JUDGMENT : Stanley, J. The facts of this appeal are very simple. One Pahalwan Singh, who owned a 5 anna 4 pie share in a certain village, mortgaged the half of it to one Ganeshi Lal on the 31st of October, 1890. The mortgagee brought a suit on foot of the mortgage and obtained a decree for sale of the share which was included in the mortgage, on the 17th of December, 1894. That decree was transferred for execution to the Collector, and owing to some mistake or oversight, the entire 5 anna 4 pie share, which had previously been changed into a separate mahal, and was described as a 16 anna share, was put up for sale and sold to Baldeo Prasad, who is a stranger to the parties, on the 20th of May, 1897, and on the 30th of June following the sale was confirmed in the presence of the parties, that is, in the presence of the judgment-debtors and the decree-holders and a certificate of sale was granted to the purchaser on the 2nd of September, 1897. Now, it is no doubt the case that the Collector had no jurisdiction to sell a moiety of the property which was included in the sale. He could only sell the property which was ordered to be sold, that is, the share which was comprised in the mortgage. A sale of property outside of that property must be treated as a nullity. However, no objection was taken by any of the parties to the sale, and on the 19th of September, 1897, possession was given to the purchaser. Following upon the sale the usual dakhil-kharij proceedings took place, when notice must have been given in the ordinary course to the judgment-debtors, who, we should mention, were the representatives of the original mortgagor, and no objection whatever was raised by them to the mutation of names which was applied for by the purchaser and was effected on the 25th of November, 1897. The heirs of Pahalwan Singh, notwithstanding the sale to Baldeo Parshad and with full knowledge of all the circumstances, sold the 2 anna 8 pie share, which had been included in the sale by the Collector to Baldeo Parshad, to the present plaintiff-respondent, Hafiz Fakhr-ud-din, on the 10th of June, 1898, and he has brought the present suit to recover possession from Baldeo Parshad of the property so sold to him. Now it is clear that if Hafiz Fakhr-ud-din had, on the occasion of his purchase, made the slightest inquiry as to the title or endeavored to ascertain how it came that Baldeo Parshad was in possession of the property, he must, if he did not already know what had occurred, have at all events then ascertained the facts connected with the sale to Baldeo Prashad. We cannot regard him as a bona fide purchaser without notice. If he had been a bona fide purchaser without notice of the sale to Baldeo Parshad, he would have been in a very different position from that in which he at present stands. The price of the property which was paid by Baldeo Parshad was Rs. 725. That money has been applied in satisfaction of the decree under which the sale by the Court took place, and we may mention that it fell very far short of satisfying the decree which then amounted to a sum considerably over Rs. 4,000. The judgment-debtors had the full benefit of the sale. 2. The Court of first instance dismissed the claim, but upon appeal the lower appellate Court reversed its decision and gave a decree to the plaintiff on the ground that the sale to Baldeo Parshad was a mere nullity, and consequently the plaintiff, under his purchase from the heirs of Pahalwan Singh, acquired a title to the property now in dispute, and was entitled to oust the defendant from possession. We are unable to uphold this contention. It would be manifestly inequitable to allow the judgment-debtors who stood by and allowed the purchase of the property to be made by an innocent purchaser, now to set up the invalidity of the sale and to deprive the purchaser of the benefit of his purchase. We are unable to uphold this contention. It would be manifestly inequitable to allow the judgment-debtors who stood by and allowed the purchase of the property to be made by an innocent purchaser, now to set up the invalidity of the sale and to deprive the purchaser of the benefit of his purchase. The plaintiff, who either was aware of the purchase made by Baldeo Parshad or else acted with gross negligence in making no inquiry as to the title, is in no better position. He cannot be regarded as a bona fide purchaser. He seeks under these circumstances to eject the appellant from the land purchased by him at a Court sale, and that too, without offering to refund any portion of the price which was paid for the property. It appears to us under the circumstances that the plaintiff, if he sought the assistance of the Court in ousting the appellant from possession, ought at least to have made an offer to return to the appellant the proportionate part of the purchase-money attributable to the property sought to be recovered. He comes into a Court of Equity to ask its assistance, and in doing so, he ought to be prepared to do equity. It appears to us that by the conduct of the heirs of Pahalwan Singh in allowing the sale of the entire property to be carried out in favour of Baldeo Parshad, in allowing possession of the property to be taken subsequent to the purchase, in not raising any objection to the substitution of the name of Baldeo-Parshad in the revenue papers, as owner of the property, in allowing Baldeo Parshad to deposit in Court the full amount of the purchase money, and permitting the appropriation of that money to the satisfaction of the decree, neither they nor the plaintiff who has not purchased in good faith can complain, if the Court refuses to grant the relief sought in this case. For these reasons we allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the lower appellate Court and restore that of the Court of first instance with costs of this appeal and the costs in the lower appellate Court.