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1904 DIGILAW 172 (ALL)

Abdul Kayum v. Sadr-Ud-Din

1904-12-11

AIKMAN, BURKITT

body1904
JUDGMENT : BURKITT, J. In this case an application for an order absolute for sale of mauza Muzaffarnagar was granted by the lower court. The property of that order is contested in this appeal. Two points have been principally argued. Firstly that the applicant-respondent was not entitled to an order absolute for the sale of Muzaffarnagar, because his mortgagor, in a subsequent mortgage, had made a certain statement that the applicant seeking to recover his money, was to be restricted to mauza Hariapur which, in a subsequent instrument, had been mortgaged to him. We can find no support for this contention on the paper on which it is based. There is not one word in that document limiting the mortgagee rights of the respondent to Hariapur only. That paper does not say that after its execution the respondent is not to take out execution of the former decree against Muzaffarnagar. We over-rule this plea. 2. Next, it is said that the instrument by which Hariapur was mortgaged, was entirely an independent transaction, and that Hariapur was not mortgaged as an additional but an independent security. 3. No argument was addressed to us in support of this allegation. In our opinion there is nothing in it. The decision of the Subordinate Judge is quite right. 4. But though we have so far found in favour of the respondent we nevertheless, are of opinion that he is not entitled to the order absolute for sale which the court below has given. The respondent's position in this matter is, that he is in actual possession of mauza Muzaffarnagar as a usufructuary mortgagee. If he were willing to waive his rights as such, and to allow that village to be sold free of encumbrance, then probably the order of the court below could stand. The respondent, however, will not adopt that course. He wants to sell Muzaffarnagar subject to his usufructuary mortgage, that is to say, he desires to sell merely the equity of redemption. It is now the accepted rule of this Court that such a sale cannot be permitted. That, which the respondents is entitled to, is to retain possession of Muzaffarnagar as a usufructuary mortgagee, until the amount due on his usufructuary mortgage and the unpaid balance due on the decree obtained by the heirs of Dilaram, shall have both been discharged. It is now the accepted rule of this Court that such a sale cannot be permitted. That, which the respondents is entitled to, is to retain possession of Muzaffarnagar as a usufructuary mortgagee, until the amount due on his usufructuary mortgage and the unpaid balance due on the decree obtained by the heirs of Dilaram, shall have both been discharged. Such a right is clearly given to the respondent by section 72 of the Transfer of Property Act. He, by paying off the decree of Dilaram's heirs, has preserved the property from sale. For the above reasons we allow the appeal, set aside the order of the lower court and dismiss the application for an order absolute. As to costs, modifying the order of the lower court, we direct that both parties bear their own costs in this Court and the court below. AIKMAN, J. I agree. I can find nothing in the document, dated the 18th August, 1894, which would stop the respondent, from recovering the unpaid balance of the amount which he paid to discharge the decree, on the prior mortgage. This is a case in which a usufructuary mortgagee, in possession, has paid off a prior encumbrance and seeks to bring to sale the property mortgaged, to recover that amount, retaining his own lien as usufructuary mortgagee. This, it is clear, he cannot do, He might have brought the property to sale to recover that amount if he had waived all rights under his usufructuary mortgage, but the learned vakil, for the respondent, says that his client will not agree to this. This case is clearly distinguishable from the case of Bansidhar v. Gaya Prasad,[1901] I.L.R., 24 All, 179, which is relied on by the lower court.