JUDGMENT Banerjee and Henderson, JJ. - This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the Plaintiffs-Appellants for a declaration that they were persons entitled to make a deposit u/s 19 of the Public Demands Recovery Act I of 1895 (Bengal Council) and that the order of the Deputy Collector made upon review under that section confirming the sale and the order of the Commissioner u/s 33 of that Act confirming the sale were ultra vires and for cancellation of the sale. The defence was that the suit was not maintainable; that the orders complained of were not ultra vires and that the sale should not be cancelled. The first Court decreed the Plaintiffs' suit. On appeal the Lower Appellate Court reversed that decree and dismissed the suit on two grounds--first, that the suit to set aside the sale in execution of a certificate is not maintainable, where, as in this case, it is found that there was an unsatisfied arrear of cesses due at the time of the sale and secondly, that the orders u/s 19 and Section 33, which the Plaintiffs asked the Court to hold as being ultra vires, were really not so. 2. In second appeal it is contended on behalf of the Plaintiffs-Appellants that the first ground of the Lower Appellate Court's judgment is wrong and the case of Troyluckho Nath Mozumdar v. Pahar Khan ILR (1896) Cal. 641, in reliance upon which the Lower Appellate Court has held this suit as not maintainable, has been overruled by the Pull Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ram Taruck Hazra v. Dilwar Ali ILR (1901) Cal. 73; and that the second ground of the judgment is also erroneous, it being argued that the order made by the Certificate Officer to set aside the sale u/s 19 of Act I of 1895 was a final order under Sub-section 4 of that section and was neither open to review by the Certificate Officer nor subject to revision by the Commissioner u/s 33 and that the subsequent orders interfering with that first order were ultra vires and should be treated as a nullity and if that is so, the first order setting aside the sale should be held to be the only order in the case and the sale should be declared by the Court as cancelled. 3. 3. The contention on behalf of the Appellants that the first ground of the Lower Appellate Court's judgment is erroneous is in our opinion correct. The case of Troyluckho Nath Mozumdar v. Pahar Khan ILR (1896) Cal. 641, in reliance upon which the Lower Appellate Court has held this suit as not maintainable, has been overruled by the Full Bench decision in the case of Ram Taruck Hazra v. Dilwar Ali ILR (1901) Cal. 73. 4. It has been argued for the Respondent that Section 15 of the Act I of 1895 was a bar to the civil suit unless it is brought under certain conditions which have not been fulfilled in this case. We do not think that Section 15 has any bearing upon this suit. If the contention of the learned vakil for the Appellants, that the first order of the Certificate Officer u/s 19, setting aside the sale was absolutely final in the sense not only of its not being open to appeal, but of its not being open either to review or revision by the Commissioner u/s 33 of the Act, be correct, then all the subsequent orders would be ultra tires and the suit would lie and would not be liable to be dismissed. Was that order really so? That is the question upon which the whole case turns. The contention on behalf of the Appellants is that as Sub-section 4 of Section 19 says any order made by the Certificate Officer under this section shall be final and as there is nothing to indicate that the finality intended by the section is finality so far as regards interference by an Appellate Court is concerned, we should hold that the intention of the Legislature was to make it final in the sense of not being open to appeal or review or revision. It was suggested that as the order contemplated by the section was of a remedial character, restoring the property sold to its former owner and compensating the auction-purchaser by awarding him one-tenth of the auction price in addition to the purchase-money, the Legislature might well have intended to make the order absolutely final. 5. It was suggested that as the order contemplated by the section was of a remedial character, restoring the property sold to its former owner and compensating the auction-purchaser by awarding him one-tenth of the auction price in addition to the purchase-money, the Legislature might well have intended to make the order absolutely final. 5. On the other hand, it is contended for the Respondent that the finality intended by Sub-section 4 of Section 19 is only finality so far as interference by an Appellate Court is concerned ; that that would not prevent the Certificate Officer from reviewing the order nor would it prevent the Commissioner u/s 33 of the Act from revising it; and it was pointed out that although Section 19, Sub-section 2, directs the Certificate Officer to set aside the sale on certain conditions, there is nothing to prevent the Certificate Officer from making an order under the section refusing to cancel the sale as he has done in this case, if not in the first instance, but upon review and that in such cases the reason given for making the order absolutely final cannot hold good. 6. After considering the arguments on both sides and the authorities cited, we are of opinion that Sub-section 4 of Section 19 of the Public Demands Recovery Act of 1895 (B.C.), in saying that any order made by the Certificate Officer under the section shall be final, only means and intends that it shall not be open to appeal such as is provided by Section 32; and that the intention is not to make the order absolutely final so as to make it not open to review or revision. Although in most cases the order contemplated by Section 19 can only have a remedial effect, there may be cases where a Certificate Officer erroneously refuses, after deposit, to cancel a sale where he ought clearly not to do so; and to hold that there is no power which can set him right by revision, would be to hold what the Legislature could never have contemplated, especially when Section 83 of the Act, after providing that no appeal shall lie from certain orders, says that the Commissioner may in any case in which he thinks fit revise any order passed by a Certificate Officer or certain other Revenue Officers' The view we take that the words "shall be final" in Section 19, Sub-section 4, have the qualified meaning indicated above and not the unqualified signification for which the learned vakil for the Appellants contends, is in accordance with that taken in the case of Nasiruddin Khan v. Indronarayan Chowdhry (1866) B.L.R. Sup. Vol. 367, which had reference to exactly the same words occurring in the CPC of 1859, with regard to an order made upon an application for review of judgment. And the same view has in effect been taken by the Bombay High Court in the case of Badaricharya v. Ramchandra Gopal Savant ILR (1893) Bom. 113 and Ramsing v. Babu Kisansing ILR (1893) Bom. 116. That being so and the order in question being in our opinion open to revision by the Commissioner u/s 33 of the Public Demands Recovery Act and the Commissioner having under that section affirmed the sale, it becomes unnecessary to consider the further question whether it was open to a Certificate Officer himself to review the order when no power of review is conferred on him by the Act--a question upon which the case of Lata Pryag Lal v. Jai Narayan Singh ILR (1895) Cal. 419 may lend some support to the Appellants contention. 7. The result is that the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.