JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - In this case the Appellant applied for the registration of a certain deed of gift by the legal heirs of a deceased Mahomedan lady : the heirs did not appear to admit execution and the Sub-Registrar refused to register. There was an appeal and u/s 76 of the Registration Act, the Registrar also refused to register. That order was made on the 4th of May 1899. The Appellant, as is found by the Lower Court, instead of coming to the Civil Court u/s 77, within the thirty days prescribed by that section, applied to the Registrar for a review and on the dismissal of that application on the 24th of June 1899, instituted the present suit on the 20th of July of the same year. 2. The question is, first, whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act applies to the present case and secondly, if so, whether, having regard to the nature of the application to the Registrar, the case is within that section. 3. In my opinion the provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply to the present case. This case is governed in principle by the Full Bench case of Nogendra Nath Mullick v. Mathura Mohun Parhi ILR (1891) Cal. 368, which is binding upon us. It is true that the decision there was in relation to another Act and not under the Registration Act, but the same principle applies. That case was followed in the case of Veeramma v. Abbiah ILR (1894) Mad. 99, where the matter was thoroughly gone into in a very careful judgment of that Court and the same view was adopted. This decision is precisely in point, because it is in relation to the Registration Act which is now under discussion. The same view was in substance held by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Girija Nath Roy Bahadur v. Patani Bibee ILR (1889) Cal. 263. The Appellant relies upon a case, Khetter Mohun Chuckerbutty v. Dinabashy Shaha ILR (1883) Cal. 265, but, with every deference to the Judges who decided that case, I do not think that it can stand beside the Full Bench case ILR (1891) Cal. 368 of this Court, to which I have referred. 263. The Appellant relies upon a case, Khetter Mohun Chuckerbutty v. Dinabashy Shaha ILR (1883) Cal. 265, but, with every deference to the Judges who decided that case, I do not think that it can stand beside the Full Bench case ILR (1891) Cal. 368 of this Court, to which I have referred. It is a feature in that case that Section 6 of the Limitation Act, which is of the highest importance in deciding this question, is not even referred to by either of the learned Judges who decided that case; and that case did not meet with the approval of the Judges who decided the case of Girija Nath Roy Bahadur v. Patani Bibee ILR (1889) Cal. 263. It is reasonably clear upon the authorities to which I have referred and in which I concur, that the Limitation Act has no application to the present case and the appeal must be dismissed with costs. Mitra J. 4. I concur.