JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - In this case the Petitioner, Mrs. Boyle, filed a petition for divorce against her husband, on the ground of incestuous adultery with her sister, Mrs. Ramsay, the present Appellant. In the Court below, Mrs. Ramsay applied that she might be at liberty to intervene in the proceedings as a party Respondent to enter appearance, and appear at the hearing to examine witnesses on her own behalf, to cross-examine the witnesses who might be called for the Petitioner, and to be heard by counsel. Mr. Justice Henderson following a decision of Mr. Justice Jenkins in the case of Bailey v. Bailey Mat. Suit No. 6 of 1896 unreported held that he had no power to grant the application, and dismissed it with costs. Hence the present appeal. 2. The first question is, whether the Court has power to grant the application and, secondly, if it has that power, whether it ought to have exercised it. 3. It is clear that under the Indian, Divorce Act (IV of 1869) no such power is expressly given, and in this respect--a very important respect--it differs from the English Divorce Act, XX and XXI, Victoria, Chap. 85, though in a great measure the Indian Divorce Act is moulded upon the English Act. Under sec. 28 of the latter Act, "upon every petition presented by a wife for dissolution of marriage, the Court, if it see fit, may direct that the person with whom the husband is alleged to have committed adultery, be made a Respondent." No such discretionary power is vested in the Court under the Indian Act, and it is not for us to say why it was excluded by the Legislature from that Act. In Bell v. Bell L. R. 8 P. D. 217 (1883) the Court acted under that section, though the late Lord Hannan, whose experience in these matters was almost unrivalled, said that it was "an unusual application." 4. We start, then, with the extremely important feature that no power to allow such intervention is directly given by the Indian Divorce Act. Whence, then arises the power ? It is contended that it is indirectly given by the combined effect of sec. 45 of that Act and sec. 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We start, then, with the extremely important feature that no power to allow such intervention is directly given by the Indian Divorce Act. Whence, then arises the power ? It is contended that it is indirectly given by the combined effect of sec. 45 of that Act and sec. 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure. At the time of the passing of the Indian Divorce Act, the Code of Civil Procedure, then in force, was Act VIII of 1859, and sec. 73 was the section which provided for making persons, not before the Court, parties to the suit. That section is now represented by sec. 32 of the present Code of Civil Procedure. There is, however, much force in Mr. Garth's argument, that the words "al proceedings under this Act between party and party," in sec. 45 apply only to proceedings after the parties to the suit have been determined, and that the parties can only be determined in accordance with the provisions of that particular statute, and especially of secs. 10 and 11. If his argument be well founded,--and I am disposed to think that it is sec. 32 of the Code cannot assist the present Appellant, inasmuch as it would not apply to the case of substitution, dismissal, or addition of parties in divorce proceedings. But even if it were otherwise, the present case does not fall within sec. 32. The seal issue between the parties in the case is, whether the husband has committed adultery with the present Appellant, and it would be difficult to say that her presence before the Court is necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon, and settle that issue; nor do I think that sec. 7 of the Indian Divorce Act, which according to the case of Abott v. Abott 4 B. L. R. 51 (1869), does not apply to procedure, can assist the Appellant. It would be an odd result if the power of making a Respondent the person with whom the husband is alleged to have committed adultery, and which is expressly given in the English Act, but is not inserted in the Indian Act, could be said to have been given by implication by sec. 7 of the latter Act. I cannot accept this view. 7 of the latter Act. I cannot accept this view. The Appellant, no doubt, may be very seriously affected by an adverse determination of the issue I have referred to, and she may consider--and properly consider--it a hardship that she is not allowed to come in to defend herself; but the law does not give us any discretion in the matter, nor any power to accede to her application. There is every force in the terse and pointed observation of Lord Lindley in the case of Lowe v. Lowe (1899) P. D. 208, where his Lordship says in a case analogous in principle to the present, "that a most grievous injustice is done to a person whose conduct is being investigated under the publicity of modern times where he is not able to say a word in his defence. That, however, is a question for the Legislature, not for us." The appeal must be dismissed with costs. Rampini, J. I agree. Mitra, J. I agree.