JUDGMENT : BANERJI, J.:— This appeal arises out of an application for the execution of a decree for money obtained by the respondent “against Sham Singh, the deceased father of the appellants. The application for execution was made during the life-time of the father, and certain ancestral property, in which the sons were interested jointly with the father, was attached. The property being ancestral, execution of the decree was transferred to the Collector. During the pendency of the execution proceedings in the Court of the Collector, Sham Singh died, and the appellants were brought on the record as his legal representatives. They thereupon objected to the sale of two-thirds of the property on the ground that they were no parties to the suit in which the decree was obtained, and that consequently their interests in the ancestral property were not liable to sale. The Court below has overruled those objections. Hence this appeal. 2. It is conceded by the learned Vakil for the appellant that, if Sham Singh had been alive, the decree-holder would have been entitled to bring to sale the joint ancestral property in execution of his decree for money, and that in that case the only right of the sons would have been a right to bring a suit to have their interests in the property exempted from liability on the ground that the debt did not exist, or was of such a nature that it was not their pious duty as Hindu sons to pay it. It has been held in this Court in Lachmi Narain v. Kunji Lal, [1894] I.L.R., 16 All., 449. that a creditor of a father in a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara Law who has obtained a money decree against the father alone, cannot, after the death of the father, execute that decree against the joint family property in the hands of the sons, in as much as by right of survivorship the property has passed to the sons and can no longer be treated as assets of the father in the hands of the sons. The fact, however, that the property was in this case attached in the life-time of the father, and that the proceedings now pending are proceedings in continuation of the attachment already placed on the property, seems to us to distinguish this case from the case last mentioned. The fact, however, that the property was in this case attached in the life-time of the father, and that the proceedings now pending are proceedings in continuation of the attachment already placed on the property, seems to us to distinguish this case from the case last mentioned. If the creditor was entiled to bring the family property to sale in the life-time of the father, he was certainly entitled to attach it, as that was a necessary preliminary to the sale of the property. Having attached the property in the life-time of the father, he is entitled to bring the property to sale, although the father is now dead. Such an attachment according to the ruling of the Privy Council in the case of Surai Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Pershad Singh, [1878] I.L.R., 5 Cal., 148. conferred on the creditor the right to proceed against the property attached even after the death of the father. Under these circumstances we think the Court below was right in overruling the objections of the appellants. We accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs.