JUDGMENT : Burkitt, J.:— This is an appeal from a decree of the District Judge of Ghazipur, reversing the decision of the Subordinate Judge of that district, who had dismissed the plaintiff's suit. In paragraph 4th of the plaint it is alleged that the plaintiff had lawfully obtained possession of 15 bighas odd of land and had it cultivated, but that at the instigation of defendant No. 2, namely, one Gobind Singh, the defendant No. 1, one Basawan Kurmi, interfered with plaintiff's possession and prevented him from ploughing. The plaint then goes on to claim that the plaintiff is entitled to retain possession of the land as representative of defendant No. 2, Gobind Singh,” and in the prayer for relief the plaintiff asks for a decree for “maintenance of possession” in respect of the 15 bighas odd and goes on to say that “if in the opinion of the Court it is deemed proper to pass a decree for recovery of possession, then a decree for recovery of possession may be passed.” Now the facts found by the lower Courts as regards the allegations in the plaint are that the plaintiff was never in possession of the land in suit and therefore was never ejected. Those are findings of fact behind which in second appeal we cannot go. Paragraph (b) of the prayer for relief asked for any other relief, but this we think must be some relief arising out of the cause of action. Now the cause of action as set forth here was lawful possession of certain area of land by the plaintiff and unlawful dispossession of the plaintiff therefrom by the defendant. The Courts have found that no such cause of action ever accrued. That being so, in our opinion the suit fails and should have been dismissed, and for that reason we allow this appeal, and as far as the defendant-appellant Basawan is concerned, we dismiss the plaintiffs suit, restoring so for the decree of the Subordinate judge. 2. The cause of action set forth above, we may add, was entirely abandoned at the hearing by the learned Advocate for the respondent. He took his stand on certain proceedings which ended in a decree for redemption, dated the 18th March, 1902, and on those proceedings he contended that his client was entitled to retain the decree now under appeal. The cause of action set forth above, we may add, was entirely abandoned at the hearing by the learned Advocate for the respondent. He took his stand on certain proceedings which ended in a decree for redemption, dated the 18th March, 1902, and on those proceedings he contended that his client was entitled to retain the decree now under appeal. The facts attending those proceedings are that the plaintiff Nakched was mortgagee from Parmeshar Kurmiand others of 13 bighas of land under a usufructuary “mortgage-deed of the 26th of March, 1901. The learned District Judge is wrong in saying that Basawan was one of those mortgagors and was their “fighting man.” The land being subject to a prior mortgage held by one Gobind Singh, dated the 29th of July, 1878, Nakched sued to redeem that mortgage. At the hearing of the suit it was objected on behalf of Gobind Singh that he was a holder of four other mortgages ranging from December, 1886, to October, 1900, and he claimed that those mortgages must also be redeemed before plaintiff could redeem the mortgage of the 29th July, 1878, Those four mortgages admittedly affected an area of 15 bighas and also a part of the 13 bighas affected by the mortgage of the 26th March,’1901. Nakched obtained a decree for redemption conditionally on his paying the sum of Rs. 5,276-14-0 to Gobind Singh that being the sum which the Court adjudged, him to pay for redemption of the 5 mortgages, that is to say, the mortgage of 1878, and the four other subsequent mortgages. 3. Nakched paid that money into Court on the 17th of June, 1902, and six days afterwards he applied in execution to be put into possession of the 13 bighas and of the 15 bighas. It was objected that under the decree of the Court he was entitled to possession of the 13 bighas only. On inspection of the decree this turned out to be correct, as the Court which passed the redemption decree had by some blunder omitted to give Nakched a decree for possession as mortgagee of the 15 bighas. The plaintiff's application was accordingly rejected as far as the 15 bighas were concerned. Now at that time, on the passing of that order, there were two courses open to Nakched. The plaintiff's application was accordingly rejected as far as the 15 bighas were concerned. Now at that time, on the passing of that order, there were two courses open to Nakched. If he considered the execution Court had wrongly interpreted the redemption decree, he might have appealed against that order under section 244 or if he considered that the decree was wrong, as it manifestly was, in not giving him possession as mortgagee of the 15 bighas, he might either have appealed against the decree as it stood or have applied to the Court in review to amend the blunder apparent on the face of the decree. He did neither, but has instituted this suit in which on a false allegation of facts he asked for recovery of possession of the 15 bighas, and, it is to be noted, he does not ask for possession of that area as mortgagee, but apparently asked for proprietary possession to which he certainly would not be entitled even if the redemption decree had been properly framed. It appears to us then that this present suit is virtually a suit, the object of which is to have the redemption decree amended and to have the order in execution refusing possession of the 15 bighas set aside. Such a suit is in our opinion entirely misconceived and not maintainable. We are unable in* any way to concur with the view of the law taken by the District Judge in this matter, while on the other hand we think the view taken by the Subordinate Judge is correct. 4. Therefore, for these reasons as well as those given in an earlier part of this judgment, we allow this appeal. As far as the appellant Basawan Kurmi is concerned, we set aside the decree of the lower appellate Court and to the same extent we restore the decree of the Court of first instance, dismissing the plaintiff's suit with costs in all Courts.