. I do not think the point is altogether free from doubt, but it has been carefully considered by the Allahabad High Court in two cases, and I am prepared to follow these decisions. In the later case of Kamrakh Nath v. Sundar Nath I.L.R. 20 All. 299. the decision is to the effect that paragraph C of this Section does not refer solely to a question of jurisdiction, but that the applicant must make out that he has a good subsisting prima facie cause of action capable of enforcement. 3. The third point relied upon on behalf of the Petitioner is that the plaint, on the face of it, discloses a right to sue. As to this I see no reason to differ from the conclusion at which the Munsif has arrived. 4. That being my view with regard to the three points raised on behalf of the Petitioner, I hold that it has not been shown that the District Munsif failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in him by law or that he acted illegally or with material irregularity. 5. I dismiss the Petition with costs.