JUDGMENT : Burkitt, J. :— This is a frivolous appeal. The suit out of which it has arisen is one which was instituted for the purpose of obtaining a declaration of plaintiffs' right to and for partition of an occupancy holding. The suit was; instituted in the court of the Munsiff on the 17th of April, 1901, and was decided on the 11th of March, 1902. During that interval, Act No. II of 1901, passed by the Local Legislature, came into effect. The contention raised by the learned Vakil for the appellant is that inasmuch as section 32 of that Act provides that “no suit or other proceeding for the division of a holding or distribution of the rent thereof shall be entertained in any Civil or Revenue Court,” the effect of this provision is to cut down the power of the Subordinate Judge in appeal and to restrain him from ordering a partition of the holding. We should mention that an appeal was instituted before the Subordinate Judge against the decision of the Munsif of the nth of March, 1902, and the appeal was allowed and partition of the holding was ordered. The contention before us is that be cause from the first of January, 1902, no Court—Civil or Revenue — has any power to partition a tenants' holding, therefore the Subordinate Judge in appeal had no power to pass such an order. It is admitted that the suit was instituted in a competent court, namely, that of the Munsif. It is also admitted that the appeal from the Munsif's decision was instituted in a competent court. But it is contended that in some unexplained way the Subordinate Judge, though empowered to hear the appeal, had no power to decide it in a particular way. 2. The reason given for this argument is because no suit or proceeding for the partition of a tenant's holding could be heard by any Court after the 1st of January, 1902. But it is contended that in some unexplained way the Subordinate Judge, though empowered to hear the appeal, had no power to decide it in a particular way. 2. The reason given for this argument is because no suit or proceeding for the partition of a tenant's holding could be heard by any Court after the 1st of January, 1902. In this argument however, the learned pleader lost sight entirely of the provisions of section II of the Local General Clauses Act No. I of 1887, which following the wording in section 6 of Act No. I of 1868 and also of Act No. X of 1897, section 6, provides that the repeal of any Act or Regulation shall not affect anything done or any offence committed or any fine or penalty incurred or any proceedings commenced before the repealing Act came into operation, and the proceedings shall be continued and concluded as if the repealing Act had not been passed. 3. Now the repealing Act came into operation on the 1st of January, 1902. The proceedings in this suit which as has been constantly held by all Civil Courts, include the whole proceedings from the filing of the plaint down to the final order in execution had been commenced in 1901, and therefore were “proceedings commenced” within the meaning of section II of the Act we have mentioned above. To such proceedings therefore the last clause of section 32 of the new Tenancy Act No. II of 1901 is not applicable. We dismiss this appeal with costs.