JUDGMENT : STANLEY, J. 1. This is an appeal under section 10 of the Letters Patent of this Court from the judgment of one of the learned Judges of the Court which affirmed in appeal the decision of the two lower Courts. The suit was one in which the plaintiff Jairam claimed possession of certain property in the village on the allegation that he had tendered to the defendants a sum of money which according to him the predecessor in title of the defendant had paid on account of Government revenue due from the predecessor in title of the plaintiff, The learned Judge of this Court is of opinion that the proceedings under which the predecessor in title of the defendants was put in possession of the property in suit, were proceedings under section 157 of the North-Western Provinces Land Revenue Act No. XIX of 1873. In our opinion the learned Judge was mistaken in that matter; as far as we can see, section 157 of the Act, just cited, has nothing to do with this case. In it no action whatever was taken by the Collector nor was any report made to the Commissioner for sanction to the transfer of the patti of the defaulting pattidar to a solvent pattidar. It is in our opinion abundantly clear that the transfer took place under the provisions of the Wajib-ul-arz of the mahal. 2. What happened was that some time in 1885, an application was made to the Deputy Collector, Het Ram, by one Sohan Pal, who was the Lambardar of the village, alleging that as Lambardar, he had been compelled to make certain payments of revenue due from 5 men whom he named, who were pattidars in the village. He went to say that these men had left the village, but had leased their interest in it to one Jhandu who also had failed to pay the quota of Government revenue due from his lessors. 3. The application then prayed that under the provisions of the wajib-ul-arz, inasmuch as he the Lambardar had paid on behalf of the defaulting pattidars the revenue due from them, he should be put into possession of the shares in the village belonging to the defaulters. This application appears to have been granted on the 18th of July, 1885. The applicant, Sohan Pal, the lambardar, was put in possession of the shares in question. 4. This application appears to have been granted on the 18th of July, 1885. The applicant, Sohan Pal, the lambardar, was put in possession of the shares in question. 4. Matters remained in this position until the present suit was instituted in May, 1901 (that is to say, 16 years afterwards), by the present plaintiff-appellant. He derives his title by purchase from defaulting purchasers mentioned above. He alleges that he tendered to the defendants the amount of the revenue due from the defaulters in 1885, and called on them to surrender possession to him of the shares which, had belonged to the defaulters, Oh refusal he instituted this suit. 5. The defence set up and accepted by the lower Courts practically is that the defendants and their predecessor in title, Sohan Pal, held adverse possession of those shares from the time when they were put into possession of them in 1885, and so had acquired a prescriptive title. In our opinion that defence cannot be supported. It is perfectly clear that the transfer of possession from the defaulting pattidars to Sohan Pal’ who paid off revenue due from them was made under the provisions of clause (6) of the Wajib-ul-arz of the village. That clause is one which contains, “the mutual arrangement” made between the pattidars as to the transfer and return of shares of defaulters. It provides that if any sharer is in default in payment of Government revenue, certain categories of persons can, one after the other, on payment of the default take possession of the property of the defaulter. Amongst these categories one is co-sharer in the patti and in the village which of course would include the lambardar of village. The condition is that the person's so discharging the unpaid revenue due by defaulters, sail take possession of their shares though without power to transfer or sell, But the Wajib-ul-arz goes on to say that if within 12 years the defaulter or his heir wishes to take back the property, he shall get in the month of Jeth on payment of the amount of default without interest and without being entitled to a rendition of accounts. Then after certain provisions as to the construction of wells the Wajib-ul-arz goes on to say that after the said term (i.e., the 12 years) the defaulter or his heirs shall not get the property, and the persons put therein shall be the owner thereof. 6. It is on the wording of the clauses that the lower Courts held that the defendants here, with their predecessors in title, had acquired a prescriptive title to that property of which they had taken possession in 1885. Prima facie the words of Wajib-ul-arz appear to confer an absolute interest in the property after the lapse of 12 years. But the Wajib-ul-arz cannot be construed so as to override the general law of limitation. The transaction which here happened between the predecessors in title of the plaintiff and of the defendants was clearly this, that the lambardar, Sohan Pal, was put in possession of the property of the defaulting pattidars on condition of paying revenue due from it, and there was tins condition that if that money were not repaid to him within 12 years, he should be the absolute owner.’ 7. These terms seems to us exactly to describe a mortgage by conditional sale as defined in section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act, where the mortgagor ostensibly sells the mortgaged property on condition that on default of payment of the mortgage money on a certain day sale shall become absolute. Here the shares of the defaulting pattidars were transferred to the mortgagee, Sohan Pal, the price was the amount of the revenue which was in default, and the condition was that if that money was not repaid within 12 years, the transfer to Sohan Pal should be absolute. This transaction then in our opinion was a mortgage by conditional sale, and as such it is subject to the Law of Limitation. By article 148 of the second schedule to the Limitation Act of 1877, it is provided that a suit against a mortgagee to redeem or to recover possession of mortgaged property has a Limitation of 16 years. This transaction then in our opinion was a mortgage by conditional sale, and as such it is subject to the Law of Limitation. By article 148 of the second schedule to the Limitation Act of 1877, it is provided that a suit against a mortgagee to redeem or to recover possession of mortgaged property has a Limitation of 16 years. We are of opinion then that the plaintiff is in the position of mortgagor by conditional sale to whom a period of 12 years was given within which to pay the mortgage money, who did not so pay and who therefore has a period of 60 years within which to sue for redemption in the absence of a suit for foreclosure. 8. For the above reasons we must set aside the decree of the learned Judge of this Court and also the concurrent decrees of the District Judge and Munsif of Mahaban and as the suit has been decided on a preliminary point, and as we have reversed the decision on that point, we remand the record under section 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure through the Court of the District Judge to the Court of first instance to be replaced on the file of pending, suits and decided according to law. 9. The appellant is entitled to his costs in all three Courts.