JUDGMENT : Stanley, J.:— This second appeal, which has occupied a good deal of the time of the Court, arises out of a suit which was instituted by the plaintiffs-respondents to have a declaration that certain property, namely, a two-anna share in mauza Bhagirathpur was not liable to be attached and sold in execution of two decrees, dated the 22nd of September, 1894, and the 24th of January, 1898, respectively, which were obtained by the defendant-appellant against one Niranjan Khan, deceased. Niranjan Khan is the predecessor-in-title of the plaintiffs. He left two sons surviving him, namely, Sheonandan Khan and Ramnandan Khan, both of whom are alive. The plaintiffs are the three grandsons and a great grandson of Niranjan Khan. It appears that the defendant-appellant obtained the two decrees to which we have referred for arrears of rent. These decrees were put in execution and the two-anna share of the village, which belonged to Niranjan Khan as ancestral property, was attached and ordered to be sold. The proceedings in execution of the decrees were taken in the Collector's Court. We are informed, and we have no doubt that it is true, that Sheonan-dan Khan and Ramnandan Khan, both resisted the sale of the property, but their objections were disallowed. Thereupon the present appellants endeavouring to throw further obstacles in the way of the realization of the claim of the defendant-appellant, have instituted the present suit. In the time of Niranjan Khan an attempt was made also to prevent a sale, It appears from the records that he filed an objection on the 16th of May, 1899, in which he objected to the sale of the property, stating that it was heavily encumbered and admitting that it was under attachment. His objection however, also failed. 2. The present suit is a declaratory suit instituted under the provisions of section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, which gives the Court a discretionary power to make a declaratory decree; if it think under the circumstances of the particular case, the plaintiff is entitled to such decree. Now, under the Rent Act, the Legislature has made provision for determining questions such as are raised in the present appeal. It was open to the plaintiffs to file an objection or appear before the Collector and claim a right to or interest in the property. 3. Now, under the Rent Act, the Legislature has made provision for determining questions such as are raised in the present appeal. It was open to the plaintiffs to file an objection or appear before the Collector and claim a right to or interest in the property. 3. If they had done so, it would have been the duty of the Collector to examine the parties and their witnesses and satisfy himself as to whether or not the claim put forward was well-founded. If they failed to establish their claim before the Collector, it would have been open to them under the provisions of section 181 to institute a suit in the Civil Court to establish their right at any time within one year from the date of the order. Now, in this case, strange to say, the plaintiffs did not implead Sheonandan Khan or Ramnandan Khan who unquestionably have an interest in the property, the subject-matter of the suit, and in their claim they ask for a declaration from the Court that the entire of the two-anna zamindari share is not liable to be attached and sold in execution of the defendant-appellant's decree. They do not limit their claim to a declaration that their own interest in the two-anna share is not liable to be sold 4. The Munsif, before whom the case came in the first instance was of opinion that Sheonandan Khan and Ramnandan Khan ought to have been impleaded, and that they not having been impleaded, the Court should not, in the exercise of its discretion, determine the question raised in the plaint, and therefore dismissed the suit. We are of opinion that the learned Mnnsif was perfectly right It is difficult for us to know what proceedings have taken place in the Court of the Collector, We do not know what orders have been passed either as regards Sheonandan Khan and Ramnandan Khan or plaintiffs, or any of them, and it is obviously inconvenient that this Court should intervene in a matter which is pending in the Collector's Court, particularly as the Legislature has provided a definite course for persons in the position of the plaintiffs to take in a case where property in which they claim to have an interest is being attached and sold. We think, therefore, that the learned Munsif exercised a wise discretion in refusing to grant the relief claimed under section 42 of the Act to which we have referred. On appeal the learned officiating District Judge does not appear to have considered the provisions of Section 42, nor was his attention apparently directed to that section. He determined the case in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents on the ground that a rent decree, such as the decrees which were obtained in this case by the defendant-appellant, cannot be executed against the descendants of the judgment-debtor. That was a question not for the learned officiating District Judge to determine but for the Rent Court which has jurisdiction to deal, with questions arising in execution of rent decrees. 5. We think that, for these reasons, this appeal ought to be allowed and that the decree of the lower appellate Court should be set aside. This will not interfere with the right of the plaintiffs to take such steps in the Court of the Collector as they may be advised in defence of their rights, if any, in the property. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the lower appellate Court and restore the decree of the Munsif, dismissing the suit, with costs in all Courts. 6. We notice from the record that the Munsif took upon himself to pass an order, dated the 17th of February, 1903, prohibiting the Collector from carrying out the sale of the property. The issuing of such an order is prohibited by section 56 of the Specific Relief Act. The Collector is not a Court subordinate to the Munsif, as the learned Munsif ought, to have known, and the order ought not to have been passed. We observe that the Collector properly refused to recognize the order as binding upon him.