JUDGMENT : Blair, J.:— This appeal raises a question whether certain persons of the Chhipi caste and occupation residing in a village abadi are bound to pay to the zamindars certain specified sums by way of rent. The village appears to have two classes of occupants and two only: the one, no doubt the larger body, are agricultural tenants who are entitled to occupy houses in the abadi as an incident of their tenure in agricultural land, and that class is not liable to pay any rent. It is for us to see as a practical question that the rent which is paid by them nominally only for their zamindari land, is really and substantially paid by them for their agricultural land and the incidents attached thereto, one of those incidents being a right to occupy houses in the abadi. The other class of Chkipis are liable to make annual payment which is called in the wajib ul-arz ‘muhtarfa’ That is a word which is very common in use in Madras and Bombay. It indicates trade tax. There are cases in which there is a poll-tax, tax upon profession, tax upon looms and tax upon tradesmen's shops. 2. That word however, is not a word which has currency in this district, nor has it been shown to me that it has any ascertained meaning. This population of Chhipis is an excrescence of the village community, and it would indeed be surprising if the agricultural tenant by virtue of his holding as bound to pay anything, were in a worse position than the Chhipis who upon the contention of the defendant are not bound to pay any rent at all, and have acquired a right to perpetual occupation of the land. The Chhipi brings nothing to the zamindar in any way except a small payment described in the wajib-ul-atz as muhtarfa which, in my opinion, only means rent paid by any body other than agricultural tenants. The contention is that the payment is by way of access. It seems to me clear that the primary notice of access is a payment not for the benefit of the landlord but a payment for some purpose of public convenience, such as sanitation, police, and the like. The contention is that the payment is by way of access. It seems to me clear that the primary notice of access is a payment not for the benefit of the landlord but a payment for some purpose of public convenience, such as sanitation, police, and the like. It would appear that the Land Revenue Act of 1903 has attributed to the word access a meaning quite different from that which is ordinarily attached to it. It speaks of access as something payable by tenants on account of the occupation of agricultural land. I confess, I should like to examine some persons competent to answer to what they mean by the word access in that Act. But all these words as ‘rent, access,’ and so forth, must be interpreted with reference to the meaning attached to them at the time for which the payments are claimed, and for the period during which this wajib-ul-arz made before the passing of the new Act, was the authority for the village custom. I see no reason to doubt that the payment to be made by the respondent here was of the nature of rent. That being so, this appeal must succeed. The judgments of the Court below are set aside, and the case will be returned to the Court of first instance for restoration to its original number in the register and trial upon the merits.