JUDGMENT 1. In this case a rule wan granted calling upon the District Magistrate of Hughly to show cause why the order, dated the 10th December 1902, requiring the Petitioner to execute a security-bond for the sum of four hundred rupees, should not be set aside, on the ground that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to make such order, and why such other order should not be made as to this Court may seem fit. It appears that a complaint was lodged against the present Petitioner by one Sasi Bhusan Mullik before the Joint Magistrate of Hughly charging him with the commission of an offence under sec. 404 of the Indian Penal Code with respect to certain ornaments left by a deceased woman. That complaint was sent by the Joint Magistrate for a preliminary enquiry by a Deputy Magistrate, and on receipt of his report the Joint Magistrate called on the parties to appear before him, and after inspecting a letter which had been addressed to the present Petitioner by the pleader on behalf of the complainant, he passed the following order:--"Purno Banerjee is to execute a surety-bond to the extent of Rs. 400, and to hold the ornaments in deposit with him as trust and to produce them whenever required. In the meanwhile the complainant should have his claim proved in a competent Court. The case may remain till 3 months." 2. In support of the rule it is contended that the order of the Magistrate demanding security from the Petitioner could not be passed under the provisions of sec. 517 or sec. 523 or any other section of the Criminal Procedure Code. 3. We think that this contention is valid, and that the rule must be made absolute, and the order set aside. If the Magistrate thought that a criminal offence had been committed in respect of the ornaments he had power to proceed under sec. 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and to direct their production in his Court for the purpose of any investigation or trial into that offence, and, on failure of the party, in whose possession the property then was, to produce it, to proceed under sec. 96 of the same Code, or any other section, in order to secure their production. 96 of the same Code, or any other section, in order to secure their production. We can find no section of the law enabling him to demand security from the person in possession of the articles for their production when required. In the explanation it has been suggested that the order which the Joint Magistrate has passed is an executive order. But we can find nothing whatever to support such a view. The matter was before the Magistrate in his judicial capacity, and he appears to have taken cognisance of the offence, and to have postponed the trial pending the reference by the complainant to the Civil Court. If the Magistrate did not think fit to take proper steps under the law to secure the production of the property before his Court, the only course which was open to him was to leave it to the Civil Court to take such steps as it might think fit for the production and custody of the property in question. The rule is therefore made absolute and the order is set aside.