JUDGMENT 1. The High Court granted sanction to Dinobandhu Nandy, the Plaintiff, in a certain suit to prosecute the present Petitioners for an offence under sec. 193, I. P. C. One Nritya Gopal Rai claiming to be an employee of the said Dinobandhu Nandy, applied to the Chief Presidency Magistrate for summonses against the Petitioners. The application was not in writing and the Magistrate acting under cl. (b) of sec. 200, C. P. C., did not reduce to writing any examination of the complaint. 2. The Petitioners were summoned and the cases against them were transferred to Mr. Bonnaud. Before him they challenged the right of the complainant to proceed with the cases as they were not initiated by the person to whom sanction to prosecute had been granted. Upon motion to this Court two rules were granted on the ground that the complainant, Nritya Gopal Roy, was not the person to whom sanction to prosecute had been granted, and that there was nothing on the record to show that he had any lawful authority from Dinobandhu Nandy to prosecute the Petitioners. Mr. Hill for the complainant has cited In re Thathayya I. L. R. 12 Mad. 47 (1888) and contended that the law does not impose any restriction in these cases, such as in secs. 198 and 199, C. P. C., as to the person who must complain and that the Magistrate is excused by cl. (b) of sec. 200, C. P. C., from recording the complainant's examination including his statement of how he was authorized to complain. 3. We think it clear that in the particular cases the sanction to prosecute was not of a general nature, but was expressly restricted to Dinobandhu Nandy who as was remarked in Giridhari Mondul v. Uchit Jha I. L. R. 8 Cal. 435 (1881) is free to exercise his own unfettered discretion as to whether he will proceed or not. 4. We do not question that such sanction would devolve on a man's heir as was held in the Madras case, and that the prosecution might also be initiated by a person expressly authorized by him to whom the sanction is given. But in the latter case the authority must be a matter of record so as to enable the accused to challenge its validity both before the Magistrate and also on appeal or revision. 5. But in the latter case the authority must be a matter of record so as to enable the accused to challenge its validity both before the Magistrate and also on appeal or revision. 5. The examination referred to in sec. 200, C. P. C., and which a Presidency Magistrate is not obliged to reduce to writing is an examination on the subject-matter of the "complaint," which as defined in sec. 4, cl. (b) means the allegation that some person has committed an offence. 6. The Chief Presidency Magistrate was not excused from the necessity of placing on record the necessary evidence of the complainant's authority from Dinobandhu Nandy, nor is it even alleged before us that the complainant offered any proof of his authority except his own bare assertion. We hold that no summous could lawfully issue on the accused until the complainant's authority had been exhibited and recorded. In this view we direct that these rules be made absolute and that the proceedings now pending against the Petitioners before Mr. Bonnaud be quashed.