JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - In this case the Plaintiff seeks to recover damages from the Defendants by reason of an alleged libel written by the Defendants and contained in a letter, dated May 4, 1901, and addressed to and received by the attorney of the Plaintiff. The Defendants after formally traversing the material allegations in their written statement of the Plaintiff, plead that the words complained of are privileged by reason of the occasion on which they were written. 2. The learned Judge in the Court below has held that, as regards a portion of those words, the plea of privilege holds good, and that the Plaintiff is not entitled to recover, and as regards certain other words, complained of, that the plea of privilege does not attach, but that, inasmuch as the Plaintiff has suffered no damage by reason of their publication, he is not entitled to judgment in respect of them, and has entered a decree in favour of the Defendants with costs. The only publication was to the Plaintiff's attorney, Against that decree the Plaintiff now appeals. 3. The facts of the case are shortly as follows : The Plaintiff who is a man of apparently substantial means, at some time prior to the year 1899, became acquainted with the Defendant P. C. Kar, a member of the firm of Ghosh and Kar, who are attorneys practising at Calcutta, and the Defendants in this suit, and in March 1899, he advanced to one Mr. S. N. Tagore who was then a client of the Defendants, the sum of Rs. 70,000 at seven and-a-half per cent., upon the mortgage security of 2 houses, 19, Store Road, Ballygunge, and 226/1, Lower Circular Road, and in respect of this matter, the Defendants' firm acted on behalf of both parties, though the transaction was brought about by the Defendant Kar alone, and the Defendant Ghose did not actively interfere. The mortgage deed contained a provision that, if the money secured were not paid on the due date (the 13th day of March 1901), the mortgagee should not be bound to receive it unless the mortgagor should have given three months' previous notice, or in lieu thereof, should pay three months' interest. 4. In March 1901, Mr. Tagore was apparently absent from Calcutta, and a sum of Rs. 4. In March 1901, Mr. Tagore was apparently absent from Calcutta, and a sum of Rs. 100 had become due for Government Revenue in respect of the premises situated at 19, Store Road : and on March 27, 1901, the Defendant Kar has become aware that the land of the premises which were worth approximately the sum of Rs. 60,000 had been sold at auction in respect of the said arrears for Rs, 12,800 and that this sum had been deposited in the Collectorate. Mr. Kar on the next day wrote informing the Plaintiff's son who appears to have acted for his father in business matters of the state of affairs, and at the same time took advice on behalf of Mr. Tagore as to the possibility of setting aside the sale. 5. Mr. Kar then had an interview with the Plaintiff himself, and received instructions to file a claim in respect of the money that had been deposited, and he alleges, and we think it probably was the case, that at this interview the sufficiency of the security remaining for his mortgage was discussed. 6. There were at this time certain negotiations proceeding on behalf of Mr. Tagore for the re-purchase from the auction-purchaser of the property in question, but such negotiations ultimately proved abortive, and on the 10th April, Mr. Kar wrote to the Plaintiff to this effect that a suggestion was evidently made at that time that Mr. Tagore should provide additional security, and by a letter of the same date the Plaintiff's son replied that, unless a settlement is come to without delay, the Plaintiff will institute such other proceedings as he may be advised, and on April 19, the Plaintiff's son wrote again complaining that Mr. Kar had not called or communicated Mr. Tagore's views and that proceedings could no longer be delayed. It seems reasonably clear that the proceedings there referred to were proceedings to enforce payment of the mortgage money. 7. On the same date Mr. Kar wrote that Mr. Tagore had been able to come to terms with the purchaser, but that if the matter was not concluded on the next day, he would give the additional security demanded by the Plaintiff. 8. At this time, apparently, Mr. Tagore was negotiating for the sale of 226/1, Lower Circular Road, with the object of paying off the Plaintiff's mortgage, and Mr. 8. At this time, apparently, Mr. Tagore was negotiating for the sale of 226/1, Lower Circular Road, with the object of paying off the Plaintiff's mortgage, and Mr. Kar was acting on his behalf. 9. On April 23, an interview took place between Mr. Kar and the Plaintiff, as to the details of which they are in direct conflict. Mr. Kar's story is that he then received positive instructions from the Plaintiff to request payment of the mortgage money, if the Plaintiff's demands were not met by Mr. Tagore, and that, acting on those instructions, he wrote the letter of the same date to Mr. Tagore. The Plaintiff, on the other hand, denies that he gave Mr. Kar any authority whatever to make any demand for re-payment of the money. 10. Upon receipt of the letter of April 23, Mr. Tagore made arrangements for a loan of Rs. 70,000 and wrote his letter of that date to the Plaintiff, and on the 24th, Mr. Kar wrote to the Plaintiff's son that Mr. Tagore had intimated his intention of paying off the loan, and on the 25th, the Defendants acting on the instructions of the Plaintiff, wrote to Mr. Tagore demanding 3 months' additional interest on the mortgage debt under the terms of the mortgage, and on the same date Mr, Tagore wrote repudiating his liability to pay, inasmuch as the demand made by the Plaintiff for re-payment waived the condition for payment of additional interest. 11. On April 26, there was an interview between the Plaintiff and Mr. Kar as to which they differ in their accounts, but it is at any rate clear the Plaintiff used language towards Mr. Kar which was at once insulting and apparently quite uncalled for. According to the entry in the Defendants' day-sheet there was a dispute at this interview as to whether or not the Plaintiff had given instructions to demand re-payment of the money, the Plaintiff denying that he had done so, and Mr. Kar asserting that he had. In his evidence, however, the latter says that the Plaintiff did not dare to suggest that he had not given instructions to make the demand. In consequence of this interview, the Defendants wrote the letter of April 26, declining to act further on behalf of the Plaintiff, and by the same post they wrote Mr. Kar asserting that he had. In his evidence, however, the latter says that the Plaintiff did not dare to suggest that he had not given instructions to make the demand. In consequence of this interview, the Defendants wrote the letter of April 26, declining to act further on behalf of the Plaintiff, and by the same post they wrote Mr. Tagore informing him of this fact and at the same time telling him that the Plaintiff persisted in his demand for the payment of the additional interest, Mr. Tagore then placed the matter in the hands of Messrs. Fox and Mondul who are attorneys practising at Calcutta and they wrote on April 27 to the Plaintiff stating that Mr. Tagore was then ready to pay off the mortgage-debt, and in reply the Plaintiff's son wrote stating that the Plaintiff would be glad of further time to consider the matter, as the Defendants had ceased to act for him and that Mr. Kar who had negotiated the loan had performed the combined function of broker and attorney and had no authority at all from the Plaintiff to make the demand for re-payment of the mortgage-debt. This letter was shown to Mr. Kar before the 4th May 1901. The Plaintiff had at this time consulted and employed as his attorney, a Mr. A. N. Ghosh, between whom and Fox and Mondul some correspondence which is not, very material passed to the re-payment of the money and other matters. On May 2, Mr. A. N. Ghosh wrote on behalf of the Plaintiff the letter of that date to the Defendants. This letter would appear to be the commencement of the present trouble. 12. Mr. Kar says that on receipt of this letter making charges of highly improper conduct as a professional man he wrote in his firm's name the letter of May 4 solely to repel the attack made upon his character, and in answer to that attack and that all he said or insinuated in that letter had reference to the matter in dispute between them and to nothing else. The statements made in that letter are the statements complained of in this action. The statements made in that letter are the statements complained of in this action. It must be remembered that, when this letter was written, the Plaintiff had gravely insulted Mr, Kar at the interview of the 26th April; that the Plaintiff's attorney had written the letter of the 29th April to Fox and Mondul which Mr. Kar had seen and which contained at least insinuations far from fair to Mr. Kar and based apparently on insufficient information for Mr. Kar had not acted as broker and attorney. And, moreover, the Plaintiff had deliberately charged him with highly improper conduct as a professional man which, if so advised on public grounds, he considered his duty to bring to the notice of the Court. 13. We cannot discover in the conduct of Mr. Kar the slightest foundation for so grave a charge. This was the position of the parties when the letter complained of was written. The Plaintiff apparently again changed his attorney for on June 6 Mr. G. N. Dutt wrote on his behalf complaining of the statements in the letter of May 4, and threatening action unless the statements were retracted and an apology made, and to this letter on June 10, the Defendants' reply vindicating their letter and asking which statement or statements the Plaintiff regarded as being libellous and to this letter the Plaintiff returned no answer and brought his action without further communication. 14. It is noticeable that the Plaintiff did not complain of the letter of 4th May until after the expiration of more than one month. 15. In these circumstances we have to determine (1) are the words complained of in their fair and ordinary sense defamatory of the plaintiff, (2) are all or some of the words privileged by reason of the occasion on which they were written and published, (3) was the Plaintiff actuated by express malice in writing the said words or any of them so as to deprive himself of the privilege of the occasion, (4) is the Plaintiff entitled to recover against either or both of the Defendants. As regards I there can be no doubt and it is not contested that the words used are defamatory of the Plaintiff. As regards 2 and 3 these can most conveniently be answered together. As regards I there can be no doubt and it is not contested that the words used are defamatory of the Plaintiff. As regards 2 and 3 these can most conveniently be answered together. There can be no doubt and it is not contested in this case that if what the Defendants wrote was written bond fide in answer to the attack made on Mr. Kar by the Plaintiff and for the sole purpose of defending themselves from such an attack the occasion is privileged, for every person has a right to defend his character against false charges and in repelling, such charges the person charged may retort upon his assailants when such retort is a necessary part of his defence or fairly arises out of the charges made against him. O'Donoghue v. Hussen Irish Rep. 5 C. L. 124, and the only question therefore will be, was what the Defendants said false and false to their knowledge or was any part of the statements or retort irrelevant and unconnected with the occasion whence the privilege is derived. For if the statements made were false to the knowledge of the Defendants the privilege of the Defendants would be destroyed, Clark v. Molyneux 3 Q. B. D. 237 (1877) or if a portion of the statement was irrelevant and unconnected with the matter in dispute, then also the privilege would be destroyed or rather there would be evidence of express malice to destroy the privilege, Picton v. Jackman 4 C. & P. 257 (1830), but it has also been held that the proper test in enquiring whether the nature of the words by themselves afford evidence of malice is to take the facts as they appeared to the Defendants' mind at the time of publication and to ask whether the words used are such as the Defendant might have honestly and bond file under the circumstances employed, for, if so, and the Defendant honestly believed the Plaintiffs conduct to be such as he described, there is no evidence of malice, Spill v. Maule L. R. 4 Exchq. 232 (1869), and further the particular expressions ought not to be too closely scrutinised provided the intention of the Defendant was good and he acted bond fide, Woodword v. Lander 6 C. & P. 548 at p. 550 (1834), Laughton v. Bishop of Sodor & Man L. R. 4 P. C. 495-508 (1872). 16. 232 (1869), and further the particular expressions ought not to be too closely scrutinised provided the intention of the Defendant was good and he acted bond fide, Woodword v. Lander 6 C. & P. 548 at p. 550 (1834), Laughton v. Bishop of Sodor & Man L. R. 4 P. C. 495-508 (1872). 16. Of course if the Defendant Kar did not in fact receive the instructions to demand the return of the mortgage money, he must have known it, and therefore it becomes necessary to enquire whether he did in fact receive such instructions or not, or honestly believed that he had received them and further to enquire whether or not the words that the learned Judge has held to be outside the privileged occasion (inasmuch as they were,--he says--entirely unconnected with the matter in question), were so unconnected or not? 17. On the question of whether or not the Plaintiff at the interview of the 23rd April did instruct the Defendant Kar to demand payment of the mortgage-money, we feel no hesitation in supporting the finding of the Court below. The probabilities are all in favour of such instructions having been given : it is unlikely--that the Plaintiff would not go on to say what was to be done if Mr. Tagore did not comply with his demands. 18. The letter of the 17th April 1901 shows that proceedings against Mr. Tagore were even then in contemplation. Apparently the sons of the Plaintiff were present at the interviews of the 23rd and 26th; neither of them is called to support their father's version of those interviews. The contemporaneous entries in Kar's day sheets,--we have pointed out one discrepancy between those entries and his oral evidence--but which we do not consider sufficient to warrant us in saying that those entries are not reliable--support Kar's story. The attempt to show that these entries have been fabricated with a view to this trial, has signally failed. There is nothing in the language of Kar's letter to the Plaintiff's son of the 24th April 1901, to support the view, as is contended that the former knew that no instructions to demand re-payment had been made, whilst the son's letter of the 25th April contains no suggestion that no instructions had been given to Kar to demand payment. There is nothing in the language of Kar's letter to the Plaintiff's son of the 24th April 1901, to support the view, as is contended that the former knew that no instructions to demand re-payment had been made, whilst the son's letter of the 25th April contains no suggestion that no instructions had been given to Kar to demand payment. It is not until the question as to the three months' interest arose--and probably this provision had been forgotten by the Plaintiff and Mr. Kar at the interview of the 23rd April--that the Plaintiff repudiated the authority given to demand payment. We have referred to some of the more salient features in the evidence on this part of the case which have been mainly relied upon in argument; but, looking at the evidence as a whole, we are clearly of opinion that the Plaintiff did give the Defendant Kar instructions to demand payment of the mortgage-money from Tagore. 19. There is then no evidence of express malice on the part of Kar, unless such is to be gathered from the language actually used by him in the letter complained of. Do the words by themselves afford evidence of malice ? As regards the entire portion of the letter we have had no argument from the Appellant that the words "false and false to the knowledge of your client" by themselves, having regard to the occasion, afford any evidence of malice. This has not been contested, not in the face of the finding of fact on this part of the case could it be. Nor has it been contested that the occasion was privileged. It is argued however that the words "as it will give us an opportunity to show up to the world some traits of your client's character" do in themselves afford evidence of malice. 20. Questions such as these are often not very easy of determination. For the Appellant, it is contended, that these words go far beyond what was necessary that they were irrelevant and unconnected with the occasion whence the privilege is derived, whilst for the Respondent it is urged that the expression "traits in your client's character" referred to traits in connection with the dispute between the parties, viz., as to whether the instructions were or were not given and that the words were distinctly connected with the occasion. As we have already pointed out the tendency of the Court is not to submit the language of privileged communications to too strict a scrutiny. In the case of Laughton v. The Bishop of Sodor and Man L. R. 4 P. C. 495-508 (1972), the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council said : "To hold all excess beyond the absolute exigency of the occasion to be evidence of malice, would, in effect, greatly limit, if not altogether defeat that protection which the law throws over privileged communications," The words in the letter "on the subject" must refer to the dispute as to the instructions and the subsequent words" some traits of your client's character" may, we think, be fairly read and intended to apply to the traits in connection with that particular subject. We feel a great difficulty in holding that these words can fairly be read as wholly unconnected with the subject of the dispute between the parties. And this was the explanation at once afforded by the Defendant Kar in the 3rd paragraph of the letter of the 10th June 1901, which appears to be consistent with his statement in cross-examination as to his intention at page 104, line 28 of the paper-book. There is no evidence of malice outside the language of the letter, nor is there any real ground for questioning the bona fides and honesty of the Defendant Kar, who was writing under circumstances of considerable provocation. Looking at those circumstances and at the language used, and that that language may be fairly read as connected with the subject of dispute we do not think that, in themselves, the words afford evidence of express malice. 21. As regards the liability of the Defend ant Ghose he had nothing whatever to do with the transaction. The letter of the 2nd May, charging Kar with unprofessional conduct was addressed to the firm and answered, consequently, in the name of the firm, and we think that the above considerations which apply to Mr. Kar, would apply equally to the case of Mr. Ghose. The appeal must be dismissed with cost.