JUDGMENT 1. The present appeal arises out of an application for revocation of letters of administration made by the present Respondent. It appears that one Gopal Chandra Saha died on the 29th March 1901, having, as it is alleged, executed a Will on the 9th February 1901. That Will was registered after his death on the 8th May 1901. An application was made in September by his two widows and a relation named Prem Chand Das Bairagi for letters of administration to the estate with the Will attached, and letters were granted on the 11th September 1901. On the 21st May 1902, the present Respondent put in an application for revocation of the grant. He is sister's son of the deceased and as such the presumptive reversionary heir and he prayed that the grant might be revoked on the ground mainly that it had been made without any citation having been issued to him. The case was adjourned to different dates in order to enable the parties to adduce evidence and during that time the evidence of two witnesses on behalf of the present Appellants was taken on commission. 2. The case came on for final hearing on the 2nd August 1902. In the order the District Judge has recorded that he heard the arguments of both parties, but in consequence of the absence of the Petitioner's witnesses no witnesses in support of the application were examined. Apparently however certain facts were admitted, and they are denied in this appeal, namely, that the Petitioner for revocation was the presumptive reversionary heir and that a special citation had not been served on him before the letters of administration had been granted with the Will attached. The District Judge having heard the arguments, revoked the grant on two grounds, first: because a special citation had not been served on the reversioner and he considered that fact as sufficient to invalidate the probate, and, secondly, because the persons to whom the grant had been made, had failed to exhibit an inventory or accounts under Ch. 7 of the Act. The opposite party Defendants in the lower Court have appealed and it has been contended on their behalf that the District Judge erred in law in revoking the grant on those two grounds. Taking the last ground first it has been argued that sec. 7 of the Act. The opposite party Defendants in the lower Court have appealed and it has been contended on their behalf that the District Judge erred in law in revoking the grant on those two grounds. Taking the last ground first it has been argued that sec. 50 of the Probate and Administration Act contemplates that the omission to exhibit an inventory or account should have been proved to the satisfaction of the Judge to have been wilful or without reasonable cause, and as in this case no evidence whatever was offered, the District Judge had no ground whatever on which he could arrive at the conclusion that there had been any wilful omission to tile the inventory or without reasonable cause, and in his order he has not stated that that was his opinion. We think the contention is sound and the District Judge has erred in law in holding that the grant was liable to revocation on that ground. 3. The other point taken is that the Judge was wrong in holding that the grant must be revoked simply for the reason that the applicant for the grant had failed to serve a special citation on the reversioner. Certain cases of this Court have been quoted to us in which it has been held that the mere omission to serve a special citation is not in itself a sufficient ground for revoking the probate, if it appears, that the person, on whom that citation ought to have been served, was in fact aware that the application for probate had been made, and of the circumstances connected with the case. We accept the view that the mere omission to serve a special citation would not by itself be a sufficient ground for revoking the grant if it was shown that the person, on whom the citation ought to have been served, had knowledge of the application for probate. But at the same time we are of opinion that the onus of proving that he had such knowledge rests on the party who alleges it, and that it is not necessary for the party who applies for the revocation of the grant to prove not only that no special citation was served on him but also that he had no knowledge of the proceedings. In the present case from the evidence taken on commission the present Appellants have, in our opinion, not only failed to show that the Respondent had knowledge of the proceedings, but have made out a very strong case to lead us to believe that he had no knowledge of the proceedings. The evidence of Raj Lakhi Dassi, one of the widows, is to the effect that the mother of the Respondent was on bad terms with her and with the testator before his death, and that on that account she was not allowed to come to the house and that she and the present Respondent were not living in the house, but were living at a house at a short distance off. Under the circumstances it is hardly probable that she would have been aware what the family in the house of the testator were doing in order to take out letters of administration to the estate; and we therefore think that the Appellants in this case have failed to prove that the omission to serve the special citation on the reversioner was cured by the fact that the Respondent himself had knowledge of the proceedings. We think therefore that there are good grounds for recalling the grant, but at the same time we think that the order passed by the District Judge is not a proper order which he should have passed in the case. The objection taken before him was to the summary grant of letters of administration to the applicant and the Judge, when he was satisfied that the summary grant should be recalled, ought to have proceeded under the law and to have called upon the applicant for the grant of letters of administration to prove the Will in solemn form in the presence of the Respondent, the objector; and after hearing the evidence and his objections he then ought to have decided whether the order granting the letters of administration should stand or whether it should be revoked. 4. We therefore set aside the order of the District Judge and in lien thereof direct that the letters of administration granted to the Appellants be recalled and that the Judge do call upon them to prove the Will in solemn form in the presence of the Respondent, the objector. 5. 4. We therefore set aside the order of the District Judge and in lien thereof direct that the letters of administration granted to the Appellants be recalled and that the Judge do call upon them to prove the Will in solemn form in the presence of the Respondent, the objector. 5. An objection has been raised to the order the District Judge has passed directing that the Appellants should pay the full amount of costs and we think that the order is not correct. If after hearing the case the Judge should be of opinion that the grant should be made then the present Appellants, the applicants for the grant, will be entitled to pay the costs out of the estate of the deceased, and if the Judge holds that no grant should be made then the present Appellants will have to pay the full costs of the proceedings. Since the appeal was instituted, the widow who joined with Prem Chand Das, the relation, in the appeal, has died and it will therefore be for the Judge to decide whether Prem Chand in the absence of the other widow of the deceased has any right under the document which is put forward as the Will of the deceased to obtain the grant of the letters of administration with the Will attached. If no further proceedings are taken in the Court below then the order of this Court directing the recall of the grant will operate as an order revoking the grant Each party will bear their own costs in this appeal.