JUDGMENT : Burkitt, J.:— This is an appeal in a pre-emption suit founded on Mohammedan law, There is one point, and one point only, for decision in it. That point is when a pre-emptor after making the talab-i-mawasibat in the presence of witnesses takes those same witnesses with him to the vendee and there makes the talab-i-ishtishhad, but does not when making the talab-i-ishtishhad, refer to the former immediate demand, has he thereby fully conformed to the conditions of the Mohammedan law? The two lower Courts have answered this in the negative. The learned District Judge says:— ”In this case the lower Court found that the evidence showed that both formalities had been carried out, but that the second formality had been fulfilled in a defective manner, as no mention was made at the time when the talab-i-ishtishhad was made of the fact that the immediate demand had already been made.” Further on, after expressing his own agreement with the opinion expressed by the Court of first instance, the lower appellate Court lays down that “the omission to refer to the first formal demand is not rectified by the fact of the witnesses being the same on both occasions,” In this conclusion we fully concur. It was so laid down by our brother AIKMAN in the case of Abid Husian v. Baskir Ahmad : [1898] I.L.R., 20 All., 499, the head note to which case runs as follows*:— “When in asserting a claim fur pre-emption, the making of the talab-i-ishtishhad is required, it is absolutely necessary that at the time of making this demand reference should be made to the fact of the talab-i-mawasibat having been previously made, and this necessity is not removed by the fact that the witnesses to both demands are the same.” In his judgment our brother AIKMAN refers to a Full Bench Ruling of the Calcutta Court in the case of Rajjab Ali Chopedar v. Chandi Charan Bhadra : [1890] I.L.R., 17 Cal, 543, which overruled an earlier judgment of that Court in the case of Nando Pershad Thakur v. Gopal Thakur : [1884] I.L.R., 10 Cal., 1008. In the latter case it was held that if the witnesses of both demands were the same it was unnecessary to refer, when making the second demand, to the fact that the first demand had been made. 2. In the latter case it was held that if the witnesses of both demands were the same it was unnecessary to refer, when making the second demand, to the fact that the first demand had been made. 2. In the Full Bench case it was held that “it is absolutely necessary that at the time of making this demand (i, e., the second demand) reference should be made to the fact that the talab-i-mawnsibat had been previously made, and this necessity is not removed by the fact that the witnesses to both demands are the same.” We can well understand why the law in this respect should be so strict. The second demand is not made for the information of the witnesses, hut for the information of the vendee or vendor, to whom it happens to be made. If the witnesses to both the immediate and second demands be the same, it naturally does seem unnecessary to repeat the same thing to them; but then at the second demand not only may the same witnesses be present, but also a third party, namely the vendee or vendor must be present, and it is for his information that at the second demand reference is required to be made to the fact that the first and immediate demand had been made. The Only authority against this view ‘of the law which has been cited to us is that of Chotu v. Husain Bakhsh : (1893) A.W.N., 101. To that case our brother AIKMAN, to whose judgment in the later case we have referred, was a part)’. In another case, Sahibzadi v. Alahdia Khan : (1902) A.W.N., 147, our brother AIKMAN, with another learned Judge of this Court, was a party to a judgment affirming practically the judgment in the case of Abid Husain v. Bashir Ahmad. So that the weight of authority of this Court is in favour of the view taken’ in the last-mentioned case, and the authority of the Calcutta High Court also favors the same view. In view of this preponderance of authority we are not prepared to hold that the view expressed by the lower appellate Court is incorrect. We must, therefore, affirming it, dismiss this appeal with costs.