JUDGMENT 1. In this appeal, which arises out of a suit for damages for malicious prosecution, two questions arise for determination, first, whether the lower Appellate Court was right in giving the Plaintiff a decree, without coming to any express finding that there was a want of reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution; and, second, whether the Court of Appeal below was right in giving the Plaintiff a decree for damages for malicious prosecution against the Defendant, when the Defendant did not institute the prosecution by any complaint made before the Magistrate but merely gave information to the Police against the Plaintiff. With reference to the first point it is argued by the learned vakil for the Defendant-Appellant, that although the lower Appellate Court has found that the Plaintiff was innocent, and hoe innocence was pronounced by the Appellate Criminal Court, and although the lower Appellate Court has further found that the Defendant was actuated by malice, there is no finding in the judgment of the lower Appellate Court that there was a want of reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution, which is one of the ingredients necessary to be established before a decree for damages for malicious prosecution, can be obtained. The contention is so far correct, that there must be a binding that there was a want of reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution; or, to quote from the judgment of Lord Justice Bowen in the case of Abrath v. The North Eastern Railway Company L. R. 11 Q. S. D.440 on appeal L. R. 11 App. Cas. 247 (1886) which was affirmed by the House of Lords " that the circumstances of the case were such as to be in the eyes of the Judge inconsistent with the existence of reasonable and probable cause." 2. Now, in the present case although there is an absence of any categorical statement as to there being no reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution, we think that there are statements in the judgment of the lower Appellate Court substantially to the effect " that the circumstances of the case were such as to be in the eyes of the Judge inconsistent with the existence of reasonable and probable cause." 3. Those circumstances, as expressly found by the Judge, are that, at the time of the commission of the alleged offence, with which the Plaintiff was charged he was not at home, and furthermore that the Defendant was also not at home when the occurrence is said to have taken place, the place of the occurrence being the Defendant's home. It is further found that the Defendant made false statements before the Criminal Court and was influenced by vindictive motives to make the false statements. It may well be said that nothing more was needed to show that the circumstances were such as to be inconsistent with the existence of reasonable and probable cause. Indeed, the circumstances found by the lower Appellate Court preclude the existence of any reasonable and probable cause. 4. The first question raised before us must therefore be answered against the Appellant. It was argued that the fact of the Plaintiff having been convicted by the first Court would point to the existence of reasonable and probable cause and that the lower Appellate Court has omitted to consider that fact, and further that it was a fact which required the very strongest evidence to the contrary to make out the absence of reasonable and probable cause. And in support of this contention the cases of Jadubar Singh v. Sheosaran Singh I. L. R. 21 AIL 28 (1879) and Parimi Bapirazu v. Bellam-konda Ghinna Venkayya 3 Mad. H. C. Rep. 288 (1866) were cited. No doubt, the circumstance of the first Court having convicted the Plaintiff was a strong circumstance in the case; but it cannot be conclusive upon the point, though one of the two cases cited seems to go, perhaps, quite as far as that. It was, however, conceded in the argument that it be cannot carried so far. The question is whether this fact was considered by the lower Appellate Court, or altogether escaped its attention. We think it was considered by the lower Appellate Court, when the Subordinate Judge at the outset says that it was proved by the evidence of the Plaintiff's wit nesses that be was innocent; and this was also found by the Appellate Criminal Court. 5. We think it was considered by the lower Appellate Court, when the Subordinate Judge at the outset says that it was proved by the evidence of the Plaintiff's wit nesses that be was innocent; and this was also found by the Appellate Criminal Court. 5. Then, as to the second question, the judgment of the lower Appellate Court does not, except incidentally, and so far as we gather from the following passages in his judgment, say that the Defendant instituted the prosecution. In one place the Subordinate Judge observes : " There was a dispute between the parties, the Defendant charged the Plaintiff with looting and other offences before the Criminal Court;" and he further says :--" The Defendant made a false statement before the Criminal Court and he was influenced by vindictive motive to make the false charge." But the facts as found by the Munsif, whose findings have been affirmed by the lower Appellate Court, were that the prosecution arose out of the information given by the Defendant before the Police under sec. 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The offence was a cognizable offence. The Police upon information made investigation and sent a report in A form against the present Plaintiff; and that led to the prosecution of the Plaintiff before the Magistrate, which was conducted by the Defendant by engaging a pleader and a mukhtear. That being so, we do not see how the Defendant can avoid responsibility, although the Police might have investigated the matter and accepted his information as correct, and sent up a report stating that the case was a true one. We were referred to the case of Lock v. Ashton 12 Q. B. 871; 18 L. J. Q. B. 76 (1848) as authority for the proposition that the party who makes a complaint is not necessarily responsible for every consequence that follows upon such complaint. That may be quite true, but we think that by giving to the Police information which is false, but which the Police is led to believe to be true, and so to act upon it, the Defendant cannot avoid his responsibility for those consequences which were among the natural and intended consequences of giving the false information, merely because there was a subsequent investigation and the. The appeals, therefore, fall and must be dismissed with casts. Doss, J. I agree.