Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (Jan. 27, 1901) affirming a decree of the Second Subordinate Judge of Mozufferpur (March 25, 1898). Both Courts concurred in finding- that a son was born to Rani Srimati, and named Tejdhar Narayan Singh. The first Court dealt with the documentary evidence in great detail; the High Court arranged it in groups. The High Court said " The groups of the plaintiffs documents above referred to establish to our satisfaction that, immediately after the birth of Tejdhar, in all the transactions in which we would expect his name to be mentioned his name was mentioned, and he was put forward as the heir to the property"; and they held this action to be " of far more weight and importance " than the subsequent conduct of the Ranis and their agents when (as they observed) " Durgabati had given birth to a son, and when Rani Srimati, at least, would be influenced by her affection for her daughter Durgabati and her son, the defendant No. 3, and inclined, or easily induced, to set up false allegations calculated to favour the latters interest and claim." The High Court also was of opinion that the oral evidence of the plaintiff was "far from being above suspicion" that Rani Srimati and her witnesses were interested in suppressing the birth of the son, and that in consequence the decision of the case depended on the documentary evidence and the probabilities of the case. The High Court also admitted in evidence some of the documents; and considered that from them the birth of the son was proved, and that a legal presumption in the case existed that the said documents were binding on Srimati. Haldane, K.C., and De Gruyther, for the appellants, contended that the concurrent findings might in this case be reversed. They relied principally upon some of th^ documents which the Courts in India regarded as proof of the birth of a son to Srimati not being in law admissible for that purpose, and upon the admissible evidence being insufficient for that purpose. Upon the point of admissibility they referred to s. 32, sub-s. 5, of the Evidence Act, Sangram Singh v. Rajan Bai (( 1885) L. R. 12 Ind. Ap. 183.), and Rai Jagatpal Singh v. Raja Jageshar Baksh Singh. (( 1902) L. R. 30 Ind. Ap. Upon the point of admissibility they referred to s. 32, sub-s. 5, of the Evidence Act, Sangram Singh v. Rajan Bai (( 1885) L. R. 12 Ind. Ap. 183.), and Rai Jagatpal Singh v. Raja Jageshar Baksh Singh. (( 1902) L. R. 30 Ind. Ap. 27.) They contended that there had been a gross miscarriage of justice. Asquith, K. C., and Phillips, for the respondents, contended that the Courts were right in concurrently finding that a son was born to Sridhar Singh after his death by his widow Srimati; and that no reason was shewn for relaxing the rule that concurrent findings of fact will not be disturbed except under special circumstances. Haldane, K.C., replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD LINDLEY. The question raised by this appeal is whether there ought to be a new trial of a pure question of fact which two Courts in India have decided against the appellants. Counsel for the appellants felt the difficulty of supporting an appeal under such circumstances, but they contended that there ought to be a new trial on three broad grounds, namely— 1. 1. That there had been a gross miscarriage of justice. 2. 2. That a mass of evidence had been improperly received. 3. 3. That a particular document (referred to as Exhibit 3), which was practically decisive of the case, if genuine, was so clearly proved to be a forgery that grievous injustice would be done if the decisions appealed from were allowed to stand. Their Lordships heard counsel on all three points at con siderable length, and have come to the conclusion that none of them ought to prevail. The first ground really depends on the second and third, and their Lordships will so treat it. The action which has given rise to the appeal was brought by the first respondent (the plaintiff in the action) to have it declared that he was entitled in reversion (on the death of a lady who has since died) to a large estate in the district of Tirhoot which formerly belonged to Raja Sridhar Narayan Singh. He died in 1844 intestate, without children born in his lifetime, but leaving a widow, Rani Srimati, who was with child. She gave birth to a daughter, and the defendants claim his estate and are entitled to it by the Mithila law if the widow had no other child. He died in 1844 intestate, without children born in his lifetime, but leaving a widow, Rani Srimati, who was with child. She gave birth to a daughter, and the defendants claim his estate and are entitled to it by the Mithila law if the widow had no other child. The plaintiff, however, alleged that the widow had twins, and that the twin child was a son named Tejdhar Narayan Singh, who died some six or seven months after he was born. If this is true, it is now conceded that the plaintiff (i.e., the first respondent) is entitled to the estate and ought to succeed. On the death of Raja Sridhar Narayan in 1844 his widow was a mere child fourteen years old or thereabouts, and his mother took possession of the estate; but in 1867 she made over the bulk of it to the widow. The mother died in 1869. Since that time the widow and her daughter and the defendant claiming under them have been in possession of the estates. In 1893 the widow and daughter conveyed their interests in the estates to the appellant Sasidhar Narayan Singh and put him in possession, and he has been in possession ever since. The widow has died since these proceedings commenced. The burden of proving the plaintiffs title to the estates on the death of the Rajas widow was obviously on the plaintiff. A vast mass of evidence, both oral and documentary, was adduced at the trial. The oral evidence was extremely conflicting and by no means trustworthy. The documentary evidence was far more important, but was by no means consistent throughout ; nevertheless, when carefully examined, both the Court of first instance and the Appellate Court came to the conclusion that it established the plaintiffs case, and their Lordships are not prepared to differ from them. The documents which the appellants counsel contended were not admissible against him were objected to on the ground that they were res inter alios acta, and did not come within any of the classes of evidence enumerated in s. 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. This would have been a formidable objection if the documents had not been admissible against persons through whom the appellant Sasidhar claimed. But when looked into, the documents objected to appeared to have been clearly evidence against the Rajas mother and widow. This would have been a formidable objection if the documents had not been admissible against persons through whom the appellant Sasidhar claimed. But when looked into, the documents objected to appeared to have been clearly evidence against the Rajas mother and widow. The most important were statements made by themselves, and are clearly admissible against Sasidhar himself, who claimed under them. This objection, therefore, falls to the ground. The document Exhibit 3 is dated December 19, 1844, and is a petition for the appointment of a guardian for the protection of the Rajas estates against some execution proceedings. The petitioners were the Rajas mother and widow. The statements in it must, therefore, be regarded as their statements if the document is worth anything. As translated, the petition mentions the fact that the Rajas widow had a son, and that she and her mother were his guardians, but were not able to take care of the estates. The original of this document, which was in Persian script, was produced before their Lordships, and it was plain that it was written on two pieces of paper fastened together and of very different textures. Affidavits recently obtained in this country from skilled witnesses were also tendered and read de bene esse, and without prejudice to any question. These affidavits stated that " son" in the translation should be "child," and that the handwriting on the lower part of the paper was not the same as that on the upper part; and that different pens were used. There can be no doubt that this is a very suspicious document, and their Lordships are far from satisfied that in its present shape it is genuine throughout. But, correcting the word " son " and substituting " child," the fact remains that the top part of the document, the genuineness of which is not impeached, talks of guardians, and this points unmistakably to the existence of a son, and not of a daughter only. But what weighs with their Lordships more than anything else is that there is a later document, Exhibit 21, dated January 9, 1845, the original of which was produced in the Courts in India. This document refers to a petition which was apparently the Exhibit 3, and mentions a minor son of the Rajas widow, and that his grandmother and mother were his guardians. This document refers to a petition which was apparently the Exhibit 3, and mentions a minor son of the Rajas widow, and that his grandmother and mother were his guardians. In the face of this document, which their Lordships see no reason to regard with suspicion, they feel that there are no sufficient grounds for overruling both the Courts in India and for sending the case back for a new trial. The case is unquestionably one of great difficulty, but the appellants have failed to shew any miscarriage of justice, or the violation of any principle of law or procedure. Their Lordships, therefore, see no reason for departing from the usual practice of this Board of declining to interfere with two concurrent findings on pure questions of fact. Their Lordships will, therefore, humbly advise His Majesty to dismiss this appeal, and the appellants must pay the costs of it.