JUDGMENT : Knox, J.:— The suit out of which this appeal arises was a suit for sale upon the basis of a hypothecation bond. The respondents, Kishun, Dyal and Nehang, were the executants of the bond. In that bond it is expressly stated that the executants have received the consideration and brought it to their own use. In the suit throughout the executants have admitted execution of the bond but denied receipt of consideration. The court of first instance held that the onus of proving want of consideration lay upon the executants and that they had failed to discharge that burden; it therefore gave a decree in the plaintiff's favour. This decree was reversed on appeal. A second appeal was preferred to this court, and the decision of the lower appellate court was affirmed. The learned Judge who heard the appeal laid down that “ordinarily the rule is that when execution of a document and receipt of consideration has been admitted at registration, the burden of proving non-receipt of consideration Falls upon the party who make such allegation.” He further went on to hold that the fact that before the Registering Officer they (i.e., the executants) broadly and unmistakably stated that the Obligee of the bond had not paid them the consideration money, took the case out of the general rule, and that under the circumstances the burden of proving that as a matter of fact consideration had passed lay on the plaintiff, here appellant. 2. With all due respect to our learned brother, I am unable to hold that anything has been shown in this case which takes it out of the rule laid down in section 102 and illustration (6) of the Indian Evidence Act of 1872. In this case no evidence at all was given on either side. Upon looking into the record of the case it appears that the suit was set down for hearing and final disposal upon the 16th January, 1901. Both parties previous to the day fixed for hearing had applied for an adjournment to enable them to produce evidence. 3. The Munsif refused, to grant the adjournment and disposed of the case on the day fixed for hearing in far too summary a manner, having regard to the nature of the case and the fact that there had been no previous adjournment. 3. The Munsif refused, to grant the adjournment and disposed of the case on the day fixed for hearing in far too summary a manner, having regard to the nature of the case and the fact that there had been no previous adjournment. The learned Munsif showed a want of discretion in not acceding to the application for adjournment made to him. The case should go back to the lower appellate Court in order that Court may return it to the Court of first instance for trial of the matters in issue in the case, reasonable opportunity being given to both sides to adduce any evidence they may wish to produce. Aikman, J.:— I am of the same opinion. When in a suit like the present, execution of the bond is admitted and the bond contains an admission that consideration has passed, it is for the executant to get rid of the admission which he has made in the bond. I do not think it is enough for him to prove that prior to the institution of the suit he denied receipt of consideration, even though that denial, was made before the Registering Officer,’ I concur in the order proposed. By The Court : We allow the appeal, set aside the decrees of this Court and of the Court below, and we remand the case through the lower appellate Court to the Court of first instance with directions to re-admit the suit under its original number in the register of pending suits and dispose of it on the merits after giving the parties reasonable opportunities to produce such evidence as they wish to produce. Costs here and hitherto will abide the result.