JUDGMENT Brett, J. - This is one of two analogous appeals arising out of the proceedings in two analogous execution cases which were disposed of by the same order on 18th November 1901. The analogous appeal No. 48 of 1902 came on for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Prinsep and Stephen, JJ., and was dismissed by them with costs on the 18th March 1903 [See Dinamoni Chaudhurani v. Elahudad Khan 7 C. W. N. 678 (1903)]. For some unexplained reason the paper-book in this appeal was not then ready, though it consists of 5 pages only and though for the purposes of hearing the appeal it is incomplete as the full judgment with the reasons for the order appealed against appear in the paper-book of the analogous appeal No. 48 of 1901. At all events this appeal was not then brought on for hearing before that Division Bench but it has been brought on the file of this Bench for hearing about a year afterwards. The course which has been adopted is a departure from the usual practice of the Court and is much to be deprecated. This appeal has been argued before us practically as an appeal from the decision of the previous Division Bench and we are invited to differ from the decision of that Bench and to refer the appeal for hearing to a Full Bench. It is an attempt to introduce a very undesirable precedent. The application, on which the order was passed against which this appeal has been preferred, was one made under sec. 234 of the CPC for the substitution of the present Appellant, Dinamoni Chaudhurani, the daughter-in-law of Jahnabi Chaudhurani as judgment-debtor in place of Jahnabi Chaudhurani, the original judgment-debtor who had died before the decree had been fully executed, and for execution of the decree against Dinamoni Chaudhurani. 2. The decree of which execution was sought was one for obtaining possession on declaration of title of land and for mesne profits in respect thereof and for costs amounting to over Rs. 3,000. Execution was sought for the recovery of the costs by the attachment and sale of a lodging house valued at Rs. 1,000. 3. The application was objected to on the ground that Dinamoni Chaudhurani was not the "legal representative" of her mother-in-law Jahnabi Chaudhurani. 4. 3,000. Execution was sought for the recovery of the costs by the attachment and sale of a lodging house valued at Rs. 1,000. 3. The application was objected to on the ground that Dinamoni Chaudhurani was not the "legal representative" of her mother-in-law Jahnabi Chaudhurani. 4. To explain the position it is necessary to give a small portion of the family history. Jahnabi Chaudhurani was the widow of Goloke Nath Rai who before his death executed an anumatipatra in her favour. By this document he appears to have given her power to adopt a son and at the same time to have provided that she should hold and manage the property left by him during her lifetime. She afterwards adopted Baikant Nath Rai. When the adopted son grew up, he, as is not unusual, quarelled with his adaptive mother over the possession of the property and entered into litigation with her. Wiser counsels, however, afterwards prevailed and on the 22nd Bhadra 1272, Baikant Nath executed in favour of Jahnabi Chaudhurani an ekrarnama. She afterwards adopted Baikant Nath Rai. When the adopted son grew up, he, as is not unusual, quarelled with his adaptive mother over the possession of the property and entered into litigation with her. Wiser counsels, however, afterwards prevailed and on the 22nd Bhadra 1272, Baikant Nath executed in favour of Jahnabi Chaudhurani an ekrarnama. This document after reciting that under the term of the anumatipatra Jahnabi Chaudhurani had been holding, managing, and enjoying the properties left by Goloke Nath Rai, after substituting her name for his as owner of the property according to the intention of the anumatipatra, and that he (Baikant Nath) had acted illegally against her contrary to the intention of his father, in trying to deprive her of the properties left by his father, goes on to say, "Since my father's death you have managed and protected the zamindari and improved the same and have been still doing so ; and there are provisions in the anumatipatra executed by my father authorizing you to manage and protect all the zamindari and other properties left by him even after you have adopted a son." It then provides "that you like my paternal grandmother Raj Mohini Chaudhurani will possess and enjoy during your lifetime on payment of Government Revenue without any power to transfer by sale or gift all the following properties, &c," (a list of the properties are given) "and all other properties, moveable or immoveable, either standing in sanam or in the ostensible names of others which are in the enjoyment and possession of you, and the properties which you have acquired or may acquire in future with the profits thereof, and will manage and preserve the property by maintaining the family and ancestral daily and occasional deb puja, &c, &c, and you will be at liberty to carry on litigation in your own name as you have hitherto done, and to that I or my heirs will not be able to raise any objection or advance any claim, nor to destroy your right to supervise the affairs in respect thereof on any grounds. On your death I will get all these properties, &c." The document further stipulated that during her lifetime he (the son) should not be able to transfer by sale or gift any of the properties mentioned, moveable or immoveable, and she was to have the option, like his paternal grandmother, of making a gift of a certain portion of land for the spiritual benefit of the forefathers. 5. Jahnabi Chaudhurani remained in possession of all the properties mentioned in this document up to her death. During this period a suit was brought against her by the present Appellant to recover possession of certain alluvial lands which she was in possession of and claimed to be entitled to as accretions to one of the properties left by her husband. She contested that suit but lost it, and the decree was passed against her, for partial execution of which the application out of which the present appeal arises was made. The decree was admittedly for recovery of possession of the lands in dispute, for mesne profits, and for costs. Jahnabi Chaudhurani died during the course of the execution proceedings. Her adopted son Baikant Nath Rai had died sometime before and had been succeeded by his widow, Dinamoni Chaudhurani, the present Appellant. On the death of Jahnabi Chaudhurani all the landed properties of which she had been in possession and enjoyment together with all her acquisition and savings out of them came into the possession of Dinamoni Chaudhurani. 6. In three other cases at least, in which Jahnabi Chaudhurani had been carrying on litigation for the benefit or protection of the property of which she was in possession and enjoyment, Dinamoni Chaudhurani has successfully applied and has been substituted as "legal representative" of Jahnabi Chaudhurani. In this and the analogous case she denies her liability under the decree on the ground that she is not the legal representative of Jahnabi Chaudhurani. Such inconsistent conduct on her part is certainly, remarkable. 7. In this and the analogous case she denies her liability under the decree on the ground that she is not the legal representative of Jahnabi Chaudhurani. Such inconsistent conduct on her part is certainly, remarkable. 7. Execution in the present proceedings has been taken out for the recovery of costs only and the first objection taken to the order of the Subordinate Judge is that as the decree is a personal decree, and as Dinamoni Chaudhurani could not by any possibility have succeeded to the personal property of Jahnabi Chaudhurani, so for the purposes of this decree she cannot be regarded as her "legal representative." The term "legal representative" in sec. 234, C. P. C., must, it is alleged, be interpreted strictly to mean the heir, executor or administrator of the deceased. 8. Two questions are therefore raised : (1) whether the decree is a personal decree, and (2) whether Dinamoni Chaudhurani is the legal representative of Jahnabi Chaudhurani according to the provisions of sec. 234, C. P. C. 9. The whole decree as passed was certainly not a personal decree against Jahnabi Chaudhurani but was for the recovery after establishment of title of immoveable property. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the Appellant that there is no provision of the law under which a decree can be split up for the purposes of execution so that execution of the different parts may be taken out against different persons. He however contends that this point does not arise in the present appeal, and, if it be held that it does arise, then that his client is no way bound by the decree. 10. In my opinion the point does arise. Execution for costs can only be taken out against the person against whom relief has been granted in favour of the decree-holder, that is to say, against the person against whom possession of the land could be recovered. It is admitted that the property to which Jahnabi Chaudhurani in her defence pleaded in that suit that the land in dispute belonged as an accretion has passed at her death into the hands of the present Appellant, Dinamoni Chaudhurani, but it is contended that as she succeeded to that property as heir to her husband she cannot be regarded in respect even of that property to be the "legal representative" of Jahnabi Chaudhurani. It is further contended that as Jahnabi Chaudhurani held a limited life estate only in that property lees than a Hindu widow's estate which terminated on her death, the Appellant is not bound by the result of that litigation as neither she nor her husband were made parties in the suit. The suit in which the decree was obtained was instituted in 1892 and Baikant Nath died sometime in 1892 or 1893. The decree was obtained on the 31st January 1896. By the terms of ekrarnama under which it is contended that Jahnabi Chaudhurani held her limited life interest in the property, Baikant Nath expressly gave her power to carry on litigation on behalf of the properties of which she was in possession. There seems little doubt that Baikanta Nath, whether he had been made a party or not, would, if he had survived Jahnabi Chaudhurani, have been bound by the result of that litigation. It is contended that his heir is not bound because the estate granted by him to Jahnabi Chaudhurani and the term of the agreement under which that estate was granted terminated at her death. But, if it be held that his heir was after Baikant Nath's death not bound by the terms of the ekrarnama so far as it empowered Jahnabi Chaudhurani to carry on litigation on behalf of the properties in her possession, then it follows that the heir was equally not bound after his death by the other terms of the deed. The deed however expressly binds him and his heirs both in respect of the term as to litigation and also in respect of the other terms of the deed. The deed was executed so long ago as the 22nd Bhadra 1272 B. S., and there can in my opinion be no doubt from a perusal of its terms that it was intended to bind Baikant Nath and his heir. The heir was benefited under the terms of the deed which restricted Jahnabi Chaudhurani's power of alienation and provided that all acquisition and accumulations from the properties in her possession and enjoyment should on her death pass to Baikant Nath and his heirs. The heir cannot accept all the benefits and repudiate all the liabilities arising under the same deed. 11. The heir cannot accept all the benefits and repudiate all the liabilities arising under the same deed. 11. Accepting then the contention which appears to be correct that after the execution of the ekrarnama Jahnabi Chaudhurani was in possession of the properties under an estate created by that document, the heir of the executant of that document equally with the executant himself must be held to be bound by all the terms of that document including that which gave to Jahnabi Chaudhurani full powers to conduct litigation on behalf of, and in the interest of, the properties in her possession. The learned counsel does not suggest that Jahnabi Chaudhurani exceeded her powers in defending the suit which was decreed against her, though he does not feel justified in admitting that it was for the benefit of the property. 12. There can be no reasonable doubt that in defending the suit Jahnabi Chaudhurani had very little, if any, personal interest strictly so called in the litigation, but that she was to the best of her ability acting in the interest of the property then in her possession. It has been suggested she was interested in protecting her life interest in the property claimed. She was not however then a young woman and the profits to be derived from a newly-formed strip of alluvial land must have been very trifling. There can then be no doubt that in that suit she was acting on behalf of the estate and for the protection of the interest of the estate and for the benefit of the person who on her death would succeed to the property. This is the opinion of the learned Judges of the Division Bench who heard the analogous appeal and I agree with them. Applying then the principle laid down by this Court in the case of Ramkishore Chuckerbutty v. Kally Kanto Chuckerbutty I. L. R. 6 Cal. 479 (1880) they held that the decree-holder in the case would be entitled under the provisions of sec. 234 of the CPC to satisfy his decree against the legal representative of the person from whom she had obtained the estate, that is to say, her son Baikant Nath. In my opinion that principle may safely be applied to the present case even though the estate which Jahnabi Chaudhurani had was not a widow's estate. 13. 234 of the CPC to satisfy his decree against the legal representative of the person from whom she had obtained the estate, that is to say, her son Baikant Nath. In my opinion that principle may safely be applied to the present case even though the estate which Jahnabi Chaudhurani had was not a widow's estate. 13. It has however been contended that the use of the term "legal representative" in sec. 234, C. P. C., precludes the adoption of this view. That term must, it is urged, be construed strictly and cannot include any body except the heir, executor or administrator of the deceased. The term and the definition are both taken from the English law and it is contended that when the Legislature hold the term "legal representative" in the section and not the term "representative" it must have intended to use it in the strict sense. The section appears however to have been drawn for the protection of decree-holders and to give them a right to relief against the successor in property or estate of the deceased judgment-debtor. The term "legal representative" appears to have been used as one which would cover ordinary cases of succession. It cannot however have been intended that it should be used in a stricter sense even than it is applied in the English law, from which it has been borrowed. Now in English law though it may be regarded as settled that the primary meaning of "legal representative" is "executor or administrator" that meaning may be controlled by the context. Thus in certain cases it has been held to mean "next of kin" and in others under the Married Women's Property Act of 1882 it has been held to include the person who on the death of the person spoken of becomes entitled to the property in question. 14. It is admitted that in Indian law on the death of the Hindu widow who had held a widow's estate in immoveable property a decree obtained against her in respect of that property could, in the event of her death before it was fully satisfied, be executed against the reversionar who succeeded to that property on her death [See the cases of Rameshwar Pershad v. Ram Bahadur Singh I. L. R. 12 Cal. 458 (1886) and Hari Suran Moitra v. Bhubaneswari Debt I. L. R. 16 Cal. 40 (1888)]. 458 (1886) and Hari Suran Moitra v. Bhubaneswari Debt I. L. R. 16 Cal. 40 (1888)]. The case of Ramkishore Chuckerbutty v. Kally Kanto Chuckerbutty I. L. R. 6 Cal. 479 (1880) supports this view even in the case of a decree for costs. In other cases it has been held that where a Will has been left by a deceased Hindu but probate has not been taken out, the person who takes possession of the estate of the deceased pending issue of probate must be treated for some purposes as his representative, and that a judgment obtained against such a representative is not a mere nullity [See Prosanno Chunder Bhattacharjee v. Kristo Chaitunno Pal I. L. R. 4 Cal. 343 (1878) and the case of Chuni Lal Bose v. Osmond Beeby I. L. R. 30 Cal. 1044 (1903)]. In other cases it has been held that an executor de son tort can be sued in respect of property of the deceased of which he has taken possession. The cases of Chathakelan v. Govinda Karunian I. L. R. 17 Mad. 186 (1893) and Erava v. Sidramappa I. L. R. 21 Bom. 424 (1895) do not appear to lay down a different principle as they proceed on the, view that the wording of sec. 234 of the CPC seems to point to the intention that a stranger who was in possession of property who was not a party to the decree ought not to be proceeded against in execution or otherwise than by a regular suit. The Appellant in this case is not a stranger but the person entitled to the property on the death of Jahnabi Chaudhurani as next heir. 15. It is clear therefore that both in English and Indian law cases have arisen, in which the term "legal representative" cannot be strictly confined to its primary meaning. An attempt has been made to distinguish from the present case the case of an executor de son tort and a person in possession of the property of the deceased pending probate on the ground that though it, has been held that suits could be brought against them as legal representatives of the deceased it does not follow that they could be substituted as such legal representatives in execution proceedings. The distinction is not my opinion sound. The distinction is not my opinion sound. Execution proceedings are proceedings in the suit and if a fresh suit can be brought against a person as a legal representative of a deceased person I can see no reason why the same person should not be substituted as the legal representative of the same deceased person in proceedings in execution of a decree obtained in a suit already brought against the deceased. 16. The term "legal representative" has been used in sec. 234 to meet the circumstances of a certain event, viz., the passing of the property the subject of the litigation on the death of the deceased judgment-debtor to her successor and to include such successor either to her estate or to the property in suit. It should not in my opinion be so strictly interpreted as to defeat the rights of a decree-holder in an exceptional case for which the Legislature could not have been expected to have otherwise specially provided. 17. The present case is one of such exceptional cases. Dinamoni Chaudhurani has succeeded on the death of Jahnabi Chaudhurani to the possession and enjoyment of the immoveable property for the benefit of which the suit was contested by Jahnabi Chaudhurani. She has also succeeded to all the accumulations out of that and the other properties made by Jahnabi Chaudhurani. 18. She must therefore be treated for the purposes of this case as the legal representative of Jahnabi Chaudhurani in respect of the decree obtained against her and in my opinion the Subordinate Judge has rightly substituted Dinamoni Chaudhurani for Jahnabi Chaudhurani in the present proceedings for execution of the decree. I would therefore dismiss the appeal with costs. We assess the hearing fee at two hundred rupees. Woodroffe, J. 19. I am entirely at one with my learned brother in thinking that the course which has been adopted by the Appellant in this suit and which has been stated in his judgment is inconvenient and embarrassing one and should not be followed in future. 20. It appears that a suit was brought by the Respondents for recovery of possession of land, mesne profits and costs against a lady of the name of Srimutty Jahnabi Chaudhurani in which suit the Respondents obtained a decree and they now seek to execute that decree against the Appellant her daughter-in-law as her legal representative under sec. 20. It appears that a suit was brought by the Respondents for recovery of possession of land, mesne profits and costs against a lady of the name of Srimutty Jahnabi Chaudhurani in which suit the Respondents obtained a decree and they now seek to execute that decree against the Appellant her daughter-in-law as her legal representative under sec. 234 of the CPC and the sole question for determination is whether the Appellant is the legal representative of her mother-in-law within the meaning of that section. At the outset I may dispose of a contention which was not (and I think rightly) seriously pressed, namely, that in certain other suits the Appellant had applied for and obtained substitution of her name in place of her deceased mother-in-law. It was therefore asserted for the Respondent that the Appellant had regarded herself as legal representative of her mother-in-law and that her objection in the present suit was a discreditable one. On the other hand, the learned standing counsel who appeared for the Appellant attempted to distinguish those cases from the one before us. Both these arguments however appear to me to be entirely beside the point. It is quite immaterial in a matter of law which is raised out of facts which are admittedly unaffected by any principle of estoppel what the Appellant may on other occasions have considered herself to be. 21. The question is not whether she rightly or wrongly thought herself to be in other cases the legal representative of her mother-in-law, but whether she is in fact so according to the law applicable to the case. That law is to be found in sec. 234 of the Code which is the only section dealing with the right to execute decrees against the representatives of deceased judgment-debtors [See Erava v. Sidramappa I. L. R. 21 Bom. 424 at p. 431 (1895)] and the judicial decisions which have interpreted and applied that section. 22. Before dealing with the arguments addressed to us it is necessary to state shortly the material facts upon which they were based. Srimutty Jahnabi, the deceased judgment-debtor, was the widow of Goloke Nath Rai and was authorized by him by an anumatipatra which is not before us to adopt a son. That document apparently also provided that the widow was to "manage, protect and supervise" the estate after and notwithstanding the adoption. Srimutty Jahnabi, the deceased judgment-debtor, was the widow of Goloke Nath Rai and was authorized by him by an anumatipatra which is not before us to adopt a son. That document apparently also provided that the widow was to "manage, protect and supervise" the estate after and notwithstanding the adoption. Srimutty Jahnabi adopted Baikant Nath Rai, the husband of the Appellant and upon such adoption the estate of his mother if it was that of a Hindu widow was divested. If the estate taken by her was an estate conferred by the anumatipatra a question might and apparently did arise between the mother and her son as to whether that document was effectual to continue that estate after the adoption. The rival claims made by the adopted son and his mother were settled by an ekrarnama of the 6th September 1865, whereby the former agreed that his mother was to possess and enjoy during her lifetime but without power of transfer by sale or gift all the properties specially mentioned in the ekrarnama including the zamindari No. 45, which was the subject matter of the litigation out of which the application for execution arises and all other properties, moveable and immoveable, (with the exception hereinafter mentioned) which were in his mother's possession and the properties which she had acquired or might acquire with the profits thereof. The ekrarnama deprived Srimutty Jahnabi Chaudhurani of all power of transfer and declared that she was to possess and enjoy these properties during her lifetime and to manage and preserve the property by maintaining the family and performing the ancestral worship, pilgrimages and other usual religious ceremonies and then proceeded as follows :--"And you will be at liberty to carry on litigation in your own name, as you have hitherto done, and to that I or my heirs will not be able to raise any objection and advance any claim nor to destroy your right to supervise the affairs in respect thereof on any grounds. On your death I will get all these properties and except that neither I nor my heirs during your lifetime shall be able to take possession of the said estate or any portion thereof or to interfere with the same by destroying your right of supervision" with the exception of certain specified mehals belonging to the estate of Goloke Nath Rai which his widow by a separate ekrarnama of the same date assigned to her adoptive son in lieu of a certain sum annually receivable by him for personal and other expenses. The agreement then proceeded to declare that the adoptive son should not during his mother's lifetime be able to transfer by sale or gift any of the aforementioned properties which were not to be liable for any of his future debts. A certain area of land was set apart with regard to which Srimutty Jahnabi was declared to have the power of making gift at her option; but with the permission and approval of her son for the spiritual benefit of forefathers. After her death her son was to get all these properties then undisposed of as also all costs which might remain after defrayal of expenses. 23. From the above facts it would seem that whether Srimutty Jahnabi held her husband's estate under the terms of the anumatipatra as the learned Subordinate Judge finds or as I am of opinion under the terms of the subsequent ekrarnama, she did not hold the property or rather the portion assigned to her under the latter document as and for the estate of a Hindu widow but for such an estate as was created by the deed under which she held this property. 24. It appears to me though it has been contended to the contrary that the nature of the personal interest given to Srimutty Jahnabi under the ekrarnama was a life interest only. She was to hold during her lifetime enjoying the income but without power of alienation in any case, not even in those cases in which as Hindu widow she would possess such a power and on her death the estate was to go or revert to her son. 25. She was to hold during her lifetime enjoying the income but without power of alienation in any case, not even in those cases in which as Hindu widow she would possess such a power and on her death the estate was to go or revert to her son. 25. I am supported in this construction of the ekrarnama by the unreported judgment of this Court, dated 18th May 1897, in appeal from original decree No. 57 of 1894, which apparently was not referred to when the analogous case was heard and in which the title of Srimutty Jahnabi Chaudhurani came in question and in which the Court stated as follows:--"The Plaintiff does not and could not claim as heir of her husband or of her adopted son She claims to have acquired the estate for life under a document called an ekrarnama" and then after referring to the question of the genuineness, validity and effect of this document the judgment proceeds :-- "The document is in Bengali of a somewhat remote date and not skilfully drawn but we gather from it the clear intention to give the Plaintiff a life estate and we find that the document as a whole gives effect to that intention." 26. Baikant Nath Rai died before his mother in about 1892 or 1893 leaving a widow the Appellant Srimutty Dinamoni Chaudhurani who, subject to the provisions of the ekrar giving a life interest in certain properties to her mother-in-law inherited her husband's estate. In the year 1892 two suits were instituted against Srimutty Jahnabi for possession and mesne profits in respect of certain lands which she contended (as was subsequently held wrongly) belonged to the estate of Goloke Nath Rai. These suits were decreed against her on the 31st January 1896 and by this Court in appeal on the 25th August 1898 or 1899 as it is variously stated. On the 20th November 1899, Srimutty Jahnabi satisfied the decree in this suit to the extent of Rs. 539-13-9. Thereafter and in Falgoon 1306 corresponding with February and March 1900, Srimutty Jahnabi died. The Appellant then succeeded to the possession of the estate as the heiress of her husband Baikant Nath Rai. On the 20th November 1899, Srimutty Jahnabi satisfied the decree in this suit to the extent of Rs. 539-13-9. Thereafter and in Falgoon 1306 corresponding with February and March 1900, Srimutty Jahnabi died. The Appellant then succeeded to the possession of the estate as the heiress of her husband Baikant Nath Rai. On the 13th, February 1901 the Respondents who were some of the Plaintiffs or representatives of Plaintiffs in the suit mentioned, filed a petition, dated the 30th January 1901, for execution of the decrees therein reciting the death of the judgment-debtor and stating that "her daughter-in-law Dinamoni Chaudhurani (the present Appellant) owns and holds as malike the estate left by her" and asking for execution by substituting the Appellant Dinamoni Chaudhurani in the place of the deceased judgment-debtor under the provisions of sec. 234 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Appellant filed petition of objections in which amongst other matters she stated that she was not the legal representative of the late judgment debtor and therefore no execution could proceed against her and that under the ekrarnama the judgment-debtor held only a life estate in certain properties and was not in the possession of the said properties as a Hindu widow and therefore no decree against her would bind the estate of the Appellant's husband, then in her possession as his heiress. 27. The applications for execution were registered in both suits on the 12th April 1901 and judgment was given in both applications on the 18th November 1901 by the Subordinate Judge who disallowed the objections on the grounds, firstly, that the judgment-debtor held the estate not under and according to the ekrarnama but under the anumatipatra which was recited by it; secondly, that in defending the suits above mentioned Srimutty Jahnabi defended the estate and not any personal interest of her own and that as such the costs due under the decree formed a debt due by the estate and not by Srimutty Jahnabi personally; thirdly, that the Appellant being in enjoyment of the accumulations made by Srimutty Jahnabi was precluded from objecting that the estate should not be liable for costs which Srimutty Jahnabi had had to incur apparently in good faith and for the benefit of the estate. Against the orders in both suits the Appellant appealed to this Court. Against the orders in both suits the Appellant appealed to this Court. The appeal is miscellaneous case No. 4 of 1901 was heard by this Court and dismissed by a judgment, dated 18th March 1903, which is reported in 7 C. W. N. 678 under the title Dinamoni Chaudhurani v. Elahudad Khan 7 C. W. N. 678 (1903), and the appeal in the analogous miscellaneous case No. 5 of 1901 is that which is now before us. 28. The Appellants contend that the term "legal representative" in sec. 234 of the Code bad its ordinary meaning of "heir, executor and administrator." The learned vakil for the Respondents has urged us to put what he has described as an elastic interpretation on these terms though to what limit the freedom of interpretation is to extend or to What class of cases beyond those mentioned the section is to be applied has not been stated. 29. It is true that as pointed out by him the legislature has not defined the terms "legal representative." The framers of this section in using this term must either have understood it in some defined sense or have intended thereby merely to refer to such persons as under the law applicable to the particular case might be held to be the legal representatives of a deceased person. The first supposition is negatived by the fact that the legislature has omitted to declare what are the characteristics of a legal representative for the purposes of this section. It has been urged that such a definition is unnecessary as the term has a well-known technical meaning. In their strictest and most ordinary sense the words "legal representatives" are understood to mean executors and administrators only [Price v. Strange 6 Madd. 159 (1820)]. Though the decisions upon the constructions of Wills which hold it to be a flexible term and have given it another sense such as next-of-kin or descendants do not control its legal meaning in that, they proceed upon the principle that if the Court finds that a testator attached to particular words a different meaning from that which is their proper legal sense, the Court is bound so to construe and give effect to the Will, not in its strict legal sense, but in the way in which the testator himself used the words [Eagleton v. Horner L. R. 37 Ch. D. 703-711 (1887)], the term is yet one which is naturally capable of a more extended sense than that in which it is ordinarily and strictly employed. Had the legislature, therefore, intended to confine it to particular persons only, viz., executors or administrators, it would I think have expressly named these persons and would not have used a term which though in its most strict sense denoting executor or administrator only is yet capable of a wider meaning. 30. Where there is an executor or administrator they alone are the legal representatives of a deceased judgment-debtor. But the section is also commonly applied both in the case of heirs as well as in that of executors and administrators and the term "legal representative" has been defined to ordinarily mean all these classes of persons [Ishan Chunder Sirkar v. Beni Madhub Sirkar I. L. R. 24 Cal. 62 at p. 71 (1896)]. 31. When there is no executor or administrator but succession by heirship as in cases governed by the Bengal School of Hindu Law or in cases of separate and self-acquired property under Mitakshara law the decree must be executed against the heir as the legal representative within the meaning of this section. 32. The section has, however, been applied to cases where the succession is otherwise than by heirship to the last holder of an estate as also to cases where the estate accrues to the present holder by survivorship. In these cases where a decree is passed against a judgment-debtor not in his or her personal capacity but in a representative capacity the decree may be executed against the person who, though not an heir of the judgment-debtor the last holder of the estate, is entitled thereto after her death whether as reversioner or surviving coparcener. So inasmuch as a decree properly obtained against a Hindu widow in her representative capacity is binding upon her husband's reversioner [Tribhuwan Sunder Kuar v. Sri Narain Singh I. L. R. 20 All. 341 (1898)], where a suit has been instituted or defended by a Hindu widow in her representative capacity the reversioners though they do not claim through her but as heirs of her husband have yet been held to be her legal representatives in respect of the estate held by her as such Hindu widow. [Ramkishore Chuckerbutty v. Rally Kanto Chuckerbutty I. L. R. 6 Cal. [Ramkishore Chuckerbutty v. Rally Kanto Chuckerbutty I. L. R. 6 Cal. 479 (1880), Prem Moya Chowdhurani v. Preo Nath Dhur I. L. R. 23 Cal. 636 (1896), Tribhuwan Sunder Kuar v. Sree Narain Singh I. L. R. 20 All. 341 (1898), Musala Reddi v. Ramayya I. L. R. 23 Mad. 125, 133 (1899)]. Again in the case of a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara though it has been held by this and the Madras and Allahabad High Courts that in the case of a personal decree for money obtained against the father the interest of the latter in the joint ancestral properties is not assets in the hands of the son when he dies, and consequently notwithstanding his obligation to pay his father's debt proceedings cannot be taken against him under sec. 234 as the legal representative of his father juga Lal Chaudhuri v. Audh Behari Prasad Singh 6 C. W. N. 223 (1900)], the contrary view has been adopted by the Bombay High Court in that the obligation of a son to satisfy his father's debt is within the scope of the decree against the father whether on the ground of representation of the sons by their father [Jagabhai v. Vijbhukandas I. L. R. 11 Bom. 37 (1886)] or on the ground that the creditor has the power to attach and sell the entire interest in the property in execution proceedings against the father [Umed Hathi Sing v. Goman Bhaije I. L. R. 20 Bom. 385 (1895)]. Where, however, the interest of the father has been attached during his lifetime [Lachmi Narain v. Kunji Lal I. L. R. 16 All 455, 456(1894), Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Prasad Singh I. L. R. 5 Cal. 148 (1879), Kamataka v. Audukari I. L. R. 5 Mad. 232, 233 (1882)], or a decree directing a sale of hypothecated property has been passed in the lifetime of the judgment-debtor [Sivagiri Zamindar v. Tituvangada I. L. R 7 Mad. 339 (1884)] or the judgment-debtor has been expressly sued as representing the undivided family [Muttia v. Virammal I. L. R. 10 Mad. 286, 288 (1886), Karpa Kambal v. Subbayya I. L. R. 5 Mad. 234] or the decree charges the family property [Muttia v. Virammal I. L. R. 10 Mad. 339 (1884)] or the judgment-debtor has been expressly sued as representing the undivided family [Muttia v. Virammal I. L. R. 10 Mad. 286, 288 (1886), Karpa Kambal v. Subbayya I. L. R. 5 Mad. 234] or the decree charges the family property [Muttia v. Virammal I. L. R. 10 Mad. 286, 288 (1886)]; in all these cases the decree, it has been held, may be executed against those who in succession in time take by the legal title of survivorship and not by that of heirship. 33. The principle under consideration has been still further extended to the case of a person who without title as administrator, executor, heir, reversioner or surviving co-parcener is the de facto possessor of the estate of the deceased Hindu it having been held that he must be treated for some purposes as his representative and that a judgment obtained against such a representative is not a mere nullity [Prosanno Chunder Bhattacharjee v. Kristo Chaitunno Pal ILR 4 Cal. 342(1878), Janaki v. Dhanu Lall I. L. R. 14 Mad. 454 (1891)]. The first of these cases which was followed in the second has been described as a peculiar one [Sam Chandra Mookherjee v. Raja Ranjit Singh 4 C. W. N. 405, 413 (1899), Erava v. Sidramappa I. L. R. 21 Bom. 424 (1395)]. It also proceeds upon the assumption that under the law as it existed prior to 1881 the executor did not represent the deceased until he had obtained probate and the hardship which led the Court to take the view it did, no longer exists. The Madras High Court has more recently held that there is no authority for holding that the words "legal representative" include any person who has taken possession of the property of a deceased judgment-debtor, that a stranger in possession of property who was not a party to the decree ought not to be proceeded against in execution or otherwise than by a regular suit and that the words "legal representative" cannot be taken to include any person who does not in law represent the estate of the deceased [Chathakelan v. Govinda Karunian I. L. R. 17 Mad. 186 (1893)]. 186 (1893)]. And though in the two former cases the question arose with reference to a suit brought by the creditor against the representative and not with reference to proceedings taken in execution of a decree this Court has expressed an opinion (which having regard to the facts of the particular case appear to be obiter in that the legal heir ab intestate was a party to the execution proceedings) that the principle underlying the observations in these cases are equally applicable to proceedings in execution as to proceedings by regular suit [Chuni Lal Bose v. Osmond Beeby I. L. R. 30 Cal. 1044 (1903)]. 34. From this review of the authorities it will appear that judicial decisions have extended the sense of the term "legal representative" beyond that of its ordinary meaning of "administrator, executor, and heir" and though such extension has been attended with doubt and has in some cases been the subject of conflicting decision it appears to me to be too late now to endeavour, however convenient it might be, to secure for the term that which is perhaps its strict and legitimate sense. I agree, therefore, in holding that the term is not limited to administrators, executors and heirs and am of opinion that it must now be held to include any person who in law represents the estate of a deceased judgment-debtor. 35. It remains therefore to be considered whether the Appellant is in law the legal representative of the deceased. She is admittedly not the administrator or executor. Nor is she the heiress either in respect of the stridhan property or any of her mother-in-law against which execution is not sought or in respect of the properties covered by the ekrarnama which she inherits as heiress of her husband. The deceased judgment-debtor was not as was rightly admitted by Dr. Asutosh Mukherjee who first argued the case on behalf of the Respondent in possession of her husband's estate as a Hindu widow. The Appellant's husband therefore was not in the position of a reversioner taking an estate which was bound by a decree obtained against a Hindu widow. The Appellant is not in the position of a person holding property of the deceased. The Appellant's husband therefore was not in the position of a reversioner taking an estate which was bound by a decree obtained against a Hindu widow. The Appellant is not in the position of a person holding property of the deceased. The accumulations, to which the learned Subordinate Judge refers, form, under the terms of the ekrarnama, the property of the Appellant and her husband, and not the separate and absolute property of the deceased judgment-debtor, whose interest in the estate conferred by the ekrarnama ceased on her death. Lastly, if the judgment-debtor was as has been held by this Court in the position of a life tenant a decree obtained against her as such would not bind a reversioner or remainder-man. 36. The present case therefore is not within the scope of any of the authorities to which I hare referred. The manner however in which liability is sought to, be imposed upon the Appellant is as follows :--It has been argued that whatever may have been the personal interest of the deceased judgment-debtor she was yet placed by the ekrarnama in a position which enabled her to represent the entire estate both as to her own and her son's interest thereon and that by that document such an interest was conferred upon her as enabled her to represent the estate completely for purposes of litigation regarding which there was the specific agreement to which I have referred. Nextly, such being the estate conferred upon her the decree which is sought to be executed was passed against her in such a representative capacity and bound the estate held by her and that therefore the Appellant who succeeds thereto as heiress of her husband who was entitled to the estate on the death of his mother is the legal representative of the latter. As regards the first of these contentions it is to be observed that the argument extends the principle of representation which exists by law in the case of decrees against Hindu widows and co-parceners to cases of agreement and conveyance between parties. A decree against a Hindu widow may bind the estate held by her because in law her estate is such as to enable her under certain circumstances to completely represent it. Here the deceased judgment-debtor not having the estate of a Hindu widow ceased not to represent it as such. A decree against a Hindu widow may bind the estate held by her because in law her estate is such as to enable her under certain circumstances to completely represent it. Here the deceased judgment-debtor not having the estate of a Hindu widow ceased not to represent it as such. Her authority to represent it is claimed to be derived from the agreement and conveyance contained in the ekrarnama and it is alleged that in defending the suit she acted under that authority and for the protection of the interests of the estate. As regards the second contention, the proceedings in the suit are not before us so as to enable me to say whether it was brought against the judgment-debtor in a representative capacity or not. It is admitted that neither the Appellant nor her husband were parties as they should ordinarily have been, had it been intended to bind the estate. The decree is also not before us but so far as I gather it was in form at least a personal one and no order was made therein charging the estate with the payment of costs. I therefore had during the course of the argument and still have doubt whether the Appellant can be said to be the legal representative of the deceased judgment-debtor. Having however regard to the fact that a contrary view has been taken by a Divisional Bench of this Court in the analogous case upon precisely the same facts as these which are now before us and that my learned brother concurs in that view, I do not think that under the circumstances of this case I should be justified in dissenting from the order which he proposes to make and I therefore concur for the reasons I have stated in dismissing this appeal with costs.