JUDGMENT Sir Francis W. Maclean, K.C.I.E., C.J. - In this case the Petitioner Mrs. Boyle, filed a petition for divorce against her husband, on the ground of incestuous adultery with her sister, Mrs. Ramsay, the present Appellant. In the Court below Mrs. Ramsay applied that she might be at liberty to intervene in the proceedings as a party Respondent, to enter appearance and appear at the hearing, to examine witnesses on her own behalf, to cross-examine the wit-nesses who might be called for the Petitioner and to be heard by Counsel. 2. Mr. Justice Henderson, following a decision of Mr. Justice Jenkins in an unreported case of Bailey v. Bailey See, ante p. 490 (note), held that he had no power to grant the application and dismissed it with costs. Hence the present appeal. 3. The first question is, whether the Court has power to grant the application; and secondly, if it has that power, whether it ought to have exercised it. It is clear that under the Indian Divorce Act (Act IV of 1869) no such power is expressly given and in this respect--a very important respect-it differs from the English Divorce Act (20 and 21 Vic. Chap. 85), though in a great measure the Indian Act is moulded upon the English Act. u/s 28 of the latter Act, upon every petition presented by a wife for dissolution of marriage, the Court, if it see fit, may direct that the person with whom the husband is alleged to have committed adultery be made a Respondent. No such discretionary power is vested in the Court under the Indian Act and it is not for us to say why it was excluded by the Legislature from that Act In Ball v. Bell (1883) L.R. 8 P.D. 217 the Court acted under that section, though the late Lord Hannen, whose experience in those matters was almost unrivalled, said that it was "an unusual application." 4. We start, then, with the extremely important feature that no power to allow such intervention is directly given by the Indian Divorce Act. Whence, then, arises the power? It is contended that it is indirectly given by the combined effect of Section 45 of that Act and Section 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We start, then, with the extremely important feature that no power to allow such intervention is directly given by the Indian Divorce Act. Whence, then, arises the power? It is contended that it is indirectly given by the combined effect of Section 45 of that Act and Section 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure. At the time of the passing of the Indian Divorce Act the CPC then in force was Act VIII of 1859 and Section 73 was the section which provided for making persons not before the Court parties to the suit. That section is now represented by Section 32 of the present Code of Civil Procedure. There is, however, much force in Mr. Garth's argument that the words-"All proceedings under this Act between party and party" in Section 45 apply only to proceedings after the parties to the suit have been determined and that the parties can only be determined in accordance with the provision of that particular statute and especially of Sections 10 and 11. If his argument be well founded-and I am disposed to think that it is-Section 32 of the Code cannot assist the present Appellant inasmuch as it would not apply to the case of substitution, dismissal, or addition of parties in divorce proceedings. 5. But even if it were otherwise, the present case does not fall within Section 32. The real issue between the parties in the case is whether the husband has committed adultery with the present Appellant and it would be difficult to say that her presence before the Court is necessary, in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle that issue. 6. Nor do I think that Section 7 of the Indian Divorce Act, which, according to the case of Abbott v. Abbott (1869) 4 B.L.R. (O.C.) 51, does not apply to procedure, can assist the Appellant. It would be an odd result if the power of making a Respondent the person with whom the husband is alleged to have committed adultery and which is expressly given in the English Act, but is not inserted in the Indian Act, could be said to have been given by implication by Section 7 of the latter Act. I cannot accept this view. 7. I cannot accept this view. 7. The Appellant, no doubt, may be very seriously affected by an adverse determination of the issue I have referred to and she may consider and properly consider it a hardship that she is not allowed to come in to defend herself; but the law does not give us any discretion in the matter, nor any power to accede to her application. There is every force in the terse and pointed observation of Lord Lindley in the case of Lowe v. Lowe (1899) P. 204, where His Lordship says in a case analogous in principle to the present "that a most grievous injustice is done to a person whose conduct is being investigated under the publicity of modern times where he is not able to say a word in his defence. That, however, is a question for the Legislature-- not for us." 8. The appeal must be dismissed with costs. Rampini J. 9. I agree. Mitra J. 10. I agree.