JUDGMENT Banerjee and Henderson, JJ. - This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the Plaintiff-Appellant to obtain a declaration that the Defendant No. 1, a minor, was not the adopted son of her husband and for such other relief as the Plaintiff may be deemed to be entitled to. The plaint contains an allegation that the Plaintiff has learnt on enquiry that the Defendant No. 2, the natural father of the minor Defendant No. 1, fraudulently and without knowledge of the Plaintiff had obtained by an application which was filed under a false vakalutnamah, purporting to be executed by the Plaintiff, a certificate appointing the Plaintiff as guardian of the Defendant No. 1, as her husband's adopted son. The defence was a denial-of the allegations in the plaint. Then it appears that the parties came to terms and a sulenama or compromise was effected and with the leave of the first Court, as the order-sheet shows, the natural father of the minor was allowed to enter into the compromise and a decree was made in accordance with the terms thereof. Against that decree an appeal was preferred on behalf of the minor, represented not by his natural farther by whom he was represented in the first Court, but by a distant cousin; and upon that appeal the learned District Judge has set aside the compromise and dismissed the Plaintiff's suit upon the ground, as far as we can gather from his judgment, that an appeal lay because the compromise was unlawful and that it was incompetent to the Plaintiff to maintain the suit so long as the order of the District Judge appointing her as guardian of the minor Defendant remained in force. 2. From that decision this appeal has been preferred; and it is contended on behalf of the Plaintiff-Appellant that the learned District Judge was wrong in holding that an appeal lay and in dealing with the case upon that appeal, the compromise was wrongly set aside. 3. In our opinion the contention of the learned vakil for the Appellant is well founded. If the Defendant No. 1 is entitled' to have this suknama set aside, he may have other remedy by way of an application for review in the first Court or by a separate suit; but an appeal was certainly not the proper remedy, especially having regard to the facts of this case. If the Defendant No. 1 is entitled' to have this suknama set aside, he may have other remedy by way of an application for review in the first Court or by a separate suit; but an appeal was certainly not the proper remedy, especially having regard to the facts of this case. If the ground upon which the suknama is to be pronounced unlawful, is, that it was entered into without the leave of the Court having been granted after that Court had judicially determined that the compromise was for the minor's benefit, it was not by way of appeal that that point could be made out, but the proper method was to apply to the Court which granted the leave to determine the point. An Appellate Court can determine the appeal only upon the materials before it on the record. Then, as for the ground taken by the learned District Judge, that it was not competent to the Plaintiff to maintain the suit so long as the order appointing her guardian of Defendant No. 1 stood, we are of opinion that that is an erroneous ground. Section 48 of the Guardians and Wards Act of 1890 has been relied upon in support of the learned Judge's view. That section says that, except as provided by Section 47 of that Act and by Section 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an order made under that Act shall be final and shall not be liable to be contested by suit ox otherwise. That no doubt is so. The appointment of the Plaintiff as guardian as being the proper person to have the custody of the person and property, or both, of the minor is a thing which it was for the District Judge, acting under the provisions of the Guardians and "Wards Act, to determine so long as certain preliminary conditions remain fulfilled. But a party who had been appointed guardian, even admitting that she was appointed guardian by her own consent, might say : 'I then believed that the minor, whose guardian I was appointed, was the lawfully adopted son of my late husband; now I have taken advice and I am told that the adoption is invalid in law. But a party who had been appointed guardian, even admitting that she was appointed guardian by her own consent, might say : 'I then believed that the minor, whose guardian I was appointed, was the lawfully adopted son of my late husband; now I have taken advice and I am told that the adoption is invalid in law. I want to have that adoption set aside.' She could not ask the District Judge under the Guardians and Wards Act to enter into an adjudication as to the validity or invalidity of the adoption and to revoke the order appointing her as guardian. Her only course would be to bring a suit to set aside the adoption, care being taken of course that the minor was properly represented by some other person whose interest was not adverse to that of the minor. Such a case as this is clearly contemplated by the second paragraph of Section 443 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That, being so, the decision of the Lower Appellate Court was clearly based upon an erroneous ground. The view we take that an appeal was not the proper mode of having a sulenama such as has been entered into in this case set aside, is in accordance with that taken by this Court in the case of Biraj Mohini Dasi v. Chinta Moni Dasi (1901) 5 C.W.N. 877. 4. The decree of the Lower Appellate Court must therefore be reversed and it would be loft open to the Respondent, if he wishes to have the compromise set aside, to proceed either by review or by a separate suit. The Appellant is entitled to her costs in this Court as well as in the Lower Appellate Court.