JUDGMENT : Stanley, J.:— The property which is the subject-matter of this appeal, formerly belonged to Sakhawat Husain, the husband of the defendant-respondent, Musammat Rajan. He died in the year 1890, and shortly afterwards the plaintiffs-appellants, who are his sister and two cousins, sons of a paternal uncle, instituted a suit to recover their share of the estate of Sakhawat, the defendant-respondent, Musammat Rajan being impleaded as defendant. In that suit Musammat Rajan set up the defence that she was in possession of the property of her husband under a deed of gift from him and also that she was entitled to hold possession of the property in dispute until her dower debt, which she alleged remained unpaid, had been discharged. In that suit the first defence of Musammat Rajan failed, but the Court held that she was entitled to dower which remained unsatisfied and that she could not be dispossessed of the property of her hus-band so long as the dower debt was unsatisfied, that in fact she was entitled to possession until payment of her dower debt 2. The plaintiffs-appellants, who were the plaintiffs in the former suit have instituted the present suit claiming, what I may call, redemption of the dower debt if any portion of it remain-unpaid and upon redemption recovery of their share of the estate of Sakhawat Husain. 3. They allege in the plaint that the dower debt of the defendant amounted to Rs. 800, and that of this sum Rs. 600 was satisfied during the life-time of Sakhawat, and a balance of Rs. 200 only remained due. This balance they allege the defendant has received out of the profits of the property of the deceased of which she is found to be in possession. 4. The learned Munsif before whom the case came, was of opinion that the suit was barred by section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and his view was upheld upon appeal by the learned District, Judge, who says in the course of his judgment, “It seems to me that this is a matter which ought to have been made a ground of attack in the case which terminated, with the High Court's judgment of the 1st of May, 1894, and so the case comes under section 13, explanation 2, Civil Procedure Code.” I am wholly unable to agree in the view thus expressed by the lower Courts. It appears to me that the two causes of action are separate and distinct. When the plaintiffs instituted their first suit, their claim was as heirs of Sakhawat Husain to recover their share of his estate. It is not to be presumed that they had any knowledge that the dower of his widow was then unsatisfied or that she was in possession of the assets of her husband in lieu of her dower. Their suit was dismissed upon the ground set up in one of the defenses of the defendant-respondent that she was in possession of the property in lieu of dower then unsatisfied. On the basis of the determination in that suit the plaintiffs instituted the present suit, it being one to pay off and satisfy the dower debt if it be unsatisfied and to obtain their share of the assets of Sakhawat Husain. So long as causes of action are distinct, a party may bring as many actions as there are causes of action. The cause of action in this suit is to my mind clearly distinct from the cause of action in the former suit. Under section 13 of the Code a plaintiff is only bound to make as a ground of attack in the suit, a matter which not merely might but ought to have been made a ground of attack, and it is only when a matter might and ought to be a ground of attack in a former suit that the section provides that such matter shall be deemed to be a matter directly and substantially in issue in the suit. In this case undoubtedly if the plaintiffs had been aware that the dower was unsatisfied, and that the defendant in that suit was in possession of the assets of her husband in lieu of such dower, they would have framed their claim in the form adopted in the present suit, namely, for redemption of the property upon payment of the dower. It seems to me that in the early suit in which the plaintiffs claimed their ancestor's property and did not admit the existence of any dower debt, it would have been inconsistent and inconvenient to have added to it an alternative claim for redemption. It seems to me that in the early suit in which the plaintiffs claimed their ancestor's property and did not admit the existence of any dower debt, it would have been inconsistent and inconvenient to have added to it an alternative claim for redemption. I am confirmed in this view by the decision in the case of Imam Bakhsh v. Chundo, [1886] A.W.N., 69, the facts of which seem tome on all fours with those in the present case, and I am bound to say that I have no hesitation in holding that the Courts below were entirely in error in applying the provisions of section 13 to this suit. I therefore would allow the appeal, set aside the decrees of the Courts below and remand the case under section 562 of the Code. Burkitt, J.:— All that I consider necessary to say in this case is that in view of the opinion expressed by the learned Judges who decided the case of Imam Bakhsh v. Chundo, a case which is on all fours with the present case and by the ruling in which I am bound, I have come to the conclusion that the two lower courts were wrong in holding that this suit came within the provisions of the second explanation to section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. I therefore concur with the proposed order of the learned Chief Justice that the suit should be remanded for decision on the merits. By The Court : The order of the Court is that the appeal be allowed, the decrees of the lower court set aside, and the suit remanded to the Court of first instance, through the lower appellate Court, under the provision of section 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure, with directions that it be replaced in the file of pending suits in the original number, and be tried upon the merits. The plaintiffs-appellants will be entitled to the costs of this appeal. All other costs will abide the event.