JUDGMENT : Stanley, J.:— This is a second appeal against a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Aligarh, affirming the decree of the Munsif of Bulandshahr. The facts shortly are as follows:— Four persons—Abdulla, Ala Bakhsh, Rahmat-ullah and Musammat Sundal, executed two mortgages of a house in favour of the defendant-respondent, Mansa Ram, in the year 1894. Mansa Ram took proceedings to recover the amount due to him on foot of these mortgages, and obtained a decree for sale under section 88 of the Transfer of Property Act, on the 17th of May, 1897. By that decree it was found that a sum of Rs. 226 odd would be due to the plaintiffs on the 17th of November, 1897, and it was directed that on payment of that sum by the defendants the property should be reconveyed, and in default the property should be sold. To the decree was attached a statement to the effect that the decree was passed against Musammat Sundal ex parte and as against the other defendants upon a compromise, the compromise being that the mortgagee would accept payment, of the amount found to be due from the mortgagors in the following manner, namely, as to Rs. 40, by accepting a buffalo as representing that amount, the buffalo to be handed over within two days, and as to the balance of the debtor in instalment, up to the year 1901, in default of payment, however, the property was directed to be sold. The buffalo was not delivered within the two days, and consequently the mortgagors failed to fulfil the agreement which they had entered into. The order absolute for sale was made on the 20th of August, 1898, and on the 6th of December, 1898, the sale took place, the purchaser being Mansa Ram. In October, 1897, the house in question was attached by one Kallian in execution of a simple money decree, obtained by him against two of the mortgagors, namely, Abdulla and Ala Bakhsh, and an objection to the attachment was filed by Mansa Ram on the ground that he held the two mortgages above referred to, and that suits were pending to realize the amount due under them. It was perhaps an unwise proceeding for Mansa Ram to have filed this objection seeing that he had already instituted a suit, and that a decree for sale had already been passed in that suit in his favour. The decree-holder, Kallian, was not in a position in any way to prejudice the operation and effect of the decrees of the Court which had been passed in his favour in the mortgage suit. However, he did raise, this objection, and it was disallowed on the ground that the decree of the 17th of May, 1897, did not affect the interest of any of the mortgagors, save Musammat Sundal. 2. Now in this the Court was entirely in error. The decree obtained against three mortgagors, Rahmat-ullah, Ala Bakhsh and Abdulla, was obtained upon a compromise, but none the less it was a binding decree and one which had not been in any way impeached by them. Under that decree the property was properly ordered to be sold. The property was ordered to be sold in execution of the simple money decree without any notification of Mansa Ram's mortgage, and it was sold and purchased by Ram Parshad on the 23rd of November, 1897. 3. The Court executing this simple money decree in fact took upon itself to interpret the decree passed for sale of the property by a competent Court and to ignore that decree, in fact to dissolve the decree as also the interest of Mansa Ram in the two mortgages of 1894. Mansa Ram took no further proceedings in respect of his objection which was disallowed and a year having elapsed from the date of the order of the 20th of November, 1897, disallowing his objection, the plaintiff has instituted the suit out of which the present appeal has arisen for the purpose of having it declared that the plaintiff is entitled to the property and that the sale to Mansa Ram under his decree was invalid so far as regards the interest of the two debtors, Abdullah and Ala Baksh. The Courts below dismissed the claim. 4. The Courts below dismissed the claim. 4. The contention before us by the learned counsel for the appellant is, that inasmuch as Mansa Ram did not institute a suit to establish his claim to the property within a year from the disallowance of his objection on the 20th of November, 1897, his rights in the property which belonged to these two persons, Abdullah and Ala Baksh, were absolutely lost. This contention is based upon sections 282 and 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure which have to do with proceedings consequent upon the attachment of immoveable property. Section 282 provides that “if the Court is satisfied that the property is subject to a mortgage or lien in favour of some person not in possession, and thinks fit to continue the attachment, it may do so, subject to such mortgage or lien, “and the succeeding section provides” that the party against whom an order under sections 280, 281 or 282 is passed, may institute a suit to establish the rights which he claims to the property in dispute, but subject to the result of such suit, if any, the order shall be conclusive. We are of opinion, that these proceedings have no application to a case such as the present. In the first place, section 282 only applies to the case where a Court is satisfied that property is subject to a mortgage or lien, and in that case it enables the Court to continue the attachment of that property or to dissolve the attachment as in its discretion it may think fit, but if it do continue the attachment, it must continue it subject to the mortgage or lien which has been established to the satisfaction of the Court. In the present case the Court was not satisfied that the property was subject to any mortgage or lien. On the contrary it found that so far as the interest of Abdulla and Ala Baksh at least was concerned, there was no binding decree. This the Court had no power whatsoever to determine. The Court, if it was satisfied that the mortgages were subsisting mortgages, if it did continue the attachment, was bound to continue it, subject to the mortgages, but if it came to the conclusion that the mortgages had no existence, then the section has no application. This the Court had no power whatsoever to determine. The Court, if it was satisfied that the mortgages were subsisting mortgages, if it did continue the attachment, was bound to continue it, subject to the mortgages, but if it came to the conclusion that the mortgages had no existence, then the section has no application. We think it would be a most dangerous thing if a Court in executing a simple money decree could thus get rid of mortgages on property and of decrees of competent Courts in respect of such securities. That may be the reason why the Legislature gives power to the. Court of continuing attachment, in cases in which the Court is satisfied that ‘the property is subject to mortgages but has not given any power to declare a mortgage invalid. We think that two cases, in the Bombay High Court, of Yashvant Shenvi v. Vithoba Shetii : [1887] I.L.R., 12 Bom., 231 and Nemagauda v. Praesha : [1897] I.L.R., 22 Bom, 640 upon which reliance has been placed, are altogether distinguishable from the present case, and that they, when carefully examined, have no bearing on the facts of the present case. For these reasons we think that there is no substance in this appeal and we dismiss it with cost.