JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. and Mitra, J. - We are invited by the present Petitioners, who are Defendants in a Small Cause Court suit for the recovery of a certain sum of money,--a liquidated claim,--to interfere under sec. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and to hold that certain orders made by the Registrar in the suit were made by him without jurisdiction. The facts, as to which there is no dispute, are these :--On the 3rd of February 1902 the Plaintiff brought an action in the Court of the Small Causes of Calcutta for the recovery of a sum Rs. 450, alleged to be due for money advanced. The Defendants who alleged that no notice of the proceedings was served upon them, entered no appearance, and on the 27th of February 1902 the Registrar made a decree for default with costs. 2. The present Petitioners as they say,--and this is apparently not contradicted,--acquired knowledge for the first time of this ex parte decree some time in the month of May following and they then made an application on the 21st of June, asking for a new trial. That came on on the 7th of July, and apparently the Petitioners, who were present in the Court-room, did not hear the application called on, and it was accordingly dismissed by the Registrar. On the same day, they filed further grounds for a new trial, and on the 21st of July the application for a new trial was restored, and after several adjournments the Registrar, on the 17th of February 1903, rejected the application with costs. 3. The Petitioners, though from their action they would seem to have thought that the Registrar had jurisdiction to deal with these applications, now contend that the orders of the 7th of July 1902 and of the 17th of February 1903 were passed without any jurisdiction on his part. Hence the present application under sec. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. A preliminary objection has been taken that the Bench, as now constituted, has no jurisdiction to deal with this application. 5. I am unable to accede to that view. It is clear, having regard to sec. Hence the present application under sec. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. A preliminary objection has been taken that the Bench, as now constituted, has no jurisdiction to deal with this application. 5. I am unable to accede to that view. It is clear, having regard to sec. 6 of the Presidency Small Cause Court Act (XV of 1882) that the Presidency Small Cause Court is deemed to be under the superintendence of and subordinate to the High Court and there cannot, I think, be any reasonable doubt that this Court has jurisdiction to review, under sec. 622 of the Code, orders which are said to have been made without jurisdiction in the Presidency Small Cause Court. This has been done again and again without objection. But it is contended by the opposite party that, inasmuch as no rules have been made under sec. 13 of the Charter Act, assigning to any Judges or to any Division Bench such a case as the present, this Bench has no jurisdiction to deal with it, and that it can only be heard by the Chief Justice and all the Judges of the High Court sitting together. This contention, at the present day, is rather startling. We are referred to the case of Shamsher Mondal v. Ganendra Narain Mitter I. L. R. 29 Cal. 498 (1902) where it was held that the Bench taking cases of the Presidency Group has no jurisdiction over the Court of Small Causes at Calcutta, and it has no power to set aside the decree of the said Court. It is worthy of notice that in that case the Judges said that they had not been asked to exercise their extraordinary jurisdiction under sec. 15 of the Charter. It may well be that the decision in that case is not open to question, but it does not affect the present case. The application here is made, not to the Bench taking the cases of the Presidency Group as such, but to the Chief Justice who has power under sec. 14 of the Charter Act to determine what Judges in each case shall sit alone, and what Judges shall constitute the various Division Benches, and to say what Judge or Judges shall hear a particular case. 14 of the Charter Act to determine what Judges in each case shall sit alone, and what Judges shall constitute the various Division Benches, and to say what Judge or Judges shall hear a particular case. It is by reason of this power, so vested in the Chief Justice, that applications of this nature, that is, in connection with orders made by the Presidency Small Cause Court, have invariably been made to the Chief Justice, who can appoint and who does then and there appoint himself and the Judge who may be sitting with him, to be the Bench to hear the application. It has been the universal practice, I believe, ever since the High Court was established, for the Chief Justice to say what particular case shall be tried by any particular Judge or Judges, and until this moment, that position has never been challenged. In this present case, I, as Chief Justice, have constituted this Bench, consisting of the learned Judge who is sitting with me and myself to hear this application, and I do not think there is anything which prevents me from doing that. The preliminary objection must be overruled. 6. On the merits, I have no doubt that the Registrar had no jurisdiction to entertain the application in question after the ex parte decree had been made by him. The Court, as opposed to the Registrar, was under the rules, the proper and the only authority, which could deal with an application to set aside the ex parte decree. It is clear, looking at Rules 63, 70, 92 and 94, that the Registrar had no jurisdiction to deal with the application to set it aside under Rule 63. The Court and the Court alone as opposed to the Registrar, who is invested with only a limited judicial power, can deal with such applications. A marked distinction is drawn in the rules between the power of the Court and the power of the Registrar. Sec. 36 does not help the opposite party, that section applies to decrees and orders made by the Registrar under sec. 14, which is the only previous section which gives him jurisdiction to act judicially. On these grounds, the rule must be made absolute as to the orders of the Registrar of the 7th July 1902 and the 17th February 1903 with costs, hearing fee three gold mohurs.