JUDGMENT 1. In this case a rule was granted calling upon the District Magistrate of Cuttack to show cause why the conviction and sentence passed on the Petitioner should not be set aside on the ground that at the time the Petitioner was alleged to be in possession of the kerosine oil mentioned in the judgment, there was no provision of any Act in force rendering the possession of the oil illegal at the place where the oil was found. The question raised by this rule is whether the conviction of the Petitioner under the Petroleum Act of 1899 can be sustained, the Petitioner having been in possession of petroleum at Cuttack, and the Act not having been extended by notification in the Gazette to that district. 2. By sec. 1 of the Petroleum Act of 1886 it was provided that that Act or rather a portion of that Act dealing with the possession of the species of petroleum which the Petitioner had in his possession should extend only to such local areas as the Local Government from time to time by notification in the official Gazette might direct--a direction of the Local Government extending the provisions of that Act to Cattack, the area in question has been notified in the Gazette. That notification is dated the 7th April 1891. So previous to the passing of the Petroleum Act of 1899, it would have been illegal for the Petitioner to have had at Cuttack of the petroleum which was found in his possession. Now the Act of 1886 contains in sec. 2, sub-sec. (2) a proviso that all notifications issued, rules made, licenses granted, powers conferred and certificates given under the Act shall, so far as may be, be deemed to have been issued, made granted, conferred and given under this Act. The Act referred to in that subsection is the earlier Petroleum Act of 1881 and the effect of that proviso was to preserve all notifications, rules and powers which bad issued under the earlier Act. Now, while the Petroleum Act of 1899 re-enacts the provision as to the local extent which is to be found in the Petroleum Act of 1886, there is in it no provision corresponding to sec. 2, sub-sec. (2) to which we have just referred. 3. Now, while the Petroleum Act of 1899 re-enacts the provision as to the local extent which is to be found in the Petroleum Act of 1886, there is in it no provision corresponding to sec. 2, sub-sec. (2) to which we have just referred. 3. It has been argued by the learned vakil in support of the rule that inasmuch as that proviso is not to be found in the Petroleum Act of 1899, the notifications, rules and orders made under the earlier Petroleum Act of 1886 have not been preserved, and that if they have not been preserved, then the Act, of 1889 does not extend to Cuttack, and the conviction of the Petitioner cannot stand. But between the years 1886 and 1899 there was passed the General Clauses Act, and it was argued by the learned counsel who appeared to show cause against the rule that the sub-section which corresponds to sub-sec (2) of sec. 2 of the Petroleum Act of 1886 was unnecessary in the Petroleum Act of 1899, because the orders made under the Petroleum Act of 1886 are prescribed by the terms of the General Clauses Act of 1897. By the General Clauses Act of 1897 it is provided in sec. 8 of that Act that "where this Act or any Act of the Governor-General in Council or regulation made after the commencement of this Act repeals and re-enacts with or without modification any provision of a former enactment, then references in any other enactment or in any instrument to the provision so repealed shall unless a different intention appears, be construed as references to the provision so re-enacted." Then sec. 24 provides that "where any Act of the Governor-General-in-Council or regulation is, after the commencement of this Act, repealed and re-enacted, with or without modification, then unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any order, scheme, rule, form or bye-law, issued under the repealed Act or regulation, shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted, continue in force and be deemed to have been issued under the provisions so re-enacted, unless and until it is superseded by any order, scheme, rule, form or bye-law issued under the provisions so re-enacted." 4. In the present case there has been an order directing that the Petroleum Act of 1886 shall extend to Cuttack, and that order was duly notified in the official Gazette, and therefore became a valid and binding order under the Act. It is argued that that order is not preserved by sec. 24, because it should be described as a notification and not as an order, and it is said that sec. 24 does not preserve notification made under the Petroleum Acts and reference is made to the Petroleum Act of 1886 where notifications are expressly preserved. 5. We observe that in sub-sec. (2) of sec. 2 of the Petroleum Act of 1886 there is no reference whatever to any order, the only word used being notification but in the General Clauses Act reference is made to "order," and when we refer to sec. 1 of the Act of 1886 we observe that the Act is to be extended as the Local Government may direct by notification in the official Gazette. In our opinion that direction comes within the meaning of the word 'order' as it is to be found in the General Clauses Act. It is perfectly true that the effect of the proviso as to notification is to prevent the order being a valid order until it is notified in the official Gazette, but when it has once been done, the order is a valid order, and in our opinion it is preserved by sec. 24 of the General Clauses Act which provides that any order "shall so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted, continue in force." 6. It is argued that even if the order is prescribed, it ought to be notified over again under the new Act. But to this argument we are unable to assent, because the General Clauses Act expressly provides that the "order shall continue in force" and there is nothing in that Act that we can see which renders it necessary to notify over again an order which has once been notified under the earlier Act, and has acquired the status of a valid order under the provisions of that Act. 7. 7. For these reasons we think that that part of the new Act under which the Petitioner has been convicted is extended to Cuttack by virtue of the order made under the old Act which is preserved in the new Act by the General Clauses Act. That being so, the conviction of the Petitioner was right and the rule must be discharged.