Judgement Appeal from a decree of the above Court (June 7,. 1899) reversing a decree of the Additional Civil Judge of Lucknow (April 29, 1896). The appeal raised the right of succession to the taluqa of Birwa Mehnon, situate in the district of Gonda in Oudh, the last male owner of which was Bhaiya Pirthipal Singh. After the annexation of Oudh and the confiscation of all proprietary rights in the soil by the proclamation of March 15, 1858, the second summary settlement of this taluqa was made with him in February, 1859, and on the preparation of lists of taluqdars, as provided by Act I. of 1869, s. 8, his name was entered in lists 1 and 2. He died on November 3, 1859, and was succeeded by his widow Thakurain Sarfaraz Koer, who died on February 20, 1870, and was succeeded by her daughter Thakurain Brijraj Koer. The daughter died on February 23, 1879, and on her death the Deputy Commissioner of Gonda, by order dated February 27, 1879, placed her husband Lal Achal Ram , the appellant, in possession of the said taluqa. Since then there has been constant litigation by members of the family of Pirthipal Singh to recover possession of the estate, and two judgments in regard to the succession have been delivered by the Privy Council, the first in Achal Ram v. Udai Partab Addiya Dat Singh (( 1883) L.R. 11 Ind. Ap. 51.), and the second in Narindar Bahadur Singh v. Achal Ram . (( 1893) L. R. 20 Ind. Ap. 77,) Those judgments established—(( 1883) L, R. 11 Ind. Ap. 51.), and the second in Narindar Bahadur Singh v. Achal Ram . (( 1893) L. R. 20 Ind. Ap. 77,) Those judgments established—(( 1883) L, R. 11 Ind. Ap, 51.) that Pirthipal Singh was a taluqdar within the meaning of Act I. of 1869, and that the succession to his estate is governed by s. 22 of the Act; (2.) that in default of other heirs specified in the said section the succession is governed by clause 11 thereof, and that in the application of that clause a single heir alone succeeds ; (3.) that the single heir, where the taluqdars name is in list 2, is not to be determined of necessity by the rule of lineal primogeniture, that nearness of degree has preference over priority of line, and that where two claimants are equal in degree preference is given to priority of line; (4.) that a Hindu female succeeding under the said section takes only a Hindu females estate of inheritance, and on her death the succession opens to the next heir of the last male holder. Pirthipal Singhs death in November, 1859, was before the regular settlement of the province of Oudh. His widow Sarfaraz Koer eventually obtained from the Commissioner of Fyzabad on August 25, 1869, a decree declaring her absolute proprietor as widow of the taluqdar succeeding under Act I. of 1869, s. 22, clause 7. On her daughters death as above stated Jubraj Singh claimed as nearest collateral heir to Pirthipal. At his death in November, 1881, Ardawan succeeded to his claim, and in 1888 sold a half-share to the respondent. The suit in which this appeal arose was brought by Ardawan and the respondent, An earlier suit had been brought against Achal Ram by Udai Partab Addiya Dat Singh, Raja of Bhaiya, who claimed preferentially by the rule of lineal primogeniture as a collateral nearer in line, but later in degree as compared to Ardawans father. He obtained possession under a decree of the Judicial Commissioner, and in turn one Narindar, another collateral heir (entitled only if the succession opened on the death of Sarfaraz Koer) obtained a decree against t a in 1883, and he also sold a half-share to the respondent. He obtained possession under a decree of the Judicial Commissioner, and in turn one Narindar, another collateral heir (entitled only if the succession opened on the death of Sarfaraz Koer) obtained a decree against t a in 1883, and he also sold a half-share to the respondent. Finally the Privy Council dismissed the Raja of Bhaiyas suit on the ground that he had failed to prove a custom of descent by lineal primogeniture (Sec L. R. 11 Ind Ap. 51.), and dismissed Narindars suit (L. R. 20 Ind. Ap. 77.) on the ground that he had failed to prove the exclusion of daughters from inheritance. Achal Ram regained possession after the dismissal of the Raja of Bhaiyas suit. The present suit was founded on the preferential heirship of Ardawans father when the succession opened on the death of Pirthipals daughter, the Raja respondent claiming as purchaser of a moiety from Ardawan. The appellant, after Ardawan had withdrawn from the suit on a petition of compromise, defended his title to a moiety. He raised a number of contentions, the one material to this appeal being that Ardawan had not validly transferred a moiety to the respondent, and that the latter had no right to maintain the suit on the basis thereof, inasmuch as it was champertous and not enforceable against him. Upon this point the First Court considered that the deed of sale relied on by the respondent did not truly represent the contract between him and Ardawan, and that if it did the respondent had not completely carried out its terms, and accordingly it could not be enforced, and that it had been obtained by the respondent purely for the purpose of gambling in litigation in order to have a second string to his bow if Narindar failed in his suit. The Judicial Commissioner, on the other hand, considered that the deed of sale was valid in law to convey to the respondent a moiety of the taluq while his colleague, the Additional Judicial Commissioner, was of opinion that the deed was champertous and ineffective to convey the moiety, and operative only as an agreement to convey after Ardawan had obtained a decree. The case was accordingly referred to a third Judicial Commissioner, who decided that -there was a valid transfer in presenti of the moiety. The case was accordingly referred to a third Judicial Commissioner, who decided that -there was a valid transfer in presenti of the moiety. In the result, and after remand, the respondent obtained a decree in ejectment as regards his moiety claimed. Haldane, K.C., Bonnerjee, and Ross, for the appellant, contended upon the point, which was treated as a preliminary one, that the deed of sale relied upon was not a valid contract of sale between the parties to it. If a valid contract, it could not operate as a present transfer of a moiety to the respondent and entitle him to obtain possession thereof from the appellant. Ardawan at the date of the deed was not in possession of the property which he purported to sell, and accordingly he could not give title or the right to recover possession from a third party. Accordingly, the effect of the deed was at the utmost only to give the respondent a right to obtain or enforce a transfer from Ardawan on his coming into possession—a con dition which never happened. On this point reference was made to Ranee Bhobosoondree Dasseah v. Issurchunder Dutt. (( 1872) 11 Beng. L. R. 36.) Then it was contended that the deed was void as being champertous and contrary to public policy see Tara Soondaree Chowdhrain v. Collector of Mymensingh (( 1874) 13 Beng. L. R. 495.); Chunderkant Mookerjee v. Ram coomar Koondu (( 1874) 13 Beng. L. R. 530; and on appeal ( 1876) L. R. 4 Ind. Ap.23.); Debi Dayal Sahoo v. Bhan Pertap Singh. (( 1903) Ind. L. R. 31 Calc. 433.) De Gruyther, for the respondent, contended that he had under the deed of sale a good title to a moiety of the taluq in suit. The case cited on the other side from 11 Beng. L. R. 36 was based upon Raja Sahib Perhlad Sein v. Budhoo Singh (( 1869) 12 Moores Ind. Ap. Ca.275, 292, 306.), and both were distinguished in Kalidas Mullick v. Kanhya Lal Pandit. (( 1884) L. R. 11 Ind. Ap. 219. 23.) All that was decided in those cases was that the purchaser must shew that by the terms of the contract he is entitled to possession. Ap. Ca.275, 292, 306.), and both were distinguished in Kalidas Mullick v. Kanhya Lal Pandit. (( 1884) L. R. 11 Ind. Ap. 219. 23.) All that was decided in those cases was that the purchaser must shew that by the terms of the contract he is entitled to possession. Here the vendor has never disputed that right; the terms of the contract have been affirmed and acted upon by both parties; but a third party, the appellant, a stranger to the contract, comes forward and denies the respondents right thereunder. The rule of Hindu law as to the necessity or propriety of delivery of possession so as to place the effect of the transaction beyond dispute did not affect this case, where the effect was admitted by both the parties to the contract see Maynes Hindu Law, 6th ed. pp. 494, 496. Delivery of possession was not essential to the transfer of title. On the other hand, the effect of registration was to complete the title see Transfer of Property Act, ss. 3, 54, and 123, Phulchand v. Lakkhu (( 1903) Ind. L. R. 25 Allah. 358.); Dharmodas Das v. Nistarini Dasi (( 1887) Ind. L. R. 14 Calc. 446.), and Bai Rambai v. Bai Mani. (( 1898) Ind. L. R. 23 Bomb.234.) With regard to this deed being void as against public policy, the law of champerty did not aply to India, and if it did this transaction could not be held to be champertous. Upon the first point he referred to Kunwar Ram Lall Nilkanth (( 1893) L. R. 20 Ind. Ap. 112 ; Ind. L.R. 20 Calc. 843) and Ram coomar Coondoo v. Chunder Canto Mookerjee (( 1876) L. R. 4 Ind. Ap. 23.); and upon the latter point, Fischer v. Kamala Naicker. (( 1860) 8 Moores Ind. Ap. Ca. 170, 175.) The terms of this contract were not unconscionable or extortionate, or in any way opposed to public policy. The appellant was thereupon heard on the whole case. Counsel for the appellant contended that Ardawan was not entitled since the preferential heir was found in the line of Azmat Singh, who had not passed from the family by adoption, as contended for by the respondent. There was no evidence that Azmat had changed his gotra, and accordingly he remained in the gotra of birth Stokes Hindu Law Books, p. 564, as to the meaning of gotra. There was no evidence that Azmat had changed his gotra, and accordingly he remained in the gotra of birth Stokes Hindu Law Books, p. 564, as to the meaning of gotra. The evidence of adoption was insufficient. It was also contended that under Act I. of 1869, ss. 2, 11, and 22, Pirthipals daughter took absolutely see Brij Indar Bahadur v. Janki Koer (L. R. 5 Ind. Ap. 1.); and accordingly that the appellant as her heir succeeded to the exclusion of Pirthipals collaterals; otherwise the custom to exclude daughters should have been decided in the affirmative, and in that case the suc cession opened to collaterals on the death of the widow, and Ardawans title, if any, would have been extinguished by the law of limitation. The respondents counsel contended that on the evidence the adoption of Azmat was satisfactorily proved, and that the Court below was right in upholding it. With regard to the exclusion of daughters, there were concurrent findings of fact that no custom to that effect was proved. It was impossible to hold that Pirthipals daughter took absolutely see Achal Ram v. Udin Partab Addiya Dat Singh (L. R. 11 Ind. Ap. 51.), Narindar Bahadur Singh v. Achal Ram (L. R 20 Ind. Ap. 77.), Rai Bijai Bahadur Singh v. Jagatpal Singh (( 1890) L. R. 17 Ind. Ap. 173.), Dew an Jagatpal Singh v. Jageshar Baksh Singh (( 1902) L. R. 30 Ind. Ap. 27.), and Lal Sheo Partab Singh v. Allahabad Bank. (( 1903) L. R. 30 Ind. Ap. 209.) The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD MACNAGHTEN. This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, reversing the decision of the Court below, and awarding to the respondent Raja Kazim Husain Khan possession of one-half of the taluq Birwa Mehnon. The taluq was granted to one Pirthipal after the confiscation. It was placed in classes 1 and 2, but not in class 3 of Act I. of 1869. The taluq, therefore, is one that devolves upon a single heir, though not descending according to the rules of lineal primogeniture. Pirthipal died in the year 1859. He left a widow and a daughter, but no male issue. He was succeeded by his widow. She died in 1870, and then the daughter inherited the estate. The taluq, therefore, is one that devolves upon a single heir, though not descending according to the rules of lineal primogeniture. Pirthipal died in the year 1859. He left a widow and a daughter, but no male issue. He was succeeded by his widow. She died in 1870, and then the daughter inherited the estate. Upon her death on February 23, 1879, the succession opened to collaterals of Pirthipal. The appellant Achal Ram was the husband of Pirthipals daughter. On his wifes death he took possession. He was beset by litigation. But with the exception of a short interval following his dispossession by a claimant who succeeded in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, but failed before this tribunal, he managed to hold sole possession against all comers until the decree now under appeal was pronounced. The respondent Raja Kazim Husain Khan claims to be entitled to one moiety of the estate under a purchase from Ardawan Singh, who has been held to be the heir of the nearest collateral of Pirthipal living at the daughters death. The present suit was brought by Ardawan and the Raja suing as co-plaintiffs. Ardawan afterwards withdrew from the case. He is said to have been bought off by Achal Ram . At any rate, at his own request and on the allegation that he was satisfied his case was baseless, his name was struck off the record. Then arose the question whether the Raja could sue alone, and it was held that he could. A great number of objections were raised by Achal Ram by way of defence. All but two are disposed of, either by decisions of this Board or by concurrent findings which the appellant is not in a position to contest. The two remaining objections are these In the first place it is contended that the sale to the Raja was void as being champertous and a " gambling in litigation " contrary to public policy. Then it is objected that there is a branch of the family senior to that to which Ardawan belongs, and that in it there are to be found collaterals nearer than Ardawan. This branch traces descent from a remote ancestor, Azmat Singh, the younger son of a powerful chieftain called Dutt Singh, from whose brother Ardawan is descended. Then it is objected that there is a branch of the family senior to that to which Ardawan belongs, and that in it there are to be found collaterals nearer than Ardawan. This branch traces descent from a remote ancestor, Azmat Singh, the younger son of a powerful chieftain called Dutt Singh, from whose brother Ardawan is descended. The sole question on this part of the case is whether Azmat passed out of the family by adoption. On this point, as well as on the question of champerty, the Court of the Judicial Commissioner differed from the Court of first instance, which held the sale-deed void and the adoption not proved. The sale-deed is dated August 11, 1888. In it Ardawan states his title by succession, the impossibility of recovering possession from Achal Ram without a suit, and his own inability to sue owing to want of money. " So therefore," he goes on to say, " he has sold half the estate to the Raja for a lakh and a half of rupees. He acknowledges the receipt of one lakh." The balance of Rs.50,000 is to remain on deposit with the Raja to be expended in prosecuting the proposed suit and in paying a monthly stipend of Rs.50 to himself and Rs.20 to a mukhtar. On the termination of the litigation he is to receive the balance. In the suit the Raja and he are to act and work jointly, and the Raja is given full power to conduct the litigation and manage the expenditure. Now, at the date of the sale-deed the position of things was this. Achal Ram was in possession. A suit to recover the estate had been brought against him by one Narendra, who apparently would have been entitled as the heir of his father, Harbhagat Singh, if the succession had opened on the death of Pirthipals widow. That suit had been dismissed by the Subordinate Judge on the ground of limitation. The dismissal had been affirmed by the Judicial Commissioner on a different ground, and an appeal was then pending to the Privy Council. That suit had been dismissed by the Subordinate Judge on the ground of limitation. The dismissal had been affirmed by the Judicial Commissioner on a different ground, and an appeal was then pending to the Privy Council. It seems that the Raja had bought one moiety of the estate from Narendra under a deed of sale framed on the same lines as Ardawans deed, while Narendra and Ardawan had come to some arrangement for dividing the estate between them in case either the one or the other should succeed against Achal Ram . The statement in the sale-deed to the effect that one lakh had been paid to Ardawan was not in accordance with the fact. Indeed, it seems inconsistent with the scope of the deed. It is hardly conceivable that anybody in the position of the Raja would pay down without any security so large a sum to a man confessedly without means. And besides it is obvious that if it had been intended that Ardawan should receive a lakh of rupees at once, there would have been no occasion to provide a monthly allowance for his " personal expenses. Probably the statement was introduced by the draftsman under the notion that it might impart some additional solemnity to the instrument. Of course, at the first blush, the untrue statement throws suspicion upon the whole transaction. But after all, so long as the deed stands, it is no concern of Achal Rams that Ardawan may have a grievance on the score of a misstatement in an instrument to which Achal Ram is no party. Ardawan himself has taken no steps to impeach the deed. On the contrary, in the course of the two years that. elapsed between the date of the deed and the institution of the suit (which was delayed as long as possible in order to await the result of Narendras appeal) Ardawan more than once affirmed the transaction, claiming and receiving his monthly allowance under the deed and urging the Rajas agent to commence proceedings without delay. It is not enough for Achal Ram to make out that the sale-deed is voidable, at the option of Ardawan, He must shew that it was and is absolutely void. It is not enough for Achal Ram to make out that the sale-deed is voidable, at the option of Ardawan, He must shew that it was and is absolutely void. But now Achal Ram is in this further difficulty, that, according to Ardawans petition of compromise, which he puts forward as part of his case, Ardawan has nothing to complain of, for he had nothing to sell. It may be added that the Raja did all in his power to procure the attendance of Ardawan at the trial, but he was kept out of the way. Apart from the untrue recital in the sale-deed, there seems to be no flaw in the transaction. Without assistance Ardawan could not have prosecuted his claim. There was nothing extortionate or unreasonable in the terms of the bargain. There was no gambling in litigation. There was nothing contrary to public policy. Their Lordships agree with the judgment of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner that the transaction was a present transfer by Ardawan of one moiety of his interest in the estate, giving a good title to the Raja on which it was competent for him to sue. The question of Azmats adoption is not quite so simple a matter. The adoption, if it took place, occurred before the year 1681 a.d., when Azmat succeeded to the Mankapur Raj. At this distance of time it is of course impossible to prove that all the requisite ceremonies were duly and regularly performed. On the one hand, it is not disputed that Azmat and his descendants, successors in the Raj, remained Bisains, though the adoption, if it took place, was an adoption into the Bandhalgoti clan, a clan much inferior in social position to the Bisains. It appears that on the death of a member of the Mankapur family the ceremonies usual on the death of a relative are observed among the Bisains of Birwa Mehnon, a circumstance unusual in the case of an adoption out of the family, though, it is said, not unprecedented. On the other hand, there is a body of tradition strong and persistent in favour of the adoption, and there is a story still current which may possibly serve to throw some light on the transaction. On the other hand, there is a body of tradition strong and persistent in favour of the adoption, and there is a story still current which may possibly serve to throw some light on the transaction. It is said that on Azmats birth there was a prophecy put about to the effect that the child would become a Raja within eight days. His father, Dutt Singh, alarmed for the safety of himself and his eldest son, contemplated removing the danger in a summary manner, but a better way was found of defeating or fulfilling the prophecy. The Rani of Mankapur, a sister of Dutt Singhs wife, whose son, Partab Singh, the last of his line, had recently died without issue, leaving a wife who became a Satti with her husband, out of affection for her nephew or her nephews mother, or through fear of her powerful neighbour, was ready to adopt the child to succeed her in the Raj of Mankapur. The tradition of the adoption is preserved in the Wajib-ul-arz of mouza Ashrafpur, Pargana Mankapur, and is to be found recorded in the Oudh Gazetteer and the Gonda Settlement Report. It is to be observed that in no previous litigation did Achal Ram ever suggest that collaterals nearer in degree were to be found in Azmats line. On the contrary, he filed evidence tending to shew Azmats adoption. It is still more significant that no claim to the taluq Birwa Mehnon has ever been set up by any member of the Mankapur family. On the whole their Lordships see no reason to differ from the conclusion at which the Court of the Judicial Commissioner has arrived. It seems to them that the evidence in favour of adoption preponderates. Their Lordships, therefore, will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed. The appellant will pay the costs of the appeal.