JUDGMENT Henderson, J. - On the 27th August 1903 an order was made by me, sitting on the Original Side of this Court, granting sanction to Dinobandhu Nandy, who is the Plaintiff in this suit, to prosecute Kally Kinkar Sett and Adhur Chandra Dass under sec. 193 of the Indian Penal Code. From that order an appeal was preferred, and on the 4th March 1904 the appeal was dismissed. An objection was taken, I am told, that no appeal lay from the order made by me. That point, however, was not determined and the appeal was dismissed, as it would appear, on its merits. In ordinary course, having regard to the terms of sec. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a sanction to prosecute only remains in force for six months from the date on which it was granted. The sanction granted in the present case, therefore, would in ordinary course lapse on the 26th February 1904. It was in terms granted to the Plaintiff. On the 26th February 1904 an application was made to the Chief Magistrate of Calcutta for the issue of process against Kally Kinkar Sett and Adhur Chandra Dass. That application was not made by the Plaintiff Dinobandhu Nandy himself but it was made for him by one Nritya Gopal Hoy, A form of charge was drawn up, which is exhibit B. to the petition before me, and that purports to be a charge by Nritya Gopal Roy for Dinobandhu Nandy against the two accused I have just mentioned. 2. Upon that application being made, the Chief Magistrate passed an order, in which he stated that he had been told that in the original case an appeal had been filed, and he therefore, under the circumstances, by his order directed that the proceedings should not be gone on with until after the disposal of the appeal. Subsequently on the same day a further application was made to the Magistrate that he should take cognizance of the case by issuing summons, although the hearing might be postponed. On that he directed summons to issue and he professed to do so on the ground that unless process was issued on that day the sanction would lapse. By the summons issued the accused were directed to appear on the 11th March. On issuing the summons, or shortly thereafter, the Chief Magistrate transferred the case to Mr. On that he directed summons to issue and he professed to do so on the ground that unless process was issued on that day the sanction would lapse. By the summons issued the accused were directed to appear on the 11th March. On issuing the summons, or shortly thereafter, the Chief Magistrate transferred the case to Mr. Bonnaud, the Magistrate of the Northern Division, for disposal. On the matter coming before Mr. Bonnaud, the appeal having in the meantime been dismissed, a preliminary objection was taken that, inasmuch as the sanction granted by the High Court to prosecute the two accused had been granted to Dinobandhu Nandy, the Plaintiff in this suit and the application for summons against the two accused had not been made by Dinobandhu Nandy but by Nritya Gopal for him, the Court had no jurisdiction to proceed with the case. 3. Upon this objection being taken the Magistrate of the Northern Division on the 14th of May postponed the case till the 4th of June to enable the accused to move the High Court to test the legality or otherwise of the order made by the Chief Magistrate on the 26th February directing summons to issue upon the application of Nritya Gopal Roy. 4. Subsequently applications were made on behalf of the two accused to the Bench of this Court exercising Criminal Re visional Jurisdiction, Rules were granted upon those applications on the ground that Nritya Gopal Roy was not the person to whom the sanction to prosecute was granted and that there was nothing on the record to show that he had lawful authority from Dinobandhu Nandy to prosecute the accused. 5. The learned Judges, before whom the rules were heard, did not question the proposition that a prosecution might be initiated by a person expressly authorised by one to whom sanction had been given, but they were of opinion that in such a case the authority must be "a matter of record" so that the accused might be in a position to challenge the validity of that authority before the Magistrate. It would appear that when the application was made to the Chief Magistrate for process, Nritya Gopal Roy produced no written authority and it is not suggested that he was asked to do so. It would appear that when the application was made to the Chief Magistrate for process, Nritya Gopal Roy produced no written authority and it is not suggested that he was asked to do so. But it seems to have been taken upon a statement of himself or upon that of the pleader who appeared with him, that he had such authority ; and before the Magistrate to whom the case was transferred, it seems, from what is stated in his order, to have been taken for granted that the application had been made by Nritya Gopal Roy on behalf of Dinobandhu. When a person professes to act for another it is a question of fact whether he has authority or not and in a case of this kind there can be no question that it would be open to the accused when he appeared in answer to the summons to challenge the authority of the person who had taken out process against him. The learned Judges held that no summons should have been granted to Nritya Gopal Roy without the production of his authority, and in this view, they made the rules absolute and quashed the proceedings pending in the Police Court. 6. Under these circumstances an application was made to me for an order to extend the time for taking out process under the order of the 27th August 1903, by which sanction was accorded, or in other words, to extend the period of the sanction or in the alternative for a fresh sanction to the Plaintiff to prosecute the accused Kally Kinkar Sett and Adhur Chandra Dass and a rule was granted. That rule has now come on for hearing. In the first place, it has been contended that sitting on the Original Side of this Court, as I am now, I have no power to extend the time during which the sanction shall remain in force. It is said that a Judge sitting on the Original Side of the Court is not a High Court within the meaning of the sub-sec. (6) of see 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 7. The contention is that the Words "High Court" in that sub-section must necessarily refer to the High Court in its Appellate or Revisional Jurisdiction. It is said that a Judge sitting on the Original Side of the Court is not a High Court within the meaning of the sub-sec. (6) of see 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 7. The contention is that the Words "High Court" in that sub-section must necessarily refer to the High Court in its Appellate or Revisional Jurisdiction. An appeal under the Letters Patent lies from decrees and from certain orders of a Judge sitting on the Original Side and it is therefore said that a Judge sitting on the Original Side is subordinate to the Court to which appeals from his decisions ordinarily lie. In all cases of sanction granted under sec. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code, no matter by what Court it may have been given, the only Court which has power under any circumstances to extend the time for which sanction shall remain in force is the High Court. In my opinion the proviso to sub-see. (6) only governs the sentence immediately preceding it and has no application to the sentence before that, namely, "any sanction given or refused under this sanction may be revoked or granted by any authority to which the authority giving or refusing it is subordinate." It is impossible to read the proviso as applying to this provision which deals merely with the authority which may revoke or grant a sanction which has been given or refused. Therefore it would seem that in construing the proviso in sub-sec. (6) of sec. 195, no question of subordination arises as it does under sub-sec. (7) of the same section. 8. If in this connection no question of subordination arises then, I think, there can be no doubt that a Judge sitting on the Original Side of this Court is not only the High Court but the High Court within the meaning of sub sec. (6). This view appears to be, to some extent at least, supported by the case of Faheruddin v. G. L. Garth 3 C. W. N. 91 (1898). This disposes of the first point which is taken up on this application. I hold, that sitting on the Original Side of this Court, I am competent to entertain the application before me. 9. On the merits a number of cases have been cited. In the case of Darbri Mandar v. Jagoo Lal I. L. R. 22 Cal. This disposes of the first point which is taken up on this application. I hold, that sitting on the Original Side of this Court, I am competent to entertain the application before me. 9. On the merits a number of cases have been cited. In the case of Darbri Mandar v. Jagoo Lal I. L. R. 22 Cal. 573 (1895), it was held that where 6 months had expired after the grant of sanction and no prosecution had commenced within that time it was not open to the prosecutor to procure a fresh sanction and to institute proceedings upon such fresh sanction. 10. In another case which is relied upon Joydeo Singh v. Harihar Pershad Singh I. L. R. 11 Cal. 577 (1885), the Court expressed no opinion as to whether a fresh sanction might be granted, but it held, that assuming fresh sanction might be granted, it ought not to be granted unless an explanation was given why no process was taken out within the 6 months and as in that case, no satisfactory explanation was given, the fresh sanction that had been granted was set aside. 11. In the case of Mangoram v. Behari I. L. R. 18 All. 358 (1896), where sanction under sec. 195, Criminal Procedure Code, had lapsed, not having been acted upon within 6 months, it was held that there was no bar to the grant of a fresh sanction on the same grounds if a sufficient reason for the delay was given, and in that case the learned Judge expressed his inability to concur with the decision in Darbari Mandar v. Jagoo Lal I. L. R. 22 Cal. 573 (1895), that fresh sanction could not be given if 6 months had expired after the grant of a previous sanction under sec. 195 without any prosecution having been commenced within that period. 12. These cases to which I have just referred, it is to be noted, were all decided under the Code of 1882. In that Code there was no provision, as there is in the present Criminal Procedure Code, by which the High Court may extend the time. The proviso in sub-sec. 6, sec. 195 has been introduced for the first time under the present Code, and it may be taken, I think, that in introducing this proviso the Legislature was aware of the conflict, between this Court and the Allahabad High Court. The proviso in sub-sec. 6, sec. 195 has been introduced for the first time under the present Code, and it may be taken, I think, that in introducing this proviso the Legislature was aware of the conflict, between this Court and the Allahabad High Court. It seems to me therefore that, in the present state of the law, the decision in the case of Darbari Mandar v. Jagoo Lal I. L. R. 22 Cal. 573 (1895) is not now an authority binding upon me. In my opinion, I have power to extend the time on a sufficient case being made out, or in the words of the section, for good cause shewn. 13. Before extending the time, however, I must be satisfied that a sufficient explanation has been given for the delay in applying to the Magistrate for process or for the sanction having otherwise become inoperative. The effect of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court, to which I have referred, was to get rid entirely of the proceedings, which were then proceeding before the Magistrate the ground of the decision being, as I have already stated, that it had not been made to appear at the time when Nritya Gopal Roy applied on behalf of the Plaintiff for summons that he had authority from him. With regard to the delay the explanation is that nothing was done until the 26th February because of the appeal which was then pending. It may be said that the fact of the pending of the appeal was no bar to an application being made for process. Such an application might have been made at any time after the grant of sanction but it would have been in the discretion of the Magistrate to stay proceedings pending the appeal. I am not prepared, however, to say, that in waiting till the 26th February the day before the 6 months expired, the Plaintiff was to blame. It is alleged that the reason why he waited till that time was that he did not wish to appear to be harassing the accused by making an application which might, if the appeal should have been allowed, have been fruitless, and I see no reason why I should not accept that statement. It is alleged that the reason why he waited till that time was that he did not wish to appear to be harassing the accused by making an application which might, if the appeal should have been allowed, have been fruitless, and I see no reason why I should not accept that statement. It now appears that Nritya Gopal Roy had been appointed the am-muktear of Dinobandhu Nandy by a power-of-attorney executed as far back as the 27th March 1899. This power-of-attorney, which gives him very extensive powers, (amongst other powers) authorized him to appear in various Courts and offices in the town of Calcutta and to sign on his behalf plaints and petitions and to appoint pleaders and muktears. It is true it was not produced before the Magistrate when the original application was made for process and because it was not then produced and recorded it has been held by the learned Judges of this Court that the Magistrate could not legally issue the summons. It must, therefore, if that be the law, as to which I express no opinion, be taken that no application, that is to say, that no proper application was made upon the sanction within the 6 months. But it has been distinctly held, or at all events not questioned, that if he had sufficient authority, and it had been recorded, the Magistrate would have been competent to issue process. In my opinion the power-of-attorney, to which I have referred, would have been, if produced sufficient authority to Nritya Gopal to make the application which he did. 14. Having regard to all the circumstances, I am satisfied that the Plaintiff really desired within the time to proceed upon the sanction which he originally obtained from this Court, That his efforts have been infructuous was due merely to the fact that his am-muktear Nritya Gopal Roy, when he applied to the Magistrate, bad not armed himself with the power-of-attorney which he held for his master. There is evidence that in the Police Court it is usual to allow applications to be made by agents for their principals even when the authority is not at the time produced. 15. There is evidence that in the Police Court it is usual to allow applications to be made by agents for their principals even when the authority is not at the time produced. 15. On the whole, it seems to me a sufficient explanation of the delay and other matters in this case has been given and I see no reason why I should not extend the time during which the sanction should remain in force. It is true that this sanction lapsed on the 27th of February last but that circumstance does not, in my opinion, debar me from acting under sub-sec. (6) of sec, 195, Criminal Procedure Code, and extending the time. 16. In two cases of Karuppana v. Sinna Gounden I. L. R. 16 Mad. 480 (1902) and In re Muth Kudum I. L. R. 26 mad. 191 (1902) respectively, the time was extended under somewhat similar circumstances, in each case after the period of 6 months had elapsed. 17. I shall extend the time until the 26th August. The rule therefore is made absolute on these particular terms, With costs. Order to be drawn up at once.