JUDGMENT 1. In execution of a money decree obtained against Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 who were the Karnavan and the senior Anandravan of the Tarwad consisting of the Plaintiffs and themselves certain moveable properties belonging to the Tarwad were attached and the Plaintiffs objected. Their objection was disallowed and the present suit is brought by them for a declaration that the moveable properties of the Tarwad are not liable to be attached and sold in execution of the decree. The first Defendant, the attaching creditor, has adduced evidence in this suit which has satisfied the lower Appellate Court that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the Tarwad and accordingly that Court dismissed the Plaintiffs suit. 2. It is contended in this appeal that though the debt was contracted for the benefit of the Tarwad, yet the property of the Tarwad cannot bo sold in execution of the decree in a suit to which they were not parties and in which the second and third Defendants were not sued as representing the Tarwad and in support of this contention reliance is placed upon Ittiachan v. Velappan I.L.R. 8 Mad. 484 and Govinda v. Krishnan I.L.R. 15 Mad. 333. It is rightly conceded that if the Tarwad property now in question has been disposed of in satisfaction of the decree debt voluntarily by the Manager of the Tarwad (second Defendant) such sale would be binding upon the Plaintiffs. That being so it is difficult to see on what principle it can be contended that an involuntary sale of the same property for the discharge of the same debt will not equally bind the Plaintiffs when apart from the decree it is affirmatively established as against the Plaintiffs that the debt was of a binding character. We think that the authority of the cases cited is considerably shaken by the decision of the Full Bench in Vasudevan v. Sankaran I.L.R. 20 Mad. 129. We think that the authority of the cases cited is considerably shaken by the decision of the Full Bench in Vasudevan v. Sankaran I.L.R. 20 Mad. 129. Incases governed by the ordinary Hindu Law there is a course of decisions both of this Court and of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council that in execution of a decree against a Hindu father or other managing member of a Hindu family the power of disposition (vide Section 266, Code of Civil Procedure) which he may exercise over joint family property for purposes sanctioned by law would be operative to pass to the purchaser not only his personal interest in the property sold, but also the interest of the sons or other members of the joint family in the property although they were not parties to the decree (Nunna Setti v. Chidaraboyina I.L.R. 26 Mad. 214 at PP. 222, 223.). We can see no reason why the principle of these decisions is not equally applicable to Hindu families governed by the Marumakkatayam Alyasantana or Makkatayam Law in force on the West Coast, simply because the property of the joint family is impartible in the sense that there can be no compulsory partition among the members of the family. 3. We, therefore, affirm the decree of the lower Appellate Court and dismiss this appeal.