JUDGMENT Woodroffe, J. - This suit was originally instituted in the Small Cause Court for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 1,200, alleged to be due in respect of a contract evidenced by a letter given by the Defendant to the Plaintiffs authorising the latter to let the Defendant's houses Nos. 100, Clive Street, and 3, Clive Ghat Street, to an approved tenant for 1,800/- a month for a period of not less than 5 years and promising to pay the Plaintiffs Rs. 1,200 as brokerage for letting these houses. The Defendant denies that he is any way liable to the Plaintiffs for the sum claimed, or any part thereof, inasmuch as the Plaintiffs were unable to, and did not, secure a tenant in respect of the said premises, negotiations for the renewal of the lease of which, it is admitted, were entered into and concluded with a broker of the name of Kanai Lall Pyne. The Plaintiffs are Mr. A. S. Jordon and Mr. P. A. Martyrose, who are describred in the cause title of the plaint as dealing as house and land brokers in partnership. It appears from the evidence given in this case that a suit of a similar description has recently been brought in the Small Cause Court in which Mr. Jordon and Mr. Martyrose are there also described as partners in a house and land agency business. Mr. Jordon, however, now states that the description in the cause title is incorrect and that, in fact, Mr. Martyrose is not, as described, his partner but merely an assistant who received a monthly pay of Rs. 400 as an advance against his share of the profits of the house agency business. 2. Mr. Jordon has further stated in his evidence, in explanation of the fact that Mr. Martyrose who notwithstanding that he is a Plaintiff has not been called in support of his own case, that his co-Plaintiff is colluding with the Defendant, or at any rate, has declined to give evidence on behalf of himself and Mr. Jordon in support of their joint claim. The only, evidence produced for the Plaintiff is that of Mr. Jordon himself, though Mr. Martyrose is said to have been present at several interviews with the Defendant at which certain statements are said to have been made by the Defendant which are denied by him. Jordon in support of their joint claim. The only, evidence produced for the Plaintiff is that of Mr. Jordon himself, though Mr. Martyrose is said to have been present at several interviews with the Defendant at which certain statements are said to have been made by the Defendant which are denied by him. The Defendant, Ram Chandra Gupta, is the owner of considerable landed property in Calcutta, and amongst others, of the premises mentioned Nos. 100, Clive Street and 3, Clive Ghat Street, which for over 20 years prior to the month of December 1900 were in the possession of Messrs. Geo. Henderson & Co. as the tenants of the Defendant. The latter gave to Messrs. Geo. Henderson & Co. notice to quit the premises on the expiration of their lease on the 31st December 1900. For a long time prior thereto, Messrs. Geo. Henderson & Co. had been negotiating for a new lease through a broker of the name of Kanai Lall Pyne, who was known to both parties and who was looked upon by that firm as the Defendant's Agent, but nothing was settled until early in January 1901. The Defendant therefore, with a view to obtaining a tenant for the property, had an interview with Mr. Jordon and Mr. Martyrose on the 1st December 1900, and the result of that interview was embodied in two letters given by the Defendant to the Plaintiffs on that date. In the first of such letters the Defendant requested Messrs. Bagram & Co., the Plaintiffs' firm, to let the Defendant's houses Nos. 100, Clive Street and 3, Clive Ghat Street, to tenants to be approved by the Defendant at a rental of Rs. 1,800, and in the second of such letters the Defendant, writing in continuation of the former letter of date, informed Messrs. 3. Bagram & Co. that he would pay them Rs. 1,200 only as brokerage for letting the premises mentioned at a rent of Rs. 1,800 to approved tenants for a period of not less than 5 years. Mr. Jordon states, that in addition to the terms which are set out in these two letters, there was a further arrangement to the effect that if the Defendant himself came to terms with Messrs. Geo. Henderson & Co., the Defendant would nevertheless pay the Plaintiff Rs. 1,200. Mr. Jordon states, that in addition to the terms which are set out in these two letters, there was a further arrangement to the effect that if the Defendant himself came to terms with Messrs. Geo. Henderson & Co., the Defendant would nevertheless pay the Plaintiff Rs. 1,200. That statement of the Plaintiff is denied by both the Defendants Ram Chandra Gupta and his son Bejoy Kristo Gupta who have given evidence in this case. Though Mr. Jordon states (presumably with regard to the fact that negotiations had been going on for a renewal of the lease with Messrs. Geo. Henderson & Co.) that he regarded this term as of importance, it finds no place in the letters of the 1st December 1900 constituting the contract between the parties. This term is said to have been agreed upon at the interview on the 1st December in the presence of Mr. Marty rose who has not been called to corroborate his co-Plaintiff's evidence. The latter, however, in a letter of the 24th January 1901 wrote that this term was arranged subsequently to the 1st December 1900. No mention of any such arrangement is made in the plaint in which the cause of action alleged is the promise to pay Rs. 1,200 to the Defendants for securing a tenant for the premises. I am not unmindful of the fact that no reply was given to the letter of the 24th January 1901 as to which the Defendant has given his explanation, but having regard to the circumstances I have mentioned and the improbable character of such agreement as is alleged, which in effect comes to this that notwithstanding that the lease with Mr. Geo. Henderson & Co. was effected by and through the exertion of the Defendant himself and not by the Plaintiff, the Defendant was nevertheless bound to pay to the Plaintiff the sum of Rs. 1,200. I accept the evidence on this point which has been given by the Defendant. 4. I have, therefore, to consider whether the Plaintiffs secured the lease and thereby became entitled to the brokerage stipulated (for so it is called in the contract and correspondence before suit though Mr. 1,200. I accept the evidence on this point which has been given by the Defendant. 4. I have, therefore, to consider whether the Plaintiffs secured the lease and thereby became entitled to the brokerage stipulated (for so it is called in the contract and correspondence before suit though Mr. Jordon now described it as a bonus) or whether the Plaintiffs were prevented by the wrongful act of the Defendant from earning the brokerage and are so entitled to compensation for the work and labour said to have been done and incurred by them. From the evidence of Mr. Jordon it appears that, subsequent to the 1st December 1900, when the contract was entered into, he advertised these properties in two papers on certain dates between the 1st and 7th of December 1900. On the 4th December 1900 he wrote to Messrs. Geo. Henderson & Co., acquainting them with the fact that the Defendant had written to him to let their premises and that before advertising the place and offering it to others he gave them the first refusal. No reply was given to or notice taken of this letter, apparently because Messrs, Geo. Henderson & Co. were then in negotiations for a renewal through Kanai Lall Pyne. He also states that he received five written applications from Messrs. Gran & Co., Messrs. Lyall Marshall & Co., Mr. Monro of Whiteaway Press and Messrs, Conltherd Lawson & Co., and the Bally Paper Mills, and in response to these applications he saw the several firms and persons mentioned with the exception of the manager of the Bally Paper Mills. He says that no one of these persons expressed any willingness to take a lease, but that he was refused about the middle of December inspection of the premises in question by the Plaintiff and it is suggested that this inability to give inspection prevented further negotiations with enquirers after the property, though one of them, Mr. Monro, is said to have been taken on to the roof of the Plaintiffs' premises to view the Defendant's properties. This statement, that inspection was asked for and refused, is denied by the Defendant and his son who state that a plan of the premises were furnished to the Plaintiff. No doubt in the letter of the 24th January 1901, to which I have already alluded, Mr. This statement, that inspection was asked for and refused, is denied by the Defendant and his son who state that a plan of the premises were furnished to the Plaintiff. No doubt in the letter of the 24th January 1901, to which I have already alluded, Mr. Jordon states that several persons wished to inspect the premises and when he applied to the Defendant on different occasions personally for inspection orders the Defendant put him off upon each occasion. This letter, however, was written after the difference in suit had arisen between the parties and after another difference as regards the purchase of certain other premises in respect to which the Plaintiff hoped to earn brokerage, and it is suggested that both the allegations as to refusal to give inspection and the claim in this suit are due to the disagreement of the parties on the point last mentioned. Mr. Jordon states that he was himself most desirous that the premises should be re-let to Messrs. Geo. Henderson & Co., whom he regarded as good tenants and not to others; and I am not satisfied on the evidence that inspection was refused or that if it had been asked for and granted it would have enabled the Plaintiffs to come to terms with any of the persons or firms who are said to have made enquiries of them. On the 31st December 1900 Messrs. Geo. Henderson & Co's. lease expired and on or about the 10th or 11th January an arrangement was come to between Messrs. Geo. Henderson & Co., and the Defendant through the intervention of the broker Kanai Lall Pyne, who had all along been conducting the negotiations, by which arrangement the Defendant agreed to give to Messrs. Geo. Henderson & Co., a renewed lease of the premises at the rate of Rs. 1,750 per mensem for a period of ten years upon the terms appearing in a letter of the 11th January 1901. The Plaintiffs appear to have seen the Defendant about that time and were informed by him that an arrangement having been entered into with Messrs. Henderson & Co., a renewed lease of the premises at the rate of Rs. 1,750 per mensem for a period of ten years upon the terms appearing in a letter of the 11th January 1901. The Plaintiffs appear to have seen the Defendant about that time and were informed by him that an arrangement having been entered into with Messrs. Geo, Henderson & Co., it was not necessary that they the Plaintiffs should move further in the matter to obtain a new lessee for the Defendant's premises and on that date the authority which had been given to the Plaintiff by the letters of the 1st December 1900 was revoked. On the 23rd January 1901 it appears that Mr. Martyrose and Mr. Jordon called upon the Defendant to ask for payment of the sum of Rs. 1,200 that they did not receive the same and that on the following day Mr. Jordon wrote the letter of the 24th, to which I have referred and in which he enclosed his firm's bill for the Rs. 1,200 and claimed that that sum was due on the ground that the agreement for the new lease which had been effected with Messrs, Geo. Henderson & Co., was the result of the Plaintiffs' intervention and exertions; that if that were not so, the Defendant had by letting the premises afresh to Messrs. Geo. Henderson & Co., deprived the Plaintiffs of the opportunity of letting the same to other tenants and thereby precluded the Plaintiffs from earning the brokerage they would otherwise have earned, and lastly, that the Defendant had repeatedly told the Plaintiffs since the 1st December 1900 that if the Defendant himself came to terms with Messrs. Geo. Henderson & Co., they would still be entitled to the brokerage. The same contentions have beep argued before me. 5. As regards the first contention, viz., whether or not the letting of the premises in suit to Messrs. Geo. Henderson & Co. Geo. Henderson & Co., they would still be entitled to the brokerage. The same contentions have beep argued before me. 5. As regards the first contention, viz., whether or not the letting of the premises in suit to Messrs. Geo. Henderson & Co. was brought about by the intervention of and due to the exertion of the Plaintiff--Ordinarily in a contract of this kind, and in the absence of any special stipulation, an agent is not entitled to compensation for his trouble and expense nor is any commission payable unless the lease has been directly effected through his intervention for, as has been held in several cases, it is not enough for the Plaintiff to show that the lease was obtained indirectly and as a remote and casual consequence of his efforts but he must show that the result was due to his intervention and that the lease was obtained by means of his agency or of some sub-agent of his, and a house agent can claim commission only on rent obtained as an approximate consequence of his act; [see Autrobus v. Wickens 4 P. & F. 291 (1865) and Curtis v. Nixon 24 Law Times 706 (1871)]. In order to found a claim for commission there must not only be an indirect or casual and also a direct and contractual relation between the introduction of the purchaser and the ultimate transaction of sale [see Toulmin v. Millar 58 Law Times 96 (1887)]. It appears to me to make no difference whether the sum to be paid as remuneration is described as bonus, or commission, provided that it is given as the consideration for the obtaining of the lease. The question is therefore, whether Messrs. Geo. Henderson & Co. took the renewed lease through the Plaintiffs' intervention and whether the business brought about was the result of such intervention. 6. The evidence shows that Mr. Jordon had had some unpleasantness with Messrs. Geo, Henderson & Co. on account of some alleged improper dealing by him, with the resuit, as Mr. C. D. Stewart says, that he was told not to come again to the office, and whatever may be the truth of the allegation made against Mr. Jordon, which is denied by him, and which it is not material to consider, we have it upon the evidence of Mr. Jordon himself that he had not been to Messrs. Geo. C. D. Stewart says, that he was told not to come again to the office, and whatever may be the truth of the allegation made against Mr. Jordon, which is denied by him, and which it is not material to consider, we have it upon the evidence of Mr. Jordon himself that he had not been to Messrs. Geo. Henderson & Co.'s office since July or August 1899. The only direct communication between the Plaintiff and that firm was contained in the letter to them of the 4th December 1900, to which I have referred, and of which no notice was taken by the firm. The present case is not one where a third party, being in ignorance of the fact that premises were offered on lease of the particulars of which he is unaware, is given a knowledge of that fact by a broker and through his intervention cakes the premises so offered, Messrs. Geo. Henderson & Co., who had been themselves the tenants of the premises for over 20 years, were aware that their lease would shortly terminate and had been in fact in negotiations for its renewal before the Plaintiffs were spoken to by the Defendant on the subject. 7. As has already been stated, no answer was given to the letter of the 4th December and C. D. Stewart says that the letter was not considered by him as at that time negotiations were going on for the renewal of the lease through Kanai Lall Pyne. The Plaintiff's offer was not accepted at the time it was made, viz., the 4th December, and as a matter of fact it was not until 6 weeks after that offer, that is on 10th or 11th of January that another offer was accepted for an extended term of 10 years instead of 5 years at a rental of Rs. 1,750 instead of Rs. 1,800 and on different conditions to those upon which the Defendant was willing to lease the properties in December, and that offer was accepted through the medium of another broker Kanai Lall Pyne. Mr. Stewart says that the Plaintiff had nothing whatever to do with Messrs. Geo. Henderson & Co. taking the renewed lease, and having regard to the fact which I have stated, I find that the lease which was entered into by Messrs. Geo. Henderson & Co. Mr. Stewart says that the Plaintiff had nothing whatever to do with Messrs. Geo. Henderson & Co. taking the renewed lease, and having regard to the fact which I have stated, I find that the lease which was entered into by Messrs. Geo. Henderson & Co. with the Defendant was not brought about by the intervention of the Plaintiff but through that of the broker Kanai Lall Pyne. It haw, however, been argued that assuming that to be so and that the lease was not directly effected by the Plaintiffs, yet the Plaintiff's endeavour to secure other lessees for the properties indirectly brought about the renewed lease with Messrs. Geo. Henderson & Co., in that the efforts of the Plaintiff in his negotiations with third parties compelled Messrs. Geo. Henderson & Co. to terms with the Defendant unless they were prepared to give up the suitable premises they occupied without at that time having secured other premises to which they could move, and I have been asked to hold that it is sufficient for the Plaintiff to show that the Defendant had, even if indirectly, the benefit of the Plaintiff's intervention in the manner stated, and that it is not necessary to prove that the lease was the direct result of the Plaintiff's effort. In my opinion, however, the proposition contended for is unsound in law, and the evidence does not warrant the conclusion of fact upon which it is based. I therefore hold that the lease was not secured by and was not the result of the Plaintiffs' intervention and exertions, and that they are not entitled on this ground to the sum of Rs. 1,200 they claim. 8. The next question is whether, as has been argued, the Defendant by wrongfully terminating the authority of the Plaintiffs on the 11th January 1901, prevented them from earning their commission, and whether therefore they are not entitled to recover as upon a quantum meruit for the labour and trouble which they have been put to. 1,200 they claim. 8. The next question is whether, as has been argued, the Defendant by wrongfully terminating the authority of the Plaintiffs on the 11th January 1901, prevented them from earning their commission, and whether therefore they are not entitled to recover as upon a quantum meruit for the labour and trouble which they have been put to. Where the authority of an agent employed to sell on commission is revoked by the principal before that which he has been employed to do is in fact effected the right of the agent to be remunerated for what he has done in endeavouring to effect that for which he was employed depends upon the terms on which he was employed, Simpson v. Lamb 17 C. B. 603 (1856). Under sec. 205 of the Contract Act where there is an express or implied contract that the agency should, be continued for any period of time, the principal must make compensation to the agent for any previous revocation or renunciation of the agency without sufficient cause. Under that section the contract that the agency should be continued for any period of time may be either express or implied. No express contract has been alleged and the Defendant says that nothing was said on this point. Whether such a contract ought or ought not to be implied must depend upon the particular facts of each case, Hamlyn & Co. v. Wood & Co. L. R. (1891) 2 Q. B. 488. I am however inclined to think that where as in a case of this kind an agent is employed to do something which cannot necessarily be done at once but for the carrying out of which immediate expenditure and labour by the agent is required, the Court will ordinarily imply a term that the agent is to have a reasonable time within which to do that for which he has been employed. If therefore his authority be withdrawn before such time and if in fact he has expended time, labour and expense in the matter of his agency he is entitled to compensation for what he has so done. Assuming, however, this point which has been argued on the Plaintiffs' behalf in their favour, I have to see whether in the present case they had in fact a reasonable time within which to secure a tenant for the premises. Assuming, however, this point which has been argued on the Plaintiffs' behalf in their favour, I have to see whether in the present case they had in fact a reasonable time within which to secure a tenant for the premises. The contract was entered into on the 1st December 1900 and the authority was not revoked until the 11th January 1901 following, that is, 6 weeks later during which time no tenants were secured by the Plaintiffs. There is no evidence before me which would justify me in holding that if the Plaintiffs were entitled to reasonable time they did not in fact have it. I hold therefore that the Plaintiffs' authority was not wrongfully revoked and that they are not entitled to any compensation for what Mr. Jordon states that they did in the matter of their agency. The evidence upon this point is that of the Plaintiff who states that he inserted some advertisements, wrote a letter to Messrs. Geo. Henderson & Co., saw four or five persons who replied to the advertisement and took Mr. Monro of Whiteaway Press to the roof, of his house and from there shewed him the premises in suit. From Mr. Jordon's evidence it would seem that he did some other unspecified work of a similar character. Assuming, however, that the Plaintiffs were, as I hold they are not, entitled to any compensation for this work, there is no evidence before me of its value upon which any decree for compensation might be based, except evidence that the advertisements cost Rs. 15 or 20, but these advertisements, however, included also other properties besides the premises in suit with which the Defendant was in no way concerned. No attempt was made to value these services as might possibly have been done by showing the approximate length of time during which the Plaintiffs were engaged in the work of finding a tenant and the amount of their average earnings in the house agency business or in any other way by which some idea of the value of the services said to have been rendered might have been arrived at. It cannot be said that the services, which have been spoken to, were worth Rs. 1,200 or anything like that sum and what they are in fact worth has not been alleged much less proved, in fact the plaint claims the whole amount of Rs. It cannot be said that the services, which have been spoken to, were worth Rs. 1,200 or anything like that sum and what they are in fact worth has not been alleged much less proved, in fact the plaint claims the whole amount of Rs. 1,200 only, to which I have held the Plaintiffs are not entitled. 9. It was suggested during the course of the reply and not before that the matter of damages might be referred to the Referee. It is sufficient to say that I hold that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to damages, but I may observe that such a reference is not, so far as I am aware, usual in a case of this kind, and that in any event the matter is one rather for the Court than for the Official Referee to deal with. I hold that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to the sum claimed or any other sum as commission bonus or compensation and dismiss the Plaintiffs' suit with costs on scale No. 2.