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1904 DIGILAW 121 (ALL)

Mahant Kashi Gir v. Jogendra Nath Ghosh

1904-07-05

BLAIR

body1904
JUDGMENT : Blair, J.:— In this suit the plaintiff asks that the defendant may be made to execute and register a document which shall confer upon him a lease containing provisions which are set forth in a draft, as I understand, approved of by both parties. The appellant sets up a res judicata, the res judicata being the finding of a Revenue Court upon an application under section 93 of the North-Western Provinces Rent Act, The Revenue Court found that the present plaintiff was not a tenant at fixed rates, and was therefore liable to ejectment, and passed an order for ejectment. The decision of the Revenue Court has been set up as a res judicata. It is said that it was open to the present plaintiff, the defendant in the former proceeding, upon the hearing before the Revenue Court to set up and establish that he was a lessee, and that would have been an answer to the application for ejectment which he could and ought to have set up. That matter is disposed of by a judgment of this Court, for which I am responsible, in the case of Nand Lal v. Hanuman Das : [1904] 1 A.L.J.R., 96. 2. In that case I held that under the provisions of section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, a lease could not be created by the signature upon a Kabuliat only, Until such lease or Patta is duly executed and registered, no lease is created, and except by the production of such document no lease could be proved in a Court of Justice. It follows, therefore, that the present plaintiff could not have set up in the Revenue Court that he was a lessee, for the simple reason that no lease had been then executed. The case to which I have referred above, followed a judgment (printed as a foot-note to the case of Nand Lal v. Hanuman Das) of the late Chief Justice Sir JOHN EDGE and my brother, BURKITT, in an appeal under the Letters Patent against a judgment of my own. In that case it was held broadly and flatly that no lease could be created by or could be proved by the production of a Kabuliat only. Upon the matter of injunction it seems to me the Court has exceeded its functions. In that case it was held broadly and flatly that no lease could be created by or could be proved by the production of a Kabuliat only. Upon the matter of injunction it seems to me the Court has exceeded its functions. It was asked in the plaint to grant a perpetual injunction directing the defendant not to interfere with the plaintiff's possession under the terms of the Kabuliat. The plaintiff had no right to possession under the terms of the Kabuliat. He must have a Patta before he could acquire any right as a lessee. That being so, whatever his status may have been at the time when the Revenue Court ordered him to be ejected, in that status, as far as I can understand, he remained, or else his possession was that of a trespasser. When the plaintiff has got his lease duly executed and registered, then and then only he will be entitled to the rights and privileges of a lessee. I therefore set aside that part of the judgment and decree of the Court below which grants the injunction, and affirm that part of the judgment and decree of the Court below which orders the defendant to execute and register a good Patta. The appeal is therefore allowed as far as the injunction is concerned and dismissed as to the remainder. The parties will pay and receive costs in proportion to their failure and success.