JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. and Stevens, J. - Three points arise on this appeal, first, whether the Plaintiff is entitled to maintain the suit, secondly, whether the Court below was right in disallowing one quarter's rent, as it did, and, thirdly, whether the Defendants are entitled to interest on the amount of rent, to which I will refer in a moment. The facts are these :--The landlord sued for arrears of rent: he obtained a decree, the tenancy was put up for sale and was sold under that decree, and there was a substantial surplus, after satisfying the landlord's claim. The present Plaintiff was not registered as one of the tenants, he purchased a share after the date of the decree in the suit to which I have referred. He instituted the present suit and he says, "I am entitled to a share in this tenure and I am entitled to a share of these surplus sale-proceeds, which remain after satisfying the landlord's claim." The first question is whether he can maintain the suit. I think, he can, and I am not aware of any statutory provision which disqualifies him from so doing. He could not come in under sec. 169 of the Bengal Tenancy Act--he did make the attempt,--because he was not a judgment-debtor within the meaning of that section, but I do not see why he should not be entitled to institute a suit, claiming a share of the surplus-proceeds of the sale, I therefore decide the first point in Respondent's favour. 2. The second question turns upon the true construction of sub-sec. (c) of sec 169 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Rent was due to the landlord for the period between the institution of the suit and the date of the sale, as I understand, about one quarter's rent. The question turns upon what is meant, by the date of sale in the section : Does it mean the date when the sale really took place or the date when it becomes absolute by confirmation by the Court? Looking to the object of the section, it would, I think, be a narrow construction to say that the date of sale means the actual date of sale, as opposed to the date when it becomes absolute. 3. Having regard to secs. Looking to the object of the section, it would, I think, be a narrow construction to say that the date of sale means the actual date of sale, as opposed to the date when it becomes absolute. 3. Having regard to secs. 314 and 316 of the Code of Civil Procedure, I think it means the date when the sale becomes absolute, and that this construction may fairly be placed upon it without straining the language of the section ; otherwise the landlord might be driven to bring a separate suit for the rent of the intermediate period. 4. The Appellant then is entitled to succeed on this point, and he is entitled, out of the fund, to deduct the rent for the period up to the date of the confirmation of the sale, that is, as I understand, one-fourth of the sum of Rs. 59-11-3. 5. The last point is whether the Appellant is entitled to interest on such rents. I can see nothing in the section and he falls on that point. We make no order as to costs in this appeal--each party having partially succeeded.