JUDGMENT : Stanley, J.:— The suit out of which this appeal has arisen, was brought by the plaintiffs to recover the amount due to them on foot of a mortgage of the 16th of August, 1895, executed: by the original first defendant, Diwan, in their favour, by sale of the mortgaged property. When the case came on for hearing, one of the defendants, Fakir Chand, who was impleaded as transferee of the mortgaged property, filed a written statement and set up the defence that there existed a prior mortgage of the 14th of August, 1880, which had been executed by Diwan in favour of himself and one Janki Das. The learned Munsif at the hearing having regard to this contention, came to the conclusion that the case was one in which the Court should exercise the power conferred by section 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure and add Janki Das as a party defendant, and he accordingly passed an order to that effect. The case came on again for hearing, on the 2nd of October, 1901, the newly added defendant having filed a written statement in which be set up the same defence as that which was set up by Fakir Chand. Neither of these defendants put in an appearance at the trial, either personally or by pleader. In the absence therefore of any proof that any sum remained due on foot of the mortgage of the 14th of August, 1880, the Munsif passed a decree for sale of the mortgaged property in favour of the plaintiffs on non-payment of the amount found to be due to them on foot of their mortgage. From this decree Fakir Chand and Janki Das appealed, alleging that the plaintiffs-respondents had knowledge of their prior mortgage and had not expressed their willingness to pay off the amount due on foot of it; and that not having done so, the Court ought not to have granted a decree under section 88. of the Transfer of Property Act. They also alleged that. The property sought to be sold was in their possession under their mortgage-deed, and that that being the case, the burden of proving that their mortgage had no existence, or that the amount due on foot of it had been satisfied lay upon the respondents and not upon them. The defendants, mortgagors, submitted to the decree and did not appeal. The property sought to be sold was in their possession under their mortgage-deed, and that that being the case, the burden of proving that their mortgage had no existence, or that the amount due on foot of it had been satisfied lay upon the respondents and not upon them. The defendants, mortgagors, submitted to the decree and did not appeal. The learned District Judge, without entering into the merits of the case, came to the conclusion, on the authority of the case of Salig Ram v. Har Chatan Lal : (1890) I.L.R., 12 All., 548, that the suit of the plaintiffs must fail, owing to the fact that they did not in their plaint implead this prior mortgagees. Whether or not, we should be prepared to follow the decision in the case referred to, it appears to us that it does not govern the present case. The learned Judges, who decided the case of Kali Charan v. Ahmad Shah Khan, [1894] I.L.R., 17 All., 4 observed: “We are unable to lay down as a rule of universal application the principle that a plaintiff who claims too much or fails to admit reasonable deductions from his claim is therefore to be deprived of that to which he is legally entitled.” We concur in this observation. 2. The case before us is distinguishable from the case which has been relied upon by the District Judge. Here no doubt the plaintiffs failed in the first instance to implead the prior mortgagees, as mortgagees, though they did, as a matter of fact, implead one of the prior mortgagees, but in a different capacity, namely, as transferee of part of the mortgaged property. The Court, however, exercised the power conferred by section 32, and directed that the prior mortgagees should be brought on the record as defendants. It seems to us that this satisfied any obligation which lay upon the plaintiffs in respect of the prior mortgage and put the mortgagees to proof of their claim. Whether or not anything was due on foot of the prior mortgage was a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of the mortgagees and a matter of which the plaintiffs would ordinarily be in ignorance. Whether or not anything was due on foot of the prior mortgage was a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of the mortgagees and a matter of which the plaintiffs would ordinarily be in ignorance. Under these circumstances we must allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the lower appellate Court and, inasmuch as the appeal has been determined upon a preliminary point, the decision on which we have reversed, direct that the appeal be replaced in the file of pending appeals—in its original number—and be disposed of on the merits. The learned District Judge will note the observations which we have made in regard to the mortgage of the 14th of August, 1880. The mortgagees ought to be in a position to prove the amount, if any which is due on foot of it, and if any sum be found to be due, the plaintiffs can only get the relief which they claim upon the payment of such sum. Costs here and hitherto will abide the event.