JUDGMENT : Burkitt, J. : The question raised in the principal appeal in this case is somewhat peculiar and novel. The suit was one for sale on a mortgage executed on the 15th of September, 1877, by one Damri Lal in favour of the predecessor in title of the plaintiffs. That mortgage was given to secure a sum of Rs. 200 which was repayable within 3 years with interest at the rate of 1¼ per cent, per annum. The interest was payable half yearly and the mortgagor undertook, in case of failure, to pay interest, to put his mortgagee into possession of the mortgaged property, interest to cease from that time, the profits of the land being set off against it. On the 28th of February, 1883, the sons of the original mortgagor mortgaged the same property to Chaubey Nand Ram, who is the appellant here, to secure the sum of Rs. 375. The same persons again on the 12th of July, 1888, mortgaged the same property to Chaubey Bhagwan Das and Ram Das to secure a further sum of Rs. 200. The third mortgagees just mentioned (i.e., Bhagwan Das and Ram Das) in 1898, instituted a suit for sale on their mortgage. They impleaded-as defendants to their suit the mortgagor and the two prior mortgagees just mentioned. A compromise was entered into on the 30th of May, 1898 by these third mortgagees and the mortgagors by which the plaintiffs accepted certain terms as to payments by installments. Eventually the property was put up for sale and was purchased by the representatives of the second mortgagees, who are the appellants here. The present suit was instituted by the representatives of the first mortgagee on the 14th of October, 1901. The suit was for sale of the mortgaged property in default of payment, of Rs. 720 claimed to be due for principal and interest. ‘A decree was passed in full by the Court of first instance but on appeal the learned Officiating District Judge, while affirming the decree for sale, refused to allow any interest on the mortgage money, Hence two appeals have been instituted. The first has been brought by the representatives of the second mortgagee who are also the auction-purchasers. The only contention raised by them which has been argued before us by their learned Vakil is that the present plaintiffs were debarred from instituting this suit. The first has been brought by the representatives of the second mortgagee who are also the auction-purchasers. The only contention raised by them which has been argued before us by their learned Vakil is that the present plaintiffs were debarred from instituting this suit. Their contention is that these plaintiffs instead of bringing a regular suit should have made an application under section 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure to have the ex parte decree set aside. As to that ex parte decree we should have mentioned that on the suit brought by the third mortgagee for sale of the mortgaged property, the first mortgagee, though impleaded as a defendant, did not appear, and in the present suit it has been found that no summons was served upon him. Appellant's contention practically is this that section 108 is exhaustive, and that any person against whom a decree has been passed ex parte has no remedy left but to apply to have the decree set aside. Whether this contention be a correct exposition of the law or not, we need not inquire. Section 108 of the Code opens with the words: “In any case in which a decree is passed ex parte against the defendant, he may apply, etc.” Clearly these words are not applicable to the present case, for as a matter of fact no decree whatever was passed in what we may term the compromise decree against the first mortgagee whose representatives are the plaintiffs here. No doubt the name of the first mortgagee or his representatives is mentioned in the heading to the decree but in the only operative part of the decree which gives effect to the compromise and directs as between the second and third mortgagees the sale of the property in default of payment, not One word is said about the first mortgagee. Clearly he had been lost sight of both by the Court and by the other litigants. This being so, we find ourselves unable to say that this is a case to which section 108 would apply even supposing that it had the exhaustive effect which the learned Vakil for the appellants contends. On this matter, therefore, we are of opinion that the decision of the lower Courts is right and we therefore dismiss Appeal No. 1043 of 1902 with costs. 2. On this matter, therefore, we are of opinion that the decision of the lower Courts is right and we therefore dismiss Appeal No. 1043 of 1902 with costs. 2. There is also a further appeal in this matter, namely, Second Appeal No. 1082 of 1902. This appeal has reference to the District Judge's refusal to allow any interest on the mortgage money. After setting forth that interest is to be paid at the rate of ¼ per cent, per annum, the provisions of the mortgage-deed as regards interest are that “I shall without any objection pay to the said creditor, the fixed amount of interest for six months from this day. If I do not pay interest on the due date, I should at once put the creditor in possession of the hypothecated property as mortgagees.” As to these words the learned District Judge remarks that “if he (i.e., the mortgagee) “did not take possession in lieu of payment of interest, he could not, under the terms of the document, which are very clear, make it a charge upon the property, and the suit for the recovery thereof does not lie.” We entirely dissent from these observations. 3. We notice that it was the mortgagor who undertook himself to put the mortgage in possession on non-payment of interest and not that the mortgagee, we presume, should by litigation take possession. This, however, we regard as an immaterial point. We are of opinion that the amount secured by the mortgage plus, interest at the stipulated rate is a charge on the property, and that the lower appellate Court should not have interfered with the decision of the Court, of first instance which gave a decree for the amount. It is a plain case of money lent at interest and made payable on the security of certain property. We must, therefore, in this appeal modify the decree of the lower appellate Court by giving interest at the stipulated rate up to the date of suit, and from date of suit up to the date of payment at 6 per cent, per annum. We modify the decree accordingly with costs in this Court and in the lower appellate Court. We allow the respondents three months' time from this date within which to pay the amount of the decree with interest.