JUDGMENT : STANLEY, J. 1. Upon the question of limitation raised in the suit we are unable to see our way to agree in the view expressed by the District Judge, which commended itself to the learned Judge who has disposed of this case under section 551 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The suit is one for the redemption of a mortgage alleged to have been made in the year 1842. The mortgagor in that instrument was one Maharaj Singh and, the mortgagees were the predecessors-in-title of the defendants. In execution of a money decree which had been obtained against Mahraj Singh, the equity of redemption in the mortgaged property was old and purchased by one Hori Lal who is the predecessor-in-title of the plaintiff-appellant. Hori Lal instituted a suit in the year 1887, for recovery of possession of the mortgaged property alleging, as he believed at the time, that the defendants-respondents were merely trespassers. A defence was filed to the suit by the defendants-respondents in which denying the allegation that they were trespassers they set up the case that they were mortgagees in possession of the property. They stated in clear terms that the property was mortgaged with possession in the year 1842 by Mahraj Singh to Kanchan Singh and several others to secure a sum of Rs. 150, and that from the date of that mortgage the ancestors of the defendants-respondents, the mortgagees, and afterwards the defendants-respondents had been in possession of the property under the mortgage. The plaintiff's suit was accordingly dismissed. Thereupon the present suit was filed on the 14th of June, 1900, for redemption of the mortgaged property. The suit was ultimately dismissed on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The learned District Judge after carefully reviewing the evidence, came to the conclusion that the admission contained in the defence, to which we have referred, in the suit brought in 1887, namely, that the defendants were in possession under a mortgage made in the year 1842, was made in error, that there was no mortgage of that date, but that there was a mortgage of an earlier date and that this being so the plaintiff could not rely upon the written statement which the defendants had filed as amounting to an acknowledgment under section 19 of the Indian Limitation Act. He observes in the course of his judgment: “The second alleged acknowledgment refers to the written statement of the respondents in the course of a suit in 1887 in which they setup this identical mortgage which they declared to be of the year 1842 as a bar to ejectment. This would have been a valid acknowledgment had there not been an error as to date. Taken broadly, when a man makes an acknowledgment with regard to the existence of one thing, he cannot be held to make an acknowledgment with regard to a totally disconnected thing, and an acknowledgment made under a misapprehension as to relevant, facts can only be held to be no acknowledgment at all,” We wholly fail to follow the learned District Judge in the conclusion at which he arrived on this point. The statement contained in the defence filed in the suit of 1887 was a clear and explicit acknowledgment that the defendants in that suit were in possession of the property as mortgagees and amounted to a plea that if the plaintiff sought to get possession of the mortgaged property he must first redeem their mortgage. The mere fact that the mortgage was erroneously stated to be a mortgage of 1842, did not take away from the admission its efficacy under section 19 of the Indian Limitation Act. But then it is contended on behalf of the defendants-respondents that admitting that that statement in the defence did amount to an acknowledgment which would under ordinary circumstances take the case out of the bar of the statute, it was open to the defendants to rely upon the fact, if it be a fact, that at the time when the acknowledgment was given more than 60 years had elapsed from the date of the mortgage, and the suit was therefore barred, and that the acknowledgment was inefficacious, the suit having been already barred. This might be so if they had been able to satisfy the onus which clearly lay upon them of satisfying the Court that the mortgage was executed upwards of 60 years prior to the filing of the written statement in the suit of 1887, but they have failed to do so. This might be so if they had been able to satisfy the onus which clearly lay upon them of satisfying the Court that the mortgage was executed upwards of 60 years prior to the filing of the written statement in the suit of 1887, but they have failed to do so. Consequently, as it appears to us, that acknowledgment must be treated, so far as this appeal is concerned, as an acknowledgment that at the time when it was made the mortgage was a subsisting mortgage, whatever be its date. We only decide in this appeal that the claim of the plaintiff has not been shown to be statute-barred, and that the decision of the learned Judge which has been upheld in appeal to this Court, cannot be supported. We decide no other question. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the decisions of the various Courts before which this matter has come, and remand the case under the provisions of section 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the Court of first instance through the lower appellate Court with directions that it be re-admitted in its original number in the register of pending suits and be determined on the merits. 2. It is to be understood that we decide nothing on the merits of the case. It will lie on the plaintiff to establish the terms of the alleged mortgage. 3. All that we hold is upon the facts which have been brought before the lower appellate Court and this High Court,’ there was no justification for dismissing the suit upon the question of limitation which was raised before those Courts. Costs in all Courts will follow the event.