Judgement Appeal from a decree of the above Court (Nov. 22, 1899) reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Sitapur (June 24, 1898) which dismissed the suit. The sole question was whether the first respondent, who was plaintiff in the suit, was entitled to pre-empt the village of Pahladpur, which had been sold by the second and third respondents to the appellants and the fourth respondent. The right of pre-emption in Oudh is a statutory right, and provision is made therefor by Act XVIII. of 1876, Part III., c. 2. Sect. 9 of the Act is as follows — " If the property to be sold or foreclosed is a proprietary or under-proprietary tenure, or a share of such a tenure, the right to buy or redeem such property belongs, in the absence of a custom to the contrary, " 1st. To co-sharers of the sub-division (if any) of the tenure in which the property is comprised, in order of their relationship to the vendor or mortgagor. " 2nd. To co-sharers of the whole mahal in the same order. “3rd. To any member of the village community, and 4th. If the property be an under-proprietary tenure to the proprietor." Sect. 10 of the said Act requires the vendor to give notice through the Court of his intention to sell; and by s. 11 the right of pre-emption is lost to any person who does not pay or tender the price mentioned in the said notice within three months of the date thereof. The plaint recited the sale, that no notice was given under s. 10, that the price mentioned in the deed of sale was fraudulent, and prayed for a decree for pre-emption at the market value. The defence was that the plaintiff had no right to pre-empt, that a custom to that effect did not apply to the village in question, and that the plaintiff was not a co-sharer within the meaning of the above s. 9. The Subordinate Judge decided that the plaintiff was superior proprietor of thirty-three acres in Pahladpur, and that the said tenure, together with the rest of the village, constituted one mahal. He was, however, of opinion that the plaintiff was not a co-sharer in the mahal or a member of the village community. The Subordinate Judge decided that the plaintiff was superior proprietor of thirty-three acres in Pahladpur, and that the said tenure, together with the rest of the village, constituted one mahal. He was, however, of opinion that the plaintiff was not a co-sharer in the mahal or a member of the village community. The judges of the Appellate Court said " It is sufficient to hold that when the lambardar entered into a fresh agreement with Government to pay Rs. 40 revenue on account of Rukn-ud-dins land, in addition to the revenue previously payable, and when Rukn-ud-din, i.e., the plaintiffs father, agreed to pay that sum to the lambardar, he thereby became a co-sharer with the lambardar in a perfect pattidari mahal." In construing s. 9 of Act XVIII. of 1876, they considered " that the existing legal position of the persons concerned is a sufficient guide to the meaning of the terms co-sharer and member of the village community. A co-sharer of the whole mahal is none the less a co-sharer merely because he may have become so by agreement with Government and other individuals, instead of by inheritance or purchase from original owners." They also held that the suit was not barred under s. 11 of Act XVIII. of 1876, and that the formalities prescribed by Mahomedan law were not essential to the exercise of the right of pre-emption. Bonnerjee, for the appellants, contended that Act XVIII. of 1876 did not alter the law previously existing as to what constituted a co-sharer or member of a village community entitled to pre-emption. It was essential to such a relation that there should have been an original community of interest existing between and transmitted by inheritance or otherwise to the present holders of the land. Accordingly the plaintiff was neither a co-sharer in Pahladpur nor a member of a village community within the meaning of s. 9, clauses 2, 3. His position was that he held a small plot of land in the mahal as sole proprietor. He was not a member of the village community. To become such he must be resident in the village and subject to the control of the general body of the members of the community see Rahimuddin v. Rewal. (( 1903) L. R. 30 Ind. Ap. He was not a member of the village community. To become such he must be resident in the village and subject to the control of the general body of the members of the community see Rahimuddin v. Rewal. (( 1903) L. R. 30 Ind. Ap. 89.) Mahomedan law, moreover, only allowed the right of pre-emption in the same way as the Act, and made no difference to the plaintiffs position thereunder. De Gruyther, for the plaintiff, the first respondent, was not heard. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD ROBERTSON. The sole question in this appeal is whether the respondent Maulvi Saiyid Muhammad Ismail, who may be more conveniently referred to as the plaintiff, is entitled to pre-empt the village of Pahladpur, which had been sold to the appellants and the fourth and fifth respondents. The village is in Oudh; and the appeal is against a judgment of the Judicial Commissioners of Oudh, who, reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Sitapur, have held that the plaintiff has a right of pre-emption under the Oudh Laws Act (XVIII. of 1876). The facts are undisputed, and the question is entirely on the construction of the 9th section of the Act. Under that section, which admittedly applies to the sale of Pahladpur, the right of pre-emption is given to (among other persons) " co-sharers of the whole mahal" in order of their relationship to the vendor, and to " any member of the village community." There is no question about the relationship of the plaintiff, and the only dispute is whether his connection with the village is such as to give him the right of pre-emption. The material facts are that the plaintiff is owner of a chak of thirty-three acres in Pahladpur; and, by the settlement under which he holds, he pays Rs. 40 per annum of revenue, this being payable through the lambardars of the village ; but he does not reside in the village. The judgment of the Judicial Commissioner was that the plaintiff is a co-sharer of the whole mahal. This opinion is concurred in by the Additional Judicial Commissioner, who further held that the plaintiff is also a member of the village community. The judgment of the Judicial Commissioner was that the plaintiff is a co-sharer of the whole mahal. This opinion is concurred in by the Additional Judicial Commissioner, who further held that the plaintiff is also a member of the village community. In their Lordships judgment it is clear that the plaintiff is a co-sharer of the whole mahal, in the sense of the 9th section of the Oudh Laws Act, 1876 ; and, this being so, it is unnecessary to discuss the question whether he is also a " member of the village community." The Oudh Land Revenue Act (No. XVII. of 1876) is really decisive of the right of the plaintiff to be deemed a co-sharer of the whole mahal. In the case of every mahal, according to s. 108, the entire mahal is to be charged with, and all the proprietors jointly and severally shall be responsible to Government for, the revenue for the time being assessed on the mahal. The term " proprietors " for the purposes of that chapter of the Act includes all persons in possession for their own benefit, and the " chapter" is the whole of that relating to collection of the land revenue, and everything now to be referred to is in that chapter. The 112th section provides that if the settle ment of any land has been made with a lambardar, and if there be an arrear of revenue due in respect of such land, both the lambardar and the co-sharers of the mahal from which the arrear is due shall be deemed defaulters. By s. 121 it is provided that, if an arrear of land revenue has become due in respect of the share of any member of a village community, such community, or any member thereof, may tender payment of such arrear, or may offer to pay such arrear by instalments. And in case of conflicting tenders or offers under this section the co-sharer who, in case the share were sold, would have a right of pre-emption under s. 9 of the Oudh Laws Act, shall be preferred. This last enactment is important, because it expressly identifies "the co-sharer " of the 9th section of the Oudh Laws Act of the same year with every proprietor who, by the combined operation of ss. This last enactment is important, because it expressly identifies "the co-sharer " of the 9th section of the Oudh Laws Act of the same year with every proprietor who, by the combined operation of ss. 108 and 112 of the Oudh Land Revenue Act, is liable for the revenue assessed on the whole mahal. If the various sections of this " chapter " of that Act be read together, it is plain that every " proprietor" liable for the revenue of the mahal is a " co-sharer." The plaintiff is exactly in this position. He is certainly a " proprietor " in the sense of s. 108 of the Land Revenue Act; and the settlement of his land has been made (on the face of his title) with a lambardar in the sense of s. 112. He is, therefore, liable just as much as every other proprietor in the mahal for the whole arrear of the mahal in case of default. Their Lordships accordingly consider that the fact that the share of the plaintiff in the mahal consists of a separate chak does not make him the less a co-sharer in the sense of this legislation, and the circum stance of his being non-resident does not seem to affect, or even bear upon, the language or the theory of the enactment. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal ought to be dismissed, and the appellants will pay the costs of the appeal.