JUDGMENT Mookerjee, J. - This appeal arises out of an action commenced by the Plaintiffs for ejecting the Defendants from certain lands which, the Plaintiffs alleged, were originally held under them by Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 as their tenants and subsequently transferred by them to Defendant No. 1. It appears to have been the case of the Plaintiffs that the tenancy in question was not transferable by custom or local usage and consequently the Defendant No. 1 could not have acquired any valid rights under his purchase from the Defendants Nos. 2 and 3. The Defendant No. 1 contended that the holding was transferable and that he had acquired a valid title under his purchase. The Defendants Nos 2 and 3, who were not originally made parties to the suit but were subsequently added, upon an objection taken by Defendant No. 1 pleaded that they were quire willing to recognise the Plaintiff as their landlords, that they had not abandoned their holding, although they had sold it to Defendant No. 1 and had taken a sub lease from him and that they were quite willing to pay rent to the Plaintiff's. 2. The Court of first instance found that the holding in question was not transferable and made a decree for khas possession in favour of the Plaintiffs. Upon appeal preferred by all the Defendants, the learned Judge of the Court below has held that, inasmuch as the holding was not transferable, the Defendant No. 1 could not be said to have acquired any valid title under his purchase and that it was wholly immaterial whether Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 still continued in occupation of the lands as sub tenants of Dependant No, 1. In this view of the matter, the Court of Appeal below has confirmed the decision of the Court of first instance and this second appeal has been preferred by all the Defendants. 3. On behalf of Defendant No. 1, it has been contended by the learned vakil who appears on his behalf that inasmuch as Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are still in occupation of the lands, it cannot be said that the Plaintiffs have any cause of action as against Defendant No. 1. We are of opinion that this contention cannot be supported. The Plaintiffs are entitled to look to Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 for any. 2 and 3 are still in occupation of the lands, it cannot be said that the Plaintiffs have any cause of action as against Defendant No. 1. We are of opinion that this contention cannot be supported. The Plaintiffs are entitled to look to Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 for any. input of rent and if the Defendant No. 1, under colour of his purchase which has been found to be inoperative in law, intervenes and claims a title to collect rent from Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 and further alleges that the Plaintiffs are bound to look to him for rent which was originally payable by Defendants Nos. 2 and 3, surely it cannot be contended that the Plaintiffs have no cause of action against Defendant No. 1. We are of opinion, therefore, that the appeal of Defendant No. 1 must fail. 4. So far as Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are concerned, the matter stands on a different footing. It has been found that tiny are still in occupation of the lands, although they have repudiated their tenancy under the Plaintiffs and have set up a new tenancy under their transferee, Defendant No. 1. But the question arises whether this would constitute a forfeiture of their tenancy. We are of opinion that the tenancy which they originally held under the Plaint ill's still subsists and the view that we take is supported by the decision of this Court in the case of Srishtidhur Biswas v. Madan Sirdar I. L. R. 9 Cal. 648 (1883). In that case, the question for decision was whether occupant cultivators who had asserted a transferable right in their lands and sold that right to a stranger without giving up their occupation were liable to be ejected by the superior landlord whom they repudiated in a suit brought against them for arrears of rent, setting themselves up as tenants of the purchaser. This question was answered in the negative and, we have no doubt, correctly. Reliance has been placed upon the decision of this Court in the case of Dwarka Nath Misser v. Harrish Chunder I. L. R. 4 Cal. 925 (1879), in which Mr. This question was answered in the negative and, we have no doubt, correctly. Reliance has been placed upon the decision of this Court in the case of Dwarka Nath Misser v. Harrish Chunder I. L. R. 4 Cal. 925 (1879), in which Mr. Justice L. Jackson is said to have observed : "If it be true that the former occupant raiyats are still upon the land, that circumstance does not exist in the same shape, but does in this shape that they are upon the land no longer as raiyats with a right of occupancy, but as tenants at will under the so-called tenant with a right of occupancy." But as pointed out by Wilson, J., in the case of Srishtidhar Biswas (1), in the case of Dwarka Nath Mitter (2) the appeal was not on behalf of the occupancy raiyats who had transferred their rights and, therefore, no question could arise whether the decree for ejectment, which had been made by the lower Courts, not only against the transferee but also against the transferor had been correctly made and could be maintained. Reliance was also placed on the decision of this Court in the case of Kali Nath Chakerbartty v. Upendra Chunder Chowdry I. L. R. 24 Cal. 212 (1806), but we are of opinion that that Case is clearly distinguishable. In the first place, the original tenants in that case had not been made parties to the suit nor was any objection taken to the suit proceeding in their absence. In the second place, the appeal had been preferred only on behalf of the purchasers whose purchase had been found inoperative in law. It has been contended by the learned vakil for the Respondents that, in the case of Kali Nath Chakerbartty I. L. R. 24 Cal. 212 (1896) a decree for khas possession was made. But we may point out, as appears from the judgment in that case, that after the transfer from the original tenants, the transferees took khas possession of a portion of the ten. Any which had been transferred to them and the transferor took a sub-lease of the remainder of the lands. It was, therefore, necessary for the Plaintiffs in that suit to have a decree for khas possession as against the transferees. Any which had been transferred to them and the transferor took a sub-lease of the remainder of the lands. It was, therefore, necessary for the Plaintiffs in that suit to have a decree for khas possession as against the transferees. That case could not, in the absence of the transferors, decide whether they would be affected by the fact of the transfer they had made and it would appear form the judgment at page 215 that the case of Srishtidhur v. Mudan I. L. R. 9 Cal. 648 (1883) was expressly distinguished on this very ground. It appears tons, therefore, that the appeal of Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 ought to succeed. The decree of the Court below will, therefore, be discharged and, in lien thereof, a decree will be made in favour of the Plaintiffs for possession as against Defendant No. 1 with costs in this Court and in the Courts below. The Plaintiffs' claim for khas possession as against Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 will be dismissed, but they will be entitled to receive rents from those De Pendants. As between the Plaintiffs and Defendants Nos. 2 and 3, we make the order as to costs.