JUDGMENT 1. Goloke Nath Rai died, leaving his widow Janhabi power to adopt and, under this authority, she adopted Baikuntha Nath Roy. Apparently, during his minority disputes and litigation arose amongst those who were managing his property and Janhabi. Shortly after attaining majority Baikuntha came to terms with Janhabi, his adoptive mother, and executed a deed under which he gave her during her lifetime full power to enjoy possession of certain properties mentioned therein which formed portion of the estate of Goloke Nath. Some alluvial lands formed on the border of one these properties they were taken possession of by Janhabi as reformation in situ of part of her properties. The neighbouring zemindar claimed these lands as accretion and, in a suit against Janhabi, he obtained a decree for possession with mesne profits and costs. While this decree was under execution, Janhabi died, and it was sought to make Dinomoni Chowdhurani to whom as the widow of Baikuntha Nath, the estate had passed a party to the suit in her place and liable for the mesne profits and costs decreed against Janhabi. Not withstanding Dinomoni's objection, she has been made a party to the decree and it is against this order that the present appeal has been preferred. The learned Advocate-General and Mr. Hill on behalf of the Appellant have contended that the action being one of tort, the decree was a personal decree against the deceased Janhabi who was alone a party in the case and that, in this view, neither the estate in which Janhabi had then a life-interest nor Dinomoni who is the present holder of the estate could be made liable under the decree and it was further contended that, if the Plaintiff in that suit desired to make the estate liable, he should have made the zemindar man a Defendant. We cannot agree in this view of the suit. 2. Having regard to the position occupied by Janhabi under the deed executed in her favour by Baikuntha Nath, we think that at that time she must be regarded as acting on behalf of the estate. We cannot agree in this view of the suit. 2. Having regard to the position occupied by Janhabi under the deed executed in her favour by Baikuntha Nath, we think that at that time she must be regarded as acting on behalf of the estate. She was certainly not claiming any personal advantage on her own account and although it was held in the suit brought against her that she had acted unlawfully in claiming the lands as reformations in situ to property held by her under a deed executed by Baikuntha, still she acted on behalf of the estate and for the protection of the interests of that estate. That was the principle upon which the case of Ram Kishore Chuckerbutty v. Kally Kanto Chuckerbutty I. L. R. 6 Cal. 479 (1880) which has been cited by Mr. O'Kinealy for the Respondent proceeded and we think that that was a proper way of dealing with the relations between the parties. Mr. O'Kinealy has further drawn our attention to three instances shown from the record in which Dinomoni has successfully applied for and obtained substitution of her name for that of the deceased Janhabi as her legal representative. We would also point to a passage in the deed giving Janhabi a life-interest over the properties mentioned therein in which Baikuntha Nath who had the absolute right and title gave her liberty to carry on litigations in her own name without any objection by him or by his heirs with the object evidently as also stated that he will at her death obtain possession of all the properties. Under such circumstances we think that the Subordinate Judge has rightly made Dinamoni a party to this case. We accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs, ten gold mohurs.