JUDGMENT 1. The facts of this case, so far as it is necessary to set them forth for the purposes of this second appeal, may be briefly stated as follows :-- There is a taluk, the Defendant-Appellant's five annas share of which has been separated off by a revenue batwara into a distinct Mahal. The Plaintiff-Respondent claims to be the owner of the entire residual share of the taluk by purchase. This residual share includes eight annas (of the whole taluk) which was brought to sale in execution of a mortgage decree had against one Amirunnessa, who derived her title from a conveyance purporting to have been made to her by her husband Abdul Ali. The Plaintiff-Respondent sued to recover possession of certain plots of land which he alleged to appertain to that eight annas share, and of which he alleged himself to have been dispossessed by the Defendant-Appellant. The Defendant-Appellant alleged that the plots in dispute had in fact been included in his separated five annas share at the batwara and he further disputed the title of Amirunuessa altogether. 2. It appears that in certain previous litigation, to which all the heirs of Abdul Ali were parties, but the present Defendant-Appellant was not a party, it was held that Abdul Ali's heirs were estopped from showing that the ostensible conveyance by Abdul Ali to his wife was a merely fictitious transaction. The decree in that case was admitted as evidence against the Defendant in the present suit, in spite of his objection, and on the strength of that decree, both the Courts below have held that, though the transaction in question appears to have been in fact a fictitious one in fraud of creditors, yet as Abdul All's heirs are estopped from disputing it, and as they are the only persons who could question it, the transfer must be taken to be complete and good against the whole world. 3. The main point that has been urged before us is that this view was erroneous. 4. We think that this contention is well founded. The Defendant-Appellant was, as we have said, not a party to the previous litigation nor is he the representative of any person who was a party to it; he stands entirely outside it. 3. The main point that has been urged before us is that this view was erroneous. 4. We think that this contention is well founded. The Defendant-Appellant was, as we have said, not a party to the previous litigation nor is he the representative of any person who was a party to it; he stands entirely outside it. It seems to us very difficult to see how, in these circumstances, he can be in any way bound by the result of it. 5. The decree is admissible in evidence for the limited purpose of showing that in 1890 there was litigation as to the property, that the Plaintiff was then asserting his title to it, and that, as between the then parties to that litigation he asserted it successfully, But as the Appellant was no party to that litigation, he cannot be estopped by the decree made in it. 6. The Plaintiff is suing for land in the possession of the Defendant, and we think that the Defendant is entitled to say :--"Before you can turn me out of this land you are bound to make out your title in my presence. If you succeed in establishing that the land lies within the eight, annas share, though I say that it does not, you are still bound to prove in my presence that you have a good title to that share before you can disturb my possession." 7. We think no useful purpose would result from remanding the case upon this point. The first Court found that the transaction in question was a benami one and the lower Appellate Court has virtually accepted that finding. The Plaintiff, however, says that be can make out a title by adverse possession : this has not been gone into by the lower Court, and there must, therefore, be a remand on this question as the Plaintiff asks for it. The costs will abide the result.