JUDGMENT : Burkitt, J.:— This is an appeal against a decision of the learned District Judge of Benares in a suit for possession of certain property on redemption of a mortgage-executed on the 7th of September, 1869. The plaintiff, Rugad Singh, is assignee by purchase of a portion of the equity of redemption. As such, he was a person entitled to redeem the whole mortgage. Accordingly, with a view to so doing, he on the 29th of May, 1901, under the provisions of section 83 of the Transfer of Property Act, deposited in Court a certain sum of money which in the course of these proceedings has been found, and at the hearing of this appeal was admitted by the learned vakil for the respondent to be sufficient to discharge the sum due on the mortgage mentioned above. Notice of the deposit having been served on the mortgagors, they declined to accept it as sufficient not because it was insufficient to pay off the amount due on the mortgage of the 7th of September, 1869, but because they claimed payment of the amount due on a simple-money bond of the 24th of July, 1874. Their claim was that the amount due on that bond should be paid off before the mortgage of the 7th of September, 1869, could be redeemed. Hence this suit for possession to which one Shakal Narain Singh alleged to be the purchaser of other portions of the equity of redemption was made a party. This person, when impleaded as a defendant alleged in his defence that he had been impleaded without any reason that he owned a five-sixth share in the equity of redemption that he wished to obtain redemption of the property sought to be redeemed by paying a sum proportionate to his share, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to obtain redemption of the share belonging to him. Finally he asked that he should be added as a co-plaintiff to the suit and given an opportunity of obtaining redemption of his share. The plaintiff, Rugad Singh, refused to consent to this man being added as a co-plaintiff, and we think rightly, for the plaintiff and this Shakal Narain Singh had not the same cause of action. Finally he asked that he should be added as a co-plaintiff to the suit and given an opportunity of obtaining redemption of his share. The plaintiff, Rugad Singh, refused to consent to this man being added as a co-plaintiff, and we think rightly, for the plaintiff and this Shakal Narain Singh had not the same cause of action. Each of them had a separate cause of action, the plaintiff by his purchase of a share in the equity of redemption from one Sher Ali and Shakal Narain by his purchase from other sharers in that equity. The causes of action were different and the relief they sought was not the same. The plaintiff sued for possession of the whole property on redemption of the whole mortgage and rightly so sued, while Shakal Narain desired only to redeem his share. In the lower Courts two points were decided; first, that, this property could not be redeemed until the bond of July 24th, 1874, had been paid off, and secondly, that Shakal Narain was entitled to a decree for redemption of five-sixths of the property. The plaintiff, Rugad Singh, appeals against these decisions. 2. We will first take up the question as to whether the bond of the 24th of July, 1874, had the effect of postponing redemption of the mortgage of 1869 until it had been paid off. We think both the lower Courts were wrong in their decision in this point. We have carefully considered the provisions of the bond of the 24th of July, 1874, which is described by the parties to it as a “simple bond. “It provides, no doubt, in very strong language, as follows:— “Therefore we agree that the principal and interest due under this simple bond shall be paid before the amount due on the usufructuary mortgage is paid. The creditor may refuse to accept payment of the amount due under the usufructuary mortgage bond before the amount due under the simple bond is paid up.” It is contended that these words, coupled with words of almost exactly similar import at the conclusion of the mortgage-deed of September, 1869, create a charge on the mortgaged property, and that that charge according to the contract made by the parties must be paid off before redemption of the bond of 1869. 3. 3. In our opinion it does not create any charge, and amount to no more than a clog or fetter on the equity of redemption. It seems to us that this case is entirely governed by the decisions of a Bench of this Court in the case of Sheo Shnnkar v. Parma Mahton : [1904] A.W.N., 123. In that case it was held that provisions in a bond resembling very much those in the bond before us, were a clog or fetter on redemption placing in the way of the mortgagor a bar to the exercise of the right of redemption which the law gave him, and therefore provisions which could not be enforced. We can see no distinction between the facts of that case and the case before us. We are bound by the rule of law laid down in it, and following that rule we must hold that the Courts below were wrong in the conclusion they arrived at, that the bond of 1874 must be paid off before usufructuary mortgage of 1869 can be redeemed. 4. As to the second point also, that is to say, the right of Shakal Narain to a redemption decree in this suit, we think the lower Courts are wrong. When the plaintiff deposited the sum which is now admitted, to have been the full amount then due on the mortgage of 1869, the effect of that payment was in our opinion to satisfy and discharge the mortgage fully. Thenceforth there was no longer any subsisting mortgage which could be enforced or redeemed. Nothing further remained to be done by the mortgagor depositor, but to take possession of the mortgaged property if the mortgagee consented, or, in case of a refusal, to sue for possession of that property. The mortgage, we hold, had been satisfied and therefore no longer existed. The plaintiff as a part owner of the equity of redemption, was fully justified by law in redeeming the whole mortgage; in fact it is doubtful whether he could have done otherwise than redeem the whole. Shakal Narain, the alleged holder of another portion of the equity of redemption, did not make his appearance on the scene until after the mortgage had, in our opinion, been satisfied. Shakal Narain, the alleged holder of another portion of the equity of redemption, did not make his appearance on the scene until after the mortgage had, in our opinion, been satisfied. Therefore when in his written statement he prayed to be allowed to redeem his share of the mortgage of September 7th, 1869, he asked for redemption of that which did not then exist. We think that, having deposited under section 83 the full amount due on the mortgage, the plaintiff-appellant, Rugad Singh, thereby became entitled to possession of the entire mortgaged property, and is now entitled to a decree for possession of it. As to that property he will of course hold as absolute proprietor of whatever may have been his fractional interest in the equity of redemption, and as to the rest he will hold, as laid down by this Court, as lienor, liable to be paid off in respect of it by any one entitled to the equity of redemption on payment of an amount of the mortgage money proportionate to the share of that person and of the expenses properly incurred by the plaintiff in redeeming and obtaining possession, as is provided by Section 95 of the Transfer of Property Act. We do not say what Shakal Narain's interest is. His learned Advocate contended that he was entitled to five-sixths, and that the District Judge had said so. Such, however, is not the case. The meaning of the Judge is clear. He was putting forth the claims made by the respective parties and mentioned that Shakal Narain had claimed a five-sixths share, but the Judge came to no conclusion as to that matter. It was not a question which could be decided in this suit. We trust that Shakal Narain and the plaintiff-appellant will be able to come to an amicable arrangement as to the amount to be paid to the plaintiff by Shakal Narain to liberate his interest from the charge given to the plaintiff by section 95 of the Transfer of Property Act. We trust that Shakal Narain and the plaintiff-appellant will be able to come to an amicable arrangement as to the amount to be paid to the plaintiff by Shakal Narain to liberate his interest from the charge given to the plaintiff by section 95 of the Transfer of Property Act. For these reasons we modify the decision of the two lower Courts, we set aside as much of the order of those Courts as directs the bond of 1874 to be paid before the redemption of the mortgage of 1869, and we further set aside as much of the decision of these Courts as gives the defendant-respondent Shakal Narain a decree for redemption of five-sixths of the property. In substitution for those orders we, finding that the deposit made by the plaintiff-appellant under the provisions of section 83 is admittedly sufficient to redeem the mortgage of the 7th of September, 1869, give the plaintiff-appellant a decree for possession of the whole of the property affected by that mortgage and for mesne profits from the 29th of May, 1901, the date, on which the plaintiff appellant made his deposit in Court under section 83 of the Transfer of Property Act, up to the date on which he obtains possession, the amount to be ascertained in the Execution Department. The plaintiff-appellant is entitled to his costs of this appeal against both sets of respondents and in both the Lower Courts.